L'efficacité des banques, structure actionnariale et les réglementations au Vietnam by Pham, Ha
L’efficacite´ des banques, structure actionnariale et les
re´glementations au Vietnam
Ha Pham
To cite this version:
Ha Pham. L’efficacite´ des banques, structure actionnariale et les re´glementations au Vietnam.
Economies et finances. Universite´ de Limoges, 2015. Franc¸ais. <NNT : 2015LIMO0046>.
<tel-01223478>
HAL Id: tel-01223478
https://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-01223478
Submitted on 2 Nov 2015
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
 
 
UNIVERSITE DE LIMOGES 
ECOLE DOCTORALE Sociétés et Organisations n°526 
Faculté de Droit et des Sciences Economiques 
Laboratoire d’Analyse et de Prospective Economiques (LAPE) - EA 1088 
 
Thèse 
pour obtenir le grade de 
Docteur de l’Université de Limoges 
Discipline/ Spécialité : Sciences Économiques 
 
Présentée et soutenue publiquement par 
Ha PHAM 
Limoges, le 8 Juin 2015 
BANK EFFICIENCY, OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE  
AND REGULATIONS IN VIETNAM 
 
Thèse dirigée par Mr. Amine TARAZI, Professeur, Université de Limoges  
et Mme. Isabelle DISTINGUIN, Maître de Conférences, Université de 
Limoges 
 
JURY: 
Rapporteurs: 
- Mr. Bill FRANCIS, Warren H. and Pauline U. Bruggeman Distinguished Professor, 
Rensselaer, New York, USA 
- Mr. Philip MOLYNEUX, Professor, Bangor University, UK 
Suffragants : 
- Mr. Iftekhar HASAN, Gerald Corrigan Professor, Fordham University, New York 
- Mr. Alain SAUVIAT, Professeur, Université de Limoges 
- Mr. Amine TARAZI, Professeur, Université de Limoges 
Membre invité : 
- Mme. Isabelle DISTINGUIN, Maître de Conférences, Université de Limoges 
 
  
i 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
« La faculté n’entend donner aucune  
approbation ou improbation aux opinions émises  
dans les thèses ; ces opinions doivent être  
considérées comme propres à leurs auteurs. »  
ii 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
To complete this dissertation, I have received many supports from my professors and 
colleagues. First at all, I would like to express the deepest appreciation to my advisors- Amine 
Tarazi and Isabelle Distinguin for their experts, sincere and valuable guidance extended to 
me. 
I also would like to express my attitude to thank Professor Bill Francis, Professor Philip 
Molyneux, Professor Iftekhar Hasan and Professor Alain Sauviat who do me a honor of 
accepting to be members of my dissertation committees. 
My researches were supported by the Region of Linousin, France- which has granted a fund 
for me to conduct this dissertation. I place on record, my sincere gratitude to all members of 
the Regional council of Region of Limousin.  
I wish to express my sincere thanks to the members of the Ecole Doctorale for providing me 
all facilities for preparing my trip to France as well as during my time here. Specially, I am 
grateful to Claire Buisson and Céline Meslier- who have provided all supports for me to come 
to France. 
I take this opportunity to record my sincere thanks to all the member of the research center- 
LAPE- for their help and discussion to this dissertation. I also thank all classmates and PhD 
students for their sharing, conservation and help for the administrative procedure these years, 
Édouard Cottin, Nadia Zedek, Noma Ziadek, Cécile Casteuble, Clovis Rugemintwari, Irwan 
Trinigroho, Pejman Abedifar, Bowo Setiyono, Ruth Tacneng, Pierre-Nicolas Rehault, Kevin 
Spinassou and other PhD students. 
This research is impossible to finish if I have not had supports from my friends from Vietnam. 
I take on record, my sense of gratitude to my cousins for all connections with the State Bank 
of Vietnam. I also thank my friends in Baoviet Securities and Sacombank-SBS securities 
companies for their sharing. In addition, a thank to one and all who, directly or indirectly, 
have lent their helping in this venture. 
Finally, I thank my family for their unceasing encouragement and support, in particular my 
parent for their patience and sacrifices during my time in France.  
  
iii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In memory of my brother, Thai 
  
iv 
 
SUMMARY 
 
INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER .............................................................................................. 1 
CHAPTER 1   THE IMPACT OF ECONOMIC REFORMS AND OWNERSHIP 
STRUCTURE ON BANK EFFICIENCY .............................................................................. 7 
1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 8 
2. Overview of the banking system in Vietnam .............................................................................. 9 
3. Related Literature ..................................................................................................................... 11 
4. Methodology ............................................................................................................................ 13 
5. Data and variables .................................................................................................................... 15 
6. Results ...................................................................................................................................... 21 
7. Robustness checks .................................................................................................................... 30 
8. Conclusion................................................................................................................................ 30 
CHAPTER 2    BANK NET INTEREST MARGIN, OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND 
INTEREST RATE REGULATION BY THE CENTRAL BANK .................................... 42 
1. Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 43 
2. Background and Literature review ........................................................................................... 44 
3. Data and Methodology ............................................................................................................. 49 
4. Results ...................................................................................................................................... 59 
5. Conclusion................................................................................................................................ 69 
CHAPTER 3   BANK CAPITAL AND BANK LENDING CHANNEL ........................... 98 
1. Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 99 
2. Monetary policy and capital requirements in Vietnam ........................................................... 100 
3. Related literature and methodology ........................................................................................ 101 
4. Data ........................................................................................................................................ 107 
5. Results .................................................................................................................................... 109 
6. Conclusion.............................................................................................................................. 120 
CONCLUDING CHAPTER ................................................................................................ 122 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................ 126 
Introduction Chapter 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER 
 
  
Introduction Chapter 
2 
 
 
In Vietnam, in the context of removing the protection ensured to domestic banks and 
of opening the financial sector for foreign investors, there are many questions on the banking 
system such as: how do banks operate under the umbrella of the government? Does the 
presence of foreign ownership contribute to improve bank performance? How does the central 
bank prevent excessive risk-taking of bank executives? Those questions are motivations for 
our thesis to analyze bank operations and efficiency in the context of the presence of foreign 
investors and of different economic conditions as well as of the interventions of the central 
bank. This dissertation contains three chapters that are outlined hereafter. The first chapter 
attempts to measure and explain bank efficiency of domestic commercial banks in Vietnam in 
a decade of reforms and restructuring of the financial system. The second chapter discusses 
how banks operate in Vietnam after the banking law has been enacted and the involvement of 
the central bank into bank operations through its instruments. This chapter analyzes the 
determinants of net interest margins and the interest rate monitoring policy by the central 
bank. The last chapter aims to analyze the bank lending channel and the influence of bank 
capital on the response of bank lending channel to monetary policy and economic conditions. 
More precisely, the motivations, research questions and the contributions to the 
literature of each of these three chapters are briefly presented as follows. 
Chapter 1: The impact of economic reforms and ownership structure on bank efficiency 
In transitional economies, the financial market is young and less experienced 
compared with developed economies. The transformation from a central-oriented to a market-
oriented economy requires the central governments to reduce their orders and ease their 
interventions into the operations at firm levels through programs of reforms. The reforms of 
transitional economies are different from country to country but the banking system is 
recognized as a primary sector to reform. The reforms of the banking system in Vietnam has 
caused and continues to cause issues; and the limitation of foreign investors or the delay in the 
privatization program can affect the development of the banking system. A critical question is 
whether bank ownership has an impact on bank efficiency in Vietnam. More precisely, does 
the presence of foreign shareholders improve bank efficiency and have the reforms engaged in 
the mid 2000's lead to an improvement in Vietnamese banks' efficiency?  
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In this chapter, we examine the efficiency of Vietnamese commercial banks and its 
determinants during the 2002-2009 period. There are only few studies that focus on bank 
efficiency in Vietnam and they consider a shorter period. The contribution of this chapter is 
first to provide a deeper analysis on bank efficiency in Vietnam from 2002 to 2009, a period 
during which important reforms have been implemented. Indeed, Vietnam engaged in 
financial market liberalization and reduced the support to domestic commercial banks based 
on agreements with WTO. We therefore look into how these reforms have affected bank 
efficiency. Second, we analyze the impact of bank ownership on efficiency. As Vietnam has 
progressively removed state ownership and barriers to foreign investors, it is important to 
study whether private ownership positively impacts bank efficiency and whether foreign 
ownership (through the presence of at least one foreign shareholder on the board of managers 
or directors) has improved bank efficiency.  
The results show that the efficiency of Vietnamese commercial banks differs 
depending on bank ownership type; state-owned banks exhibit the lowest efficiency levels in 
comparison with private banks and banks with foreign shareholders. Since the implementation 
of more stringent minimum capital rules, bank capitalization has also been an important driver 
of bank efficiency. Our results have several policy implications and highlight the need to 
reduce the involvement of the government in the banking industry, and to remove barriers to 
entry for foreign investors and raise bank capitalization. 
 
Chapter 2: Bank net interest margins, ownership structure and interest rate regulation by 
the central bank  
In this chapter, we study banks' interest margin which is also considered as an 
indicator of bank performance. The chapter focuses on analyzing how banks perform their 
intermediation role under the context of various ownership structures and the effects of the 
central bank’s interaction with commercial banks’ operations. Influenced by the centrally 
oriented market, the ownership structure is the most important concern in the Vietnamese 
banking market as foreign entry has been eased recently, the state-owned banks have a crucial 
role and dominate the banking market and private banks have less experience in risk 
management. Consequently, banks set their interest margins differently according to their 
ownership.   
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For economic purposes, the central banks employ tools to control the prices of funding 
sources and the money supply in the economy. Beyond that, they also have to supervise the 
smooth operations of the financial system. Within modern nations, the primary tool to achieve 
these goals is open market operations. This tool is to manage the quantity of money directly in 
circulation through the trading of various financial instruments. But for a developing country, 
the central bank might employ other tools; it can use the common tools such as increasing the 
interest rate by fiat, reducing the monetary base or increasing the reserve requirement. 
Mlachila and Chirwa (2002) argue that “the removal of credit controls in the developing 
countries may worsen the quality of loan” and it could increase the risks of systemic crises. 
Under the traditional tools, central banks seem to force banks to follow their orders and tend 
to affect directly bank operations aiming to keep banks under control. If a tool is not able to 
force banks as the central banks’ expectations, those central banks build other tools and 
require banks to fulfill their requirements. Generally speaking, the central banks should 
strengthen their abilities to ensure financial stability and have a major and independent voice 
in the financial stability policy, but there are different situations from country to country to 
achieve that role. 
Our work is the first one to focus on net interest margins (NIM) in Vietnam by 
considering  a sample of 49 banks from 1998 to 2011 and to emphasize that NIM are 
determined by bank specific factors but also by other monetary policy and macro-economic 
factors. We specifically focus on how NIM are affected by the central bank through its 
interest rate policy. This chapter focuses on the method developed by Ho and Saunders (1981) 
which particularly fits the case of Vietnam. On the one hand, banks provide savings services 
and other related services to customers under a certain interest rate and charge service fees to 
their customers (on the supply side). On the other hand, banks lend their available sources of 
funds to borrowers (demand side) and apply fees to monitor and to prevent any loss, the 
spread of “prices” between borrowers and depositors standing for banks’ compensation. This 
framework illustrates that banks’ main business is to collect deposits and grant loans and that 
other non-interest generating bank operations (commission and fee activities and trading 
activities) are much less developed that in other countries.  
The results show that only private and state-owned banks transfer their operational 
costs to their clients. Bank capitalization which reflects bank risk aversion is a significant 
determinant for foreign and state owned banks only in presence of interest rate regulation; 
these banks tend to pass the high capital cost to customers. We also show that, in absence of 
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interest rate control, foreign banks set higher margins when they take higher credit risk while 
in presence of interest rate regulation private banks cope with higher credit risk without being 
able to raise their margin accordingly.   
  
Chapter 3: Bank capital and bank lending channel 
Capitalization is important for banks in an emerging economy since it is an indicator 
to ensure the banks' capacities to provide credits to customers and can be linked to some bank 
prudential ratios  (Ehmann et al., 2001, Gambacorta and Mistrulli., 2004, and Van-den-
Heuvel, 2006). In the presence of perfect capital markets, banks could raise funds 
continuously to adjust to the demand for loans and to comply with prudential regulation. But 
because of financial constraints on imperfect capital markets, banks face difficulties in 
increasing their funds (debt or equity). Consequently, bank lending capacities are reduced. 
Moreover, bank prudential regulations require banks to fund a certain proportion of their 
loans with equity capital. Hence, bank equity is expected to play an important role in the bank 
lending channel.  
Although Vietnamese regulators have not implemented the Basel accords strictly 
speaking, the central bank imposes minimum capital rules requiring banks to raise their equity 
level and capital ratios to prevent excessive risk-taking and to stabilize the banking system. 
Similarly to other transition economies, Vietnam has not developed its capital market and 
banks therefore face severe difficulties to raise funds (foreign debt and equity) to fulfill the 
capital requirements. Consequently the banking system can face difficulties if banks cannot 
increase their capital and reduce their loans to maintain a rational proportion of capital 
prudential ratio. In somehow, the economy can be altered if enterprises have difficulties to 
access loans from banks and have to look for more expensive financial sources. The aim of 
this chapter is to analyze the response of bank lending to monetary policy and also economic 
conditions changes and specifically the influence played by bank equity in such responses in 
the context of the Vietnamese banking system. This issue is of particular interest for a 
transition economy as introducing more stringent capital rules might jeopardize investment 
and growth.  
Our contributions in this chapter are the following. First, this is the first study on the 
role played by bank equity in the bank lending channel in Vietnam, a transition economy 
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where the banking system has been affected by the centrally oriented regime for a long time. 
Second, it provides a deep analysis of the monetary transmission mechanism by using 
individual bank data in Vietnam with more insightful implications than the aggregate data 
used in earlier studies.  
The results indicate that all types of monetary policy shocks have a negative effect on 
lending, but that an increase in bank liquidity leads to a lower reduction in loan growth. Bank 
size also has a negative influence on bank lending. By contrast, liquidity has a positive 
influence on lending. Finally, economic shocks are identified as important factors of bank 
loan responses but banks with lower capitalization are less influenced by the business cycle. 
Hence, the introduction of stricter capital rules can actually be questioned.   
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THE IMPACT OF ECONOMIC REFORMS AND OWNERSHIP 
STRUCTURE ON BANK EFFICIENCY
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
1 This chapter is an article co-authored with Isabelle Distinguin titled “The impact of economic reforms and 
ownership structure on bank efficiency: the case of Vietnam” 
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1. Introduction 
 
The banking sector in transition economies has changed dramatically over the last decades 
due to deep reforms engaged in those countries. In Vietnam, following the transition from a 
centrally planned economy to a market economy, the banking system has been transformed 
from a mono-state owned banking system (the central bank also acted as a commercial bank) 
to a commercial-oriented system. However, the banking system has remained under the 
umbrella of the government. For example, the government has protected the domestic 
commercial banks by imposing limits to foreign shareholding and by limiting branches of 
foreign banks until 2010. Moreover, foreign investors have been allowed to hold only a low 
percentage of shares in a commercial bank (a foreign investor cannot hold more than 20% of 
the total shares of a given entity and total foreign investors’ shares must be under 30%).  
Consequently, the liberalization of the financial market has been hindered, domestic banks 
have faced more difficulties to diversify their shareholders to gain benefits from foreign 
investors and to raise their financial resources. Their operations have not been transparent and 
have led to an inefficient allocation of capital since they have mainly focused on serving state-
owned enterprises (SOE) and government development programs. Besides, Vietnamese 
commercial banks took advantage of credit expansion fuelled by low interest rates and the 
economic boom during the first-half of 2000s whilst remaining inefficient.  
Thus, under the agreements of Vietnam and the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
Vietnam had to improve the efficiency of the State’s investments. From 2005, Vietnam has 
engaged in a privatization program of state-owned banks and has progressively removed 
barriers to entry for foreign investors. A critical question is whether bank ownership has an 
impact on bank efficiency in Vietnam. More precisely, does the presence of foreign 
shareholders improve bank efficiency and have the reforms engaged in the mid 2000's lead to 
an improvement in Vietnamese banks' efficiency?  
In this chapter, we examine the efficiency of Vietnamese commercial banks and its 
determinants during the 2002-2009 period. There are only few studies that focus on bank 
efficiency in Vietnam and they consider a shorter period. The contribution of this chapter is 
first to provide a deeper analysis on bank efficiency in Vietnam from 2002 to 2009, a period 
Chapter 1 
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during which important reforms have been implemented. Indeed, Vietnam engaged in 
financial market liberalization and reduced the support to domestic commercial banks based 
on agreements with WTO. We therefore look into how these reforms have affected bank 
efficiency. Second, we analyze the impact of bank ownership on efficiency. As Vietnam has 
progressively removed state ownership and barriers to foreign investors, it is important to 
study whether private ownership positively impacts bank efficiency and whether foreign 
ownership (through the presence of at least one foreign shareholder on the board of managers 
or directors) has improved bank efficiency.  
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the banking 
industry in Vietnam. Section 3 introduces related literature and section 4 describes the 
methodology employed in this article. In section 5, we present the data and the variables. 
Results and robustness checks are presented in section 6 and 7. Section 8 concludes the 
chapter. 
2. Overview of the banking system in Vietnam 
 
After the transition from central planning to a market oriented system initiated in 
1986, Vietnam faced a lot of difficulties (low productivity, hyperinflation, high deficit and 
inefficiency of monetary policy); this situation urged Vietnam to reform the financial sector 
and to reduce the State’s investments in state-owned enterprises. In 1989, the two-tier banking 
system replaced the mono-tier system. The State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) became solely a 
central bank instead of playing both the roles of a central bank and of a commercial bank. The 
commercial banking function was transferred to state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs). 
These banks have been supervised by the SBV through its central bank’s function. The 
SOCBs’ operations were decided by the government and served principally state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) or government plans (for example, any operation related to foreign trade 
was the responsibility of the Bank for Foreign and Trade of Vietnam-Vietcombank; or 
Agribank mainly served in rural areas and supported the agricultural sector and some poverty 
reduction programs).  
As a result of the reform of the banking system initiated in 1989, the government also 
allowed the establishment of other types of financial institutions such as credit cooperatives 
and private and joint-stock commercial banks (JSCB)2. The reform also allowed limited 
                                                             
2
 JSCB have both public and private shareholders. They are specialized in lending to SME and retail clients. 
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foreign bank presence through joint-venture banks and foreign bank branches which 
nevertheless faced restrictions in their activities. From 1989, the financial sector has 
experienced a boom followed by a burst of financial institutions. There have been thousands 
of newly founded credit cooperatives (around 7,180) but they have been shut down rapidly 
mainly due to their risky capital structure, their weak professionalism, and the inappropriate 
monitoring from the authorities (Vuong, 2010). Consequently, in 1993, there remained around 
750 credit cooperatives. Some credit cooperatives have been restructured and became private 
and joint-stock commercial banks (JSCB). Thus, the number of commercial banks 
significantly increased between 1991 and 1993 (from 5 banks in 1991 to 48 banks in 1993, 
including 4 state-commercial banks). However, most of them were unprofitable and 
accumulated non-performing loans granted to SOEs resulting from inefficient investments 
(Pham and Vuong, 2009, and Vuong, 2010).  
In such a context, the government aimed to improve banks’ capacities and 
competitiveness through reforms of joint-stock banks in 1999 then SOCBs in 2001, and 
allowed some international institutions (including the International Monetary Fund-IMF and 
the World Bank-WB) to invest in private banks under a limitation of stakes. These reforms 
aimed to recapitalize banks, to enhance their profitability and to increase transparency. 
At the end of 2005, to speed up the reforms and improve the performance of 
Vietnamese banks, the government has launched a program, namely “Banking Sector Reform 
Roadmap” to privatize SOCBs, to improve the competitiveness of JSCBs and to apply 
international prudential standards (Basel framework) to the banking system in Vietnam. 
Besides, Vietnam has engaged in removing barriers to entry of foreign investors. Indeed, the 
reforms and the economic boom initiated in 2006, when Vietnam became a member of WTO, 
required a reduction of government involvement in the economy and the access of many 
sectors to foreign investors. The government aimed to equitize SOCBs or partially privatize 
them and, to support this process; it made the entry of foreign investors easier. Until 2004, 
foreign banks were only allowed to take a minority share in joint venture banks and establish 
branches. With the implementation of the credit institutions law of 2004, foreign banks have 
been allowed to set up a commercial bank in Vietnam. A foreign bank had a right to deposit 
under 650% of their chartered capital from 2007, raised to 800% in 2008, 900% in 2009, 
1000% in 2010 and has had the same right as a domestic bank since 2011. Regarding the 
investment of foreign investors – under the government’s decision of 2007 - the total shares of 
foreign shareholders cannot exceed 30% of bank shares and one foreign investor cannot hold 
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more than 20% of bank shares. To improve the competitiveness of Vietnam's domestic banks, 
foreign presence increased. In November 2006, the government also raised the minimum 
notional capital levels required for all credit institutions. It required all commercial banks to 
hold at least VND 3 trillion (USD 143 million) in capital, up from the prior minimum of VND 
70 billion (USD 3.3 million). In October 2010, it also increased the required minimum capital 
adequacy ratio from 8% to 9%. 
3. Related Literature 
 
There has been a large number of studies on bank (in)efficiency in developed and 
developing countries (Weill, 2003; Bonin, Hasan et al., 2005; Havrylchyk. 2006; Tochkov 
and Nenovsky, 2011; Sun, Harimaya et al., 2013). Studies on bank efficiency in transition 
economies mainly focus on ownership structure (state, private or public ownership) and on 
the effects of economic reforms.  
Ownership structure is considered as an important determinant of bank efficiency since it 
is related to bank transparency, operational and risk management, especially in transition 
economies (Hasan and Marton, 2000; Kraft, Hofler et al., 2002; Weill, 2002; Poghosyan and 
Borovička, 2007; Anca, Laurent et al., 2008; Karas, Schoors et al., 2008). The rationale is that 
young banks and state-owned banks have less experience in risk management and other 
managerial skills. Penetration of foreign investors is often restricted in transition countries and 
bank managers tend to protect themselves by delaying the privatization process since they 
lose some power in the bank if it is privatized. 
Reforms in transition economies require central governments to reduce their investments 
in firms and financial institutions. A privatization program is an opportunity for banks (firms) 
to diversify their ownership structure, gain independence and transparency in their business 
which is expected to improve their efficiency. Allowing the participation of foreign investors 
also provides more opportunities for banks to seek financial resources more easily. Such an 
argument is developed by Grigorian and Manole (2002). They explain that banks controlled 
by boards which have foreign investors/members have more opportunities to improve risk 
management and operational techniques by learning from foreign partners. Using a sample of 
banks from 28 developing countries, Berger et al (2004) find that foreign banks have the 
highest profit efficiency followed by private domestic banks and then state-owned banks. 
Bonin et al (2005) also show from experiences of privatization in six transition countries in 
Chapter 1 
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Central and Southeastern Europe that foreign-owned banks are generally the most efficient 
banks, government-owned banks being the least efficient ones. Moreover, the involvement of 
strategic foreign owners in the privatization process is also expected to improve bank 
efficiency. Manthos and Nikolaos (2009) study how deregulation of banking system 
influences bank efficiency. They analyze bank efficiency in 10 transition economies in 
Europe during reform period (1994-2005). They show that reforms give more opportunities 
for banks to improve their efficiency and their performance.  
Using a single country to analyze bank efficiency is spreading in the literature to avoid 
any bias stemming from different economic conditions and to focus on some specific 
conditions prevalent in a given country, especially in developing or transition economies such 
as Chile, Thailand, Argentina, Philippine, Turkey or Russia (Altunbas, Liu et al., 2000; Bos 
and Kool, 2004; Berger, Hasan et al., 2007; Tochkov and Nenovsky, 2011). As in other 
transition economies, the banking industry in Vietnam is young and less developed. But there 
are only few studies on bank (in)efficiency in Vietnam (Nguyen, 2007; Ngo, 2010; Vu and 
Turnell, 2010; Minh, Khanh et al., 2012; Ngo, 2012).   
Studies on bank efficiency in Vietnam consider a short time period which does not allow 
an analysis of the impact of the reforms of the mid 2000's. Considering the DEA approach, 
Nguyen (2007) analyzes a sample of 13 banks from 2001 to 2003 to estimate cost efficiency. 
Minh et al. (2012) focus on analyzing the super-efficiency of a single state-owned bank with 
125 branches during 2007-2010.  Vu and Turnell (2010), using the SFA method, estimate cost 
efficiency of 56 Vietnamese banks from 2000 to 2006. Considering the impact of bank 
ownership, they find no significant difference between the mean efficiency of commercial 
banks, joint-venture commercial banks and foreign banks from 2000 to 2006. They justify the 
use of a cost function by the fact that before any gain or profit has been generated, costs have 
increased in the first half of 2000s. However, profit efficiency is more appropriate as it 
combines both costs and revenues in the measurement of efficiency. As emphasized by 
Maudos et al. (2002) analyzing cost efficiency gives only a partial vision whereas profit 
efficiency is a more important source of information. Indeed, it embodies revenues and loan 
performance, rather than just costs or inputs. 
Thus, in this chapter, we add to the literature on several points. First, we consider a wider 
concept of efficiency by measuring profit efficiency rather than cost efficiency. Second, as 
important reforms have been implemented in Vietnam in the mid-2000s, we study the impact 
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of these reforms on bank efficiency by considering a study period that enables us to run our 
analysis before and after the implementation of these reforms. Finally, we study whether 
foreign ownership and private ownership lead to higher efficiency than state ownership. This 
is important as Vietnam has progressively engaged in a privatization program and in 
removing barriers to entry for foreign investors. 
4. Methodology 
 
In this study, we divide the analysis of bank efficiency into two stages. In the first stage, 
we compute bank efficiency scores and compare these scores for private, state-owned and 
foreign banks. In the second stage, we analyze the determinants of bank efficiency focusing 
on ownership variables to analyze whether the existence of foreign owners leads to better 
efficiency.  
4.1 Bank efficiency 
 
We analyze the efficiency of Vietnamese commercial banks by estimating inefficiency 
scores from a profit function using the intermediation approach. Efficiency measures how 
close to the maximum profit a bank is and the maximum value is determined by best 
performers in the sample. We follow Humphrey and Pulley (1997) by assuming that banks 
have some market power in output markets. Thus, profits are a function of both input prices 
and output quantities but banks choose input quantities and output prices. Because of the 
deregulation of interest rates and imperfect competitive markets, the intermediation approach 
is suitable to analyze how banks control input prices and output quantities to optimize their 
profits. The analysis of profit efficiency shows how banks can reach the maximum profit.  
To measure productive efficiency, two common methods are applied i.e. data 
development and stochastic frontier analysis (DEA and SFA, respectively). We use SFA 
rather than DEA because it controls for measurement error and other random effects (Lensink 
et al., 2008; Matoušek and Taci, 2004). More precisely, we employ the Battese and Coelli 
(1995)’s methodology to calculate the time-varying technical efficiency scores. One of the 
advantages of this methodology is that it estimates the cost frontier and the coefficient of the 
efficiency variables simultaneously contrary to the two-step SFA approach developed in 
Aigner, Lovell et al. (1977)3. Besides, it can be estimated for an unbalanced panel and there is 
                                                             
3
 Wang and Schmidt (2002) point out that this two-step approach renders biased coefficients. 
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no assumption made on the time-functional form contrary to Kumbhakar and Hjalmarsson 
(1995) or Battese and Coelli (1992). 
We estimate efficiency levels by specifying the commonly-used translog functional 
form and we model the bank as an intermediary who collects funds from savers and allocates 
those funds to the most profitable projects at minimum costs following Humphrey and Pulley 
(1997). Based on Battese and Coelli (1995), the profit functional form is defined as: 
 
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with lk kl  and nm mn  . 
where: it - profit, itY - bank output: total loans and other earning assets, itW -input prices of 
banks: namely, price of labor (or headcount expenses to total assets) and price of funds 
(interest expenses to total deposits) and itz : fixed netput (fixed assets) in which i: bank and t: 
time.  
The disturbance term is: 
itit it
e v u  with 2~ (0, )it vv iidN   a random noise and 
2~ (Z , )
it it u
u iidN   is truncated at zero and stands for inefficiency. Efficiency is calculated as 
TE=exp(- itu ).  
The homogenous conditions are defined as (Bergman 1997): 
i. Inputs: 3 4 1   , 33 44 34 0      and 13 23 14 24 61 62 0            
ii. Outputs: 1 2 1   , 11 22 12 0      and 13 23 14 24 63 64 0            
the restrictions in (i) and (ii) are to impose linear homogeneity. The restrictions of 3 4 1    
and 1 2 1    show that banks have constant return to scale in input or in output during the 
period under study, respectively. 
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4.2 Determinants of bank efficiency 
 
The model to estimate the determinants of bank efficiency is: 
0it m mit n nt iteff X Z        
with eff: bank efficiency, mitX : bank-specific variable m of bank i at year t; ntZ :macro-
variable n at year t. m  and n  are coefficients of bank specific and macro variables, and it
is the error term. 
Since efficiency scores are bounded between 0 and 1, we apply an estimation 
procedure for fractional dependent variables (the dependent variable is defined in the range of 
0 and 1 or from 0% to 100%). More precisely, we apply the methodology proposed by Papke 
and Wooldridge (1996) instead of using a log-odd procedure in a logistic function. Papke and 
Wooldridge (1996) argue that the estimation of proportion based on log-odd procedure could 
generate some problems if the dependent variable is not a proportion from a discrete group 
size or if any observation takes the value of 0 or 1. The technique developed by Papke and 
Wooldridge (1996) is based on the quasi-likelihood method. Based on McCullagh and Nelder 
(1989), the estimation procedure of the parameters is to maximize a log-likelihood Bernouilli 
function. The advantage of this methodology is that the estimator is consistent and 
asymptotically normal for any distribution of y conditional on x. The standard errors of   are 
estimated as in Papke and Wooldridge (1996). 
5. Data and variables 
 
Annual bank reports are collected from the Central Bank of Vietnam and completed 
with Bankscope. Macro variables are collected from the general statistic office of Vietnam 
(GSO) and the State Bank of Vietnam. Data run from 2002 (after the reforms of the SOCBs to 
improve the banking system) to the end of 2009 (before foreign banks and their branches 
could access and provide financial services as domestic banks). The sample includes 37 
commercial banks operating in Vietnam (Table 1). There are five state-owned banks and 32 
private banks. Due to the privatization process, two state-owned banks were privatized over 
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the 2007-2008 period and one of these two banks had foreign shareholders in 2008
4
. There are 
16 private banks with foreign ownership. More precisely, there are four joint-venture banks, 
ten banks with foreign shareholders from 2006 and two banks with international organization-
shareholders (IMF and World-bank). The sample represents more than 84% of the aggregate 
bank assets of the banking industry in Vietnam (OECD, 2013).  
 
Table 1: Distribution of banks by type of ownership 
 
Type of banks Number of 
banks 
Remark 
State-owned banks 5 2 banks were IPOs in 2008 in which 1 bank was 
privatized with foreign shareholders*. 1 bank was 
privatized without foreign shareholders. 
Private banks 32 Among these private banks there are 10 banks with 
foreign shareholders* since 2006, 4 joint-venture banks 
between foreign banks and state-owned banks/partners 
and 2 banks with international organization 
shareholders (IMF and World Bank). 
* Banks with foreign shareholders are defined as banks that have at least one foreign member in the board of 
managers or directors.  
 
5.1 Bank efficiency 
 
The log of Profit-before-tax (pbt) is considered as the dependent variable; independent 
variables are outputs defined in log terms which are log of loans (y1) and of other earning 
assets (y2) and inputs which are the price of funds (w1) and the price of labor (w2) (see Table 
2). Since most of Vietnamese banks are young and need to invest in infrastructure and in other 
fixed assets (ATM, branches, core-banking system…) hence reducing banks’ capital 
resources, we define net fixed assets as netput. It represents the long-term commitment of 
banks to their customers and the willingness of banks to improve their performance. Net fixed 
assets will have two-side effects on banks’ profit, a negative effect for the short-term; banks 
have less resources left for loans and have to spend more to maintain or to train their 
employees (new branches, new machines, new technology). But in the long-term, if an 
                                                             
4 To test the robustness of our results, we have also performed our analysis excluding these two state-owned 
banks after their privatization. See section 7. 
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investment is a right decision, it improves bank operation and it is profitable (positive effect 
on bank profit).  
Lack of data from Bankscope and from annual statements of banks to calculate the 
price of labor in individual bank leads us to use the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets 
as a proxy of the price of labor (w1). The expected relationship with efficiency is ambiguous. 
For the amount of total assets, a bank that has a lower ratio of personnel expenses to total 
assets could generate more profit and thus have higher efficiency. However, bank efficiency 
should be higher in presence of better skilled employees that are more expensive. In that case, 
there could be a positive relationship between personnel expenses and efficiency. The price of 
funds is the ratio of total interest expenses to total customers deposits (w2). This variable 
measures the amount that a bank has to pay for one unit of input (it includes deposit interests 
and commission fees). If a bank has a lower cost of funds, its profit should be higher and its 
inefficiency lower. 
 
Table 2: Variables of profit function 
 
Variables Description Expected relations 
Pbt Log of profit before tax  
y1 Log of loans + 
y2 Log of other earning assets + 
w1 Log of personal expenses to total assets (price of 
labors) 
- 
w2 Log of total interest expenses to total customer 
deposits and short funds (price of funds) 
- 
Z Log of fixed assets + or - 
 
5.2 Determinants of bank efficiency 
 
To explain bank efficiency, we select several bank-specific variables. The log of total 
assets is used as a proxy of bank size (lgTA). It captures the possible cost advantages 
associated with size and should be positively related to bank efficiency. The ratio of loans to 
deposits (Loan2deposit) stands for bank liquidity position and is expected to have a negative 
impact on bank efficiency. The ratio of equity to total assets (CAP) measures capital 
adequacy. The link with bank efficiency is not clear cut. On the one hand, higher capital ratios 
can reduce moral hazard between shareholders and debt holders by increasing shareholders 
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incentives to control risk. This increase in monitoring should have a positive effect on bank's 
profitability. Using a sample of European banks, Fiordelisi, Marques-Ibanez and Molyneux 
(2011) find that better capitalized banks are more efficient. In the Chinese case, Pessarossi 
and Weill (2013) also find that higher capital ratios are associated with higher bank 
efficiency. On the other hand, higher capital ratios can worsen the agency problems between 
managers and shareholders and reduce bank profitability. On a sample of US banks, Berger 
and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006) find that higher capital ratios have a negative impact on 
efficiency. In our study, this variable aims to capture the impact of the reform implemented in 
2006 that raised the minimum capital required
5
. 
We also introduce dummy variables to take into account bank ownership and the 
presence of foreign shareholders. More precisely, the dummy variable PRIVATE takes the 
value of one if the bank has at least two partners but no foreign member on the board of 
managers or directors and zero otherwise. The dummy variable FOREIGN takes the value of 
one for banks that have at least one foreign member on the board of managers or directors and 
zero otherwise. Thus, the interpretation of these dummy variables is made in comparison with 
state owned banks. Private banks face more competition than state-owned banks,  but private 
banks can be managed more efficiently than state-owned banks that have complicated 
managerial structures. The existence of foreign members on the board of managers or 
directors should improve risk management and managerial skills and hence contribute to 
higher efficiency. Thus, in line with Weill (2003), Rodrigo and Marcos (2007) and Berger et 
al. (2007), we expect the dummy variables FOREIGN and PRIVATE to positively affect bank 
efficiency. 
For the macro-variables, we use the growth rate of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 
inflation (INF) as in Fethi et al (2008) or Manthos and Nikolaos (2009) and financial depth 
(FINDEP) defined as domestic credit provided by the banking system to GDP (Grigorian and 
Manole, 2002). The level of domestic credit by the banking sector is an indicator of the level 
of banking sector liberalization as well as the level of competition from private banks. The 
proxy of financial development (or financial liberalization) is the ratio of stock market 
                                                             
5
 As emphasized by Pessarossi and Weill (2013), a reverse causality from efficiency to capital might exist. More 
efficient bank might be more profitable and accumulate more capital. However, they explain that, in China, as 
banks were obliged to adapt to the new regulation in a short space of time, the changes in capital ratios can be 
assumed to be exogenous. The same argument can be applied in the case of Vietnam. Statistics about the 
evolution of capital during the 2002-2009 period confirm a sharp increase in equity following the reform (see 
Appendix A). Besides, we have performed the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for the endogeneity of the variable 
equity to total assets and found that we cannot reject the exogeneity of the variable (see section 7). 
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capitalization to GDP (CAPITAL). In young market-oriented economies, banks have more 
benefited from economic growth and the liberalization of financial markets. The existence of 
a stock exchange has been an opportunity for banks to expand their customer base as well as 
to improve their efficiency through the development of stock exchanges. It allows for 
example diversified ownership and trading on the stock exchange. Except INF and FINDEP 
which have unclear effects on bank efficiency, the other variables which relate to economic 
growth and the stock market are expected to have a positive contribution on bank efficiency. 
Since banks benefit from those developments, they can provide more services to the market 
and are likely to improve their efficiency. Table 3 summarizes the potential determinants of 
bank efficiency with the expected sign of the relationship. 
 
Table 3: Determinants of bank efficiency 
 
Variables Description Expected 
effects 
lgTA Log of total assets + 
Loan2deposit Ratio of loans to total customer deposits + 
PRIVATE 1 if banks have at least two partners/shareholders and no 
foreign member in board of managers or directors, and 0 
otherwise. 
+ 
FOREIGN 1 if banks have at least one foreign member in board of 
managers or directors, and 0 otherwise. 
+ 
CAP Equity to total assets ratio + 
GDP  Growth rate of GDP + 
INF Yearly inflation + or - 
FINDEP ratio of the domestic credit provided by banking system 
to GDP 
+ or - 
CAPITAL Capitalization of stock market to GDP + 
  
Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics of the sample. By using key accounting 
ratios, the data highlight that banks are on average focused on traditional intermediation 
activities. The average share of loans in total assets is 55.8% and the average ratio of 
customer deposits to total assets is 80.6%. However, there is a high heterogeneity across 
banks as shown by the high standard deviation and extreme values of each ratio. Considering 
profitability, the average return on assets is equal to 1.4%. Interestingly, we find that 13 banks 
lend more than the deposits they collect (the ratio of loans to total customer deposits is above 
1 or 100%). These banks have been trading on the interbank market and been refinanced by 
the SBV to cover their excess lending.  
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Considering macro variables, GDP growth rate is in the range of 5.3 to 8.4% with the 
mean at 7.3%; but inflation has fluctuated largely from 3.3% to 23.1% with a mean of 8.6%. 
Inflation has sharply increased in Vietnam since 2004. Two other macro variables have 
increased overtime and the mean is at 77.35% for the ratio of domestic credit provided by the 
banking sector to GDP (FINDEP) and 15.67% for the ratio of stock market capitalization to 
GDP (CAPITAL). This reflects the unstable economic conditions in Vietnam during the 
period under study. Consequently, there are unpredictable effects of macroeconomic 
conditions on bank efficiency, especially, the high inflation rate and the high growth rate of 
GDP could boost banks’ performances in the short-term possibly leading to higher efficiency 
but the outcome in the long-term is unpredictable.   
 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics on the period 2002-2009 
 
Variable  Mean SD Min Max 
Pbt2assets (%) 1.524     0.890           0      5.951 
Loan2assets (%)  55.876     16.428          0.067    84.477 
Earning2assets (%) 32.876     17.628        1.260     96.766 
Per2assets (%) 0.665     0.624         0.073      6.525 
Inter2loans (%) 9.039     6.901         0.084     90.109         
Fixe2assets (%) 
Depo2assets (%) 
1.364 
80.622     
2.551 
10.430         
0.103 
14.355      
26.045 
94.258 
CAP (%) 13.392 12.595 2.340 99.840 
Loans2dep (%) 
ROAA (%) 
ROAE (%) 
Net interest margins (%) 
INF (%) 
71.321 
1.402 
13.048 
3.383 
8.66         
25.367 
0.855 
7.174 
1.746 
6.14              
19.430 
0.03 
0.07 
0.51 
3.30            
210.035 
7.94 
44.25 
21.24 
23.11 
Growth rate of total assets (%) 0.917 3.131 -0.373 41.996 
Nominal GDP (current price)* 995,641.4     407,386.9      535,762     1,658,389 
GDP (%)  7.3362     1.1207       5.32       8.48 
FINDEP (%) 
CAPITAL (% GDP) 
77.35 
15.67     
25.98 
17.74       
44.8 
0.39         
123 
43 
*: in Vietnamese dong (VND-Vietnamese currency). Other variables are in percentage. Pbt2assets: ratio of 
profit-before-tax to total assets; Loan2assets: ratio of loans to total assets; Earning2assets: ratio of other 
earning assets to total assets; Per2assets: ratio of personnel expenses to total assets; Inter2loans: ratio of total 
interest expenses to loans; Fixe2assets:ratio of fixed assets to total assets; Depo2assets: ratio of total customer 
deposits to total assets; Loans2dep: ratio of loans to total customer deposits; CAP: ratio of equity to total assets; 
ROAA: Return on average assets; ROAE: Return on average equity; INF: Inflation rate; GDP: Gross Domestic 
Products. FINDEP: ratio of domestic credit provided by banking system to GDP; CAPITAL: capitalization of 
stock market to GDP. 
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6. Results 
 
Important changes have occurred in the macro-environment of the Vietnamese economy 
in 2005-2006. Vietnam became a member of WTO and there has been an important increase 
in foreign investors, a boom in the stock market and the real estate market, etc. Thus, we 
divide our sample period into two sub-periods.
6
 The first period runs from 2002 to 2005 with 
a high economic growth rate (mean of GDP growth rate around 7%), when the banking 
system recovered from the financial crisis of 1997-1998 and the government issued a program 
to support banks. Furthermore, during that period, banks benefited from the expansion of the 
private sector in Vietnam. The second sub-sample goes from 2006 to 2009, which is a period 
of deep changes after Vietnam became a member of WTO and restructured its banking system 
by applying new standards and to prepare the full access of foreign banks in 2010. During this 
period, the government and the central bank reduced their support to domestic banks and 
removed barriers for foreign banks and their branches in Vietnam. 
We first compute bank efficiency scores and compare the mean values for different bank 
ownership types and sub-periods. Then, we analyze the determinants of bank efficiency 
during the two sub-periods. 
 
6.1  Bank technical efficiency 
 
The profit function has a quadratic form and some interaction terms between input and 
output or fixed netput are introduced (see Table 5). The result illustrates that there are 
individual outputs that are not significant7. The input variables are significant and the price of 
labor shows a positive effect. As explained in section 5, higher personnel expenses can reflect 
better skilled employees and be associated with higher efficiency.8  
  
                                                             
6
 We ran a test for structural break in 2006 (Chow test) and got a significant statistics that confirms the break in 
2006 (see details in Appendix B).  
7
 We checked that we cannot reject the hypothesis of constant return to scale in outputs. See Appendix C, 
homogeneity conditions. 
8
 To test the robustness of the estimation, we employ real values to calculate the efficiency levels (see section 7) 
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Table 5: Estimation of the profit function (Profit before tax) 
 
Model specification 
 
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 Variables Parameters Estimates SE 
y1 Total loans  β1 0.230 0.664 
y2 Other earning assets  β2 0.923  0.652 
w1 Price of labor  β3 3.130** 1.249 
w2 Price of fund  β4 -2.333*** 0.774 
Z Fixed netput  β5 0.428  0.710 
sqy1 ½*total loans* total loans β11 0.023  0.102 
sqy2 ½*other earning assets*other earning assets  β22 0.370*** 0.082 
y1y2 ½*total loans*other earning assets  β12 -0.525*** 0.123 
sqw1 ½*price of labor*price of labor  β33 0.404* 0.233 
sqw2 ½*price of fund*price of fund β44 -0.109 0.161 
w1w2 ½*price of labor*price of fund β34 -0.559** 0.248 
y1w1 total loans*price of labor β13 -0.434*** 0.119 
y2w1 other earning assets
 
*price of labor β23 0.213** 0.101 
y1w2 total loans*price of fund  β14 0.082  0.082 
y2w2 other earning assets
 
*price of fund β24 0.016  0.082 
sqz ½*fixed netput*fixed netput β55 0.030  0.108 
y1z total loans*fixed netput  β61 0.027  0.117 
y2z other earning assets
 
*fixed netput β62 -0.014 0.054 
w1z price of labor*fixed netput  β63 0.178* 0.103 
w2z price of fund*fixed netput  β64 -0.124 0.114 
Constant Constant β0 1.944  2.554 
itu
    2.704  
itv
    -3.438  
R
2
 
Observations 
  0.865 
221 
 
Number of banks  37  
Dependent variable: pbt (log of Profit-before-tax). 
itu
 ,
itv
 are standardized deviations of random-effect and 
the disturbance. S.E: Standard errors. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
 
Following Battese and Coelli (1995), the technical efficiency scores (TE) are 
calculated from TE = exp(-uit). The means of efficiency by ownership type and by year are 
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shown in Table 6 and Table 7. The overall mean of efficiency of domestic commercial banks 
is at 0.646 (or 64.6%) and the efficiency scores of banks are volatile. There are a few scores 
close to 1 or 100% (there are 11 banks with efficiency scores above 0.9 and these banks get 
such high scores in 2006 due to the restructuring of the economy and the credit expansion 
over the 2005-2006 period).  
Table 6: Description of bank efficiency by ownership 
 
                  Bank ownership        Mean   Std. Dev.      Min Max     
Fully state-owned bank     0.399    0. 272      0. 099 0. 918 
Private banks without foreign 
shareholders 
  0.684    0. 198      0. 014 0. 941 
Banks with foreign shareholders    0.689    0. 179       0. 202 0. 936 
Overall mean 0.646 0.226 0.014 0.941 
 
Table 7: Description of bank efficiency by year 
 
Year   Mean      Std. Dev.         Min          Max 
2002 0.501     0.292    0.014   0.886 
2003 0.596     0.228    0.121    0.865 
2004 0.590     0.216    0.141    0.844 
2005 0.590     0.227    0.112    0.862 
2006 0.703     0.192    0.215    0.941 
2007 0.706     0.163    0.284    0.912 
2008 0.694     0.245     0.112    0.936 
2009 0.685     0.208    0.099    0.940 
Overall mean 0.646    
 
As shown in Table 7, the yearly means of efficiency scores changed slowly and the 
peak of bank efficiency is in the year 2007 with a decline later on.  The increase and decline 
might be partially caused by the restructuring of the economy, the credit expansion in 2005-
2006 as mentioned above and the stock market bubble until March 2007 followed by a burst. 
Additionally, the decline in efficiency scores from 2008 can be explained by liquidity 
problems because SBV has decided to tighten its monetary policy to control the high inflation 
rate and banks have been hit by the increase of deposit interest rates. The mean differences of 
efficiency between years are not significant but the mean difference of efficiency between the 
two sub-periods 2002-2005 and 2006-2009 is significant at the 5% significance level (see 
appendix D). 
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Concerning the impact of ownership type on bank efficiency (Table 6), the mean 
efficiency scores show that state-owned banks are less efficient than private banks without 
foreign ownership and than banks with foreign investors. Indeed, when we compare state-
owned banks with those two types of banks, we obtain significant mean-pairwise comparison 
statistics that confirm that state-owned banks are less efficient than other banks (see appendix 
D). State-owned banks play an important role in the banking industry and they receive support 
from the government and the central bank to play their role. However, it seems that they pay 
less attention to their efficiency and do not take advantage of their market power. The 
weakness of state-owned banks is illustrated by a very low mean of efficiency score at 0.399 
compared with a mean efficiency score above 0.68 for other banks. More precisely, in the 
context of a complex organization structure, state-owned banks have branches in all provinces 
and are agents for the government to donate credits with low interest rates for the provincial 
or regional development as well as to some specified state-owned organizations. Besides, 
executives of state-owned banks have less incentives to improve bank efficiency since they 
are hired as government officers. The complex structure and less incentivizing working 
environment are possible reasons that cause a delay of privatization process of state-owned 
banks and explain the lower efficiency of state-owned banks 
By contrast, the mean pairwise comparison test indicates that there is no significant 
difference between private banks with or without foreign shareholders in terms of mean 
efficiency score. This could be explained by the relatively recent presence of foreign investors 
or shareholders in Vietnamese banks and the fact that joint-ventures banks face several 
specific constraints. For example, they are allowed to provide banking services only in large 
cities. 
6.2  Determinants of bank efficiency 
 
To analyze the influence of macro variables and bank ownership on bank efficiency, 
we employ the efficiency scores calculated previously. From the model specification 
presented in section 4.2, we estimate the following equation on each sub-period
9
: 
0 1 2it m mit n nt it it iteff X Z foreign private            
                                                             
9
 To test the robustness of the estimations, instead of running the regressions on two sub-periods, we also 
construct a dummy variable (Break) that takes the value of one during the 2006-2009 period and 0 otherwise (see 
section 7).  
.  
Chapter 1 
The impact of economic reforms and ownership structure on bank efficiency 
25 
 
with 
mitX  bank-specific variables, ntZ : macro-specific variables and foreign and private  the 
dummy variables taking into account bank ownership. 
 
6.2.1. Determinants of bank efficiency during the period of high economic growth (2002-
2005) 
 
Because of high correlation between macro variables during the sub-period 2002-2005 
(see Appendix E), we separately analyze the effect of each macro-variable (model 1 to model 
4 of Table 8). 
Table 8: Determinants of bank efficiency in the sub-period 2002-2005 
 
Model specification: 0 1 2it m mit n nt it it iteff X Z foreign private            
Variables Coefficient Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
lgTA α1 0.303 0.319* 0.283 0.344* 
  (0.186) (0.186) (0.185) (0.186) 
Loan2deposit α2 0.386 0.400 0.367 0.421 
  (0.371) (0.374) (0.375) (0.365) 
PRIVATE 1 2.267*** 2.311*** 2.213*** 2.377*** 
  (0.550) (0.549) (0.568) (0.522) 
FOREIGN 2 2.082*** 2.117*** 2.037*** 2.170*** 
  (0.445) (0.457) (0.456) (0.434) 
CAP α3 0.036* 0.037* 0.035* 0.0397** 
  (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) 
GDP α4 -3.017    
  (20.970)    
INF α5  -1.708   
   (3.910)   
FINDEP α6   0.001  
    (0.011)  
CAPITAL α7    -19.930 
     (27.400) 
Constant α0 -4.666** -4.989** -4.707** -5.256*** 
  (2.053) (2.001) (1.887) (1.981) 
Test: 1 2 0    
       Chi2 
       Prob > chi2 
  
0.390 
0.533 
 
0.440 
0.508 
 
0.350 
0.556 
 
0.500 
0.479 
R
2
  0.403 0.405 0.403 0.407 
Observations  90 90 90 90 
lgTA: log of total assets; Loan2deposit: ratio of loans to total customer deposits; PRIVATE: dummy variable 
taking the value of 1 if the bank has at least two partners/shareholders and no foreign member in board of 
managers or directors, 0 otherwise; FOREIGN: dummy variable taking the value of 1 for banks with at least one 
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foreign member in board of managers or directors, 0 otherwise; CAP: ratio of equity to total assets; GDP: 
growth rate of Gross Domestic Product; INF: Inflation rate; FINDEP: ratio of domestic credit provided by 
banking system to GDP; CAPITAL: capitalization of stock market to GDP. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 The results in Table 8 show that the ratio of loans to total customer deposits 
(Loan2deposit) and the macro variables are not significant to explain bank efficiency during 
the sound economic period. By contrast, the ratio of equity to total assets (CAP) has a positive 
and significant effect on bank efficiency. This finding is similar to those of Fiordelisi et al. 
(2011) and Pessarossi and Weill (2013). While Fiordelisi et al. (2011) find that banks that 
have a higher capital ratio can obtain a higher efficiency because they can rely on a stronger 
capital base. Pessarossi and Weill (2013) argue that banks with higher capital are less prone to 
moral hazard in shareholders' behavior if the stakes of the latter in the bank are larger. Such 
findings are not surprising in the case of Vietnam since the banking industry was strongly 
underdeveloped under the recent reforms and therefore prone to severe asymmetric 
information problems. Looking back upon the financial crisis at the end of the 1990s, banks in 
Vietnam had suffered and needed to recover. The increase in capital resources might have 
been a solution for banks to boost their banking services (or to ensure that they had more 
capacities to provide loans and to invest in order to expand their subsidies or branches) and 
their efficiency. The size of the bank (lgTA) is significant in only two out of the four models 
and only at the 10% level. 
The two dummy variables, PRIVATE and FOREIGN, are significant at the one 
percent level in all the models. The test at the bottom of the table indicates that we cannot 
reject the equality of the coefficients associated with these two dummy variables (PRIVATE 
and FOREIGN) implying that private and foreign ownership has the same influence on bank 
efficiency on this sub-period. Both private banks and banks with foreign ownership have 
higher efficiency than state-owned banks. During this sub-period, SOCBs and some private 
banks focused on relationships with the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) instead of lending to 
the private sector. Under the context that the SOEs were stable and secured as they were 
under the protection of the government, those banks paid less attention to their risk 
management and generated low profitability. Sjöholm (2006) states that the inefficient SOEs 
were a burden for the government and also for the banks when those SOEs were sources of 
outstanding and non-performing loans. Some private banks and banks with foreign 
shareholders had opposite results due to restructuring programs and participation of 
diversified shareholders (including foreign shareholders).  
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6.2.2. Determinants of bank efficiency after the launch of the “Banking Sector Reform 
Roadmap" and the reform of the financial system (2006-2009) 
 
In the sub-sample from 2006 to 2009, we perform the same analysis as on the previous 
sub-period with the separated macro-variables in models 5 to 8. 
Table 9: Determinants of bank efficiency in the sub-period 2006-2009 
 
Model specification: 0 1 2it m mit n nt it it iteff X Z foreign private            
Variables Coefficient Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
lgTA α1 0.444
***
 0.334
**
 0.431
***
 0.324
**
 
  (0.116) (0.115) (0.122) (0.114) 
Loan2deposit α2 0.067 0.017 0.091 0.029 
  (0.162) (0.166) (0.156) (0.162) 
PRIVATE 1 1.302
***
 1.127
**
 1.306
***
 1.113
**
 
  (0.383) (0.408) (0.396) (0.417) 
FOREIGN 2 1.354
***
 1.111
**
 1.354
***
 1.093
**
 
  (0.392) (0.401) (0.409) (0.411) 
CAP α3 0.053
***
 0.0450
**
 0.049
**
 0.0428
**
 
  (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) 
GDP α4 18.89
**
    
  (6.370)    
INF α5  -1.175   
   (1.121)   
FINDEP α6   -0.013
*
  
    (0.005)  
CAPITAL α7    -0.019 
     (0.615) 
Constant α0 -6.810
***
 -3.927
**
 -4.090
**
 -3.930
**
 
  (1.754) (1.504) (1.419) (1.504) 
Test: 1 2 0    
       Chi2 
       Prob > chi2 
  
0.060 
0.800 
 
0.010 
0.941 
 
0.050 
0.822 
 
0.010 
0.927 
R
2
  0.259 0.216 0.248 0.209 
Observations  130 130 130 130 
lgTA: log of total assets; Loan2deposit: ratio of loans to total customer deposit; PRIVATE: dummy variable 
taking the value of 1 if the bank has at least two partners/shareholders and no foreign member in board of 
managers or directors, 0 otherwise; FOREIGN: dummy variable taking the value of 1 for banks with at least one 
foreign member in board of managers or directors, 0 otherwise; CAP: ratio of equity to total assets; GDP: 
growth rate of Gross Domestic Products; INF: Inflation rate; FINDEP: ratio of domestic credit provided by 
banking system to GDP; CAPITAL: capitalization of stock market to GDP. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 9 shows the results. As for the previous period, the bank ownership variables are 
significant. The PRIVATE and FOREIGN dummy variables have still a positive influence on 
bank efficiency at the 1% level and their coefficients are not statistically different from each 
other (see test at the bottom of Table 9). There are several possible explanations for the 
positive impact of FOREIGN during this sub-period. Firstly, banks that already had foreign 
stakeholders have benefited from experienced investors and capital resources to improve their 
efficiency. Secondly, after the boom of the stock market in 2005-2006, many private banks 
have issued new shares and called for foreign strategic investors; the presence of foreign 
investors in these banks can be interpreted as a signal that such banks have a strong potential 
compared to others. The other dummy variable, PRIVATE, indicates that private banks still 
benefit from restructuring and the improvement of their banking services compared with the 
inefficient state-owned banks. However, the coefficients associated with these dummy 
variables are lower than those obtained on the previous sub-period. This might indicate that 
the reforms and the increasing competition have led state-owned banks to improve their 
efficiency, even if they are still less efficient than private banks and banks with foreign 
shareholders.10  
The capital ratio (CAP) has a positive and significant effect on bank efficiency. 
Besides, both the levels of significance and the values of the coefficients are higher than those 
obtained on the 2002-2005 period. This might be explained by the reform implemented in 
2006 that raised the minimum notional capital levels required for all credit institutions. Thus, 
capital was an important concern for banks in order to fulfill the minimum capital requirement 
imposed by the central bank (SBV) as well as to expand their banking services. Higher equity 
has been a financial source for banks’ operations and for improving their efficiency.  
Considering other bank specific variables, bank size (lgTA) is also highly significant 
with a positive coefficient. As expected, the development of banks contributes to improve 
their efficiency over this period. When the banking industry is more competitive, banks have 
to revamp their risk management strategies and to explore other growth opportunities.  
Another difference with the results obtained on the 2002-2005 period is that two of the 
macro variables are significant in this period. About the negative effect of the ratio of 
domestic credit provided by the banking system to GDP (FINDEP), in the context of new 
                                                             
10
 We have calculated the mean efficiency scores for each category of bank (state-owned, private and foreign) on 
the two sub-periods. We find that the difference between the mean efficiency of private or foreign banks and 
state-owned banks has reduced on the 2006-2009 period (see appendix F).  
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banks established in 2006 and new foreign banks in 2008, there is high competition in 
banking services and banks have to compete and offer competitive interest rates to attract 
customers. Consequently, banks' profitability decreased due to higher deposit interest rates 
and lower credit interest rates, even though the demand for loans increased. That has probably 
negatively affected bank efficiency. The growth rate of GDP (GDP) shows a positive effect 
on bank efficiency. Bank efficiency is influenced by the growth of the economy as banks have 
larger customer bases and they can select better and liable customers to prevent and to reduce 
non-performing loans. Hence, banks can better manage their risks and have more 
opportunities to improve their efficiency.  
 
To sum-up, the analysis of these two sub-periods gives different results for the effects 
of both bank-specific and macro variables on bank efficiency. Firstly, the high significance of 
bank size on the 2006-2009 sub-period reflects the achievement of the banking system in this 
sub-period compared to the 2002-2005 period in which bank size is not significant to explain 
bank efficiency. This might be explained by the fact that, in the 2002-2005 period, banks had 
difficulties to expand their size since their principal customers were the SOEs, small and 
medium enterprises and served for some State programs. By contrast, during the 2006-2009 
period, banks have benefitted from the reforms and expanded their business while investing in 
infrastructures and new technologies. Thus, the increase in bank size has been associated with 
a gain in efficiency.  
Secondly, in the second sub-period, two macro-variables play a significant role in 
explaining bank efficiency: the growth rate of GDP and the ratio of domestic credit provided 
by banking system to GDP (FINDEP). In line with earlier studies, these results show that 
banks might benefit from economic growth and they might also be hurt by higher competition 
driven by other banks and financial institutions penetrating into the market. 
Finally, capital resources and ownership structure are important to explain bank 
performance and bank efficiency over the whole sample period. For young and small banks, 
capital resources are a priority to invest in infrastructure, new technologies or to fulfill bank 
regulations. Besides, a diversified ownership structure not only mitigates governance 
problems but can also be an additional capital resource for banks.  Indeed, foreign ownership 
could be an important opportunity for banks to access financial resources and to obtain 
experience from foreign investors. 
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7. Robustness checks 
 
First, to test the robustness of the profit function estimation, we employ real values to 
calculate the efficiency levels. The estimation of the frontier analysis shows only little 
difference with the previous one: the significance of price of labor (w1) and the interterm of 
price of labor with the fixed netput (w1z). The former has lower critical value (10% instead of 
5% as previous estimation) and the latter is no longer significant. However, the coefficients 
are not changed too much and keep the same positive contribution on the profit (see Appendix 
G). 
Second, as emphasized by Pessarossi and Weill (2013), a reverse causality from 
efficiency to capital might exist. Even if the exogenous change in banks' capital due to new 
regulations should eliminate the concern about reverse causality, we have checked the 
exogeneity of the equity to total assets variable by performing the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 
for the endogeneity. We find that we cannot reject the exogeneity of the variable (see 
Appendix H). 
Third, as in our sample of banks, two state-owned banks have been privatized over the 
2007-2008 period (see Table 1), we checked that excluding these banks from our analysis 
does not alter our results. The results obtained excluding these two state-owned banks after 
their privatization are presented in Appendix I. 
Finally, instead of running the regressions on two sub-periods, we have constructed a 
dummy variable (Break) that takes the value of one during the 2006-2009 period and 0 
otherwise. We interact this dummy variable with each of the independent variables. Results 
are presented in Appendix J and lead to the same conclusions. 
8. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we analyze the efficiency of domestic commercial banks in Vietnam in 
the context of the reforms of the banking system such as the privatization process for state-
owned banks, the removal of barriers for foreign investors to invest in Vietnamese banks and 
for foreign banks to enter the domestic market. Our results suggest that ownership has a 
significant impact on bank efficiency and that the reforms implemented in the mid 2000's 
allowed an increase in bank efficiency in Vietnam. The existence of foreign investors or 
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shareholders is an opportunity for banks to improve their efficiency. In the case of the 
Vietnamese banking system which is young and less experienced and has limited financial 
resources, the foreign investors’ investments and experience are solutions to accelerate the 
development of the banking system. Our results show that private banks and banks with 
foreign shareholders have higher efficiency scores than state-owned banks. Besides, after the 
implementation of the reforms in the mid 2000's, state-owned banks have increased their 
efficiency and reduced the gap with private and foreign banks. This supports the reforms that 
remove barriers to entry of foreign investors and reduce the involvement of the government. 
In order to provide incentives for banks to improve their efficiency, the protection provided 
by the government should be further reduced. Moreover, bank regulation is needed to enhance 
bank transparency and to improve bank performance. The strong positive link between capital 
ratios and efficiency that we find in this study after the implementation of higher minimum 
notional capital level also suggests that the reforms to meet the international capital standards 
should be beneficial for Vietnamese banks and their efficiency.  
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX A: Description of equity by year  
Year   Mean      Std. Dev.         Min          Max 
2002 78 390.76     136 917.9    523.19 497 838.1 
2003 102 823.4 188 448.9 524.04 719 285.1 
2004 119 173.4 222 154.5 525.15 907 971 
2005 138 546.7 235 389.4 9 229.59 961 130.7 
2006 180 218.8 255 751.9 16 078.34 112 978.4 
2007 328 804.3 373 733.5 38 454.46 1 552 760 
2008 391 470.6 426 947 40 715.31 1 778 154 
2009 508 082.3 501 403 108 377.9 1 986 270 
Overall mean 247 510.8    
Equity is expressed in Vietnamese dong (VND-Vietnamese currency). 
 
 
APPENDIX B: Structural break of data by Chow tests 
 
Structural break Test statistics(F*) Prob>F 
Chow test F(1, 177)= 5.87   0.0164 
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APPENDIX C: Tests for homogeneity conditions  
 
Table C1: Tests for homogeneity conditions in input 
 
Restrictions (H0) Chi2 Prob>chi2 
3 4 1    0.03 0.859 
33 44 34 0      1.04 0.308 
13 23 14 24 61 62 0            2.63 0.104 
     
 
   
Table C2: Tests for homogeneity conditions in output 
 
Restrictions (H0) Chi2 Prob>chi2 
1 2 1    0.08 0.775 
11 22 12 0      1.46 0.227 
13 23 14 24 63 64 0            0.72 0.395 
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APPENDIX D: Comparison tests 
 
Table D1: Mean pair-wise comparison of efficiency by ownership 
 
      Description     mean 
difference      
 HSD-
test 
Fully state-owned bank     vs       Private banks       0.285    10.344* 
Fully state-owned bank     vs       Banks with foreign shareholders     0.290    10.533* 
Private banks                     vs       Banks with foreign shareholders       0.005     0.189 
HSD: honestly significant difference. The studentized range critical value (0.05, 3, 247)=3.3345. *: indicates 
that the mean difference is significant at 5% critical value. 
 
Table D2: Mean pair-wise comparison of efficiency by year 
 
      Year vs year         mean difference       HSD-test 
        2002   vs   2003       0.095     2.227  
        2003   vs   2004       0.006     0.143  
        2004   vs   2005       0.000     0.006  
        2005   vs   2006       0.113     2.626  
        2006   vs   2007       0.003     0.071  
        2007   vs   2008       0.012     0.280  
        2008   vs   2009       0.008     0.204 
HSD: honestly significant difference. The studentized range critical value (0.05, 8, 242)=3.3345. *: indicates 
that the mean difference is significant at 5% critical value. 
 
Table D3: Mean pair-wise comparison of efficiency on two sub-periods  
(2002-2005 vs 2006-2009) 
 
Overallmean (2002-2005) vs (2006-2009)       mean difference       HSD-test 
0.574 vs 0.697  0.123     5.817*  
HSD: honestly significant difference. The studentized range critical value (0.05, 2, 219)=2.787. *: indicates that 
the mean difference is significant at 5% critical value. 
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APPENDIX E: Correlation matrices  
 
Table E1: Correlation between bank-specific variables 
 
Variables EFF lgTA loan2deposit CAP Public Foreign 
EFF 1      
lgTA 0.137    1     
Loan2deposit -0.070    -0.291    1    
CAP 0.219    -0.543    0.166    1   
PRIVATE 0.209    -0.188    0.029    0.046   1  
FOREIGN 0.287    -0.015    -0.262    0.098    -0.182    1 
EFF: profit technical efficiency. lgTA: log of total assets, Loan2deposit: ratio of loans to total customer 
deposits; PRIVATE: dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the bank has at least two partners/shareholders and 
no foreign member in board of managers or directors, 0 otherwise; FOREIGN: dummy variable taking the value 
of 1 for banks with at least one foreign member in board of managers or directors, 0 otherwise. 
 
Table E2: Correlation between macro variables in the sub-sample 2002-2005 
 
Variables GDP INF FINDEP CAPITAL 
GDP 1    
INF 0.8471    1   
FINDEP 0.9774    0.8999    1  
CAPITAL 0.9541    0.8192    0.8868    1 
GDP: GDP growth rate; INF: Inflation rate; FINDEP: ratio of domestic credit provided by banking system to 
GDP; CAPITAL: capitalization of stock market to GDP. 
 
Table E3: Correlation between macro variables in the sub-sample 2006-2009 
 
Variables GDP INF FINDEP CAPITAL 
GDP 1    
INF -0.318    1   
FINDEP -0.749    -0.135    1  
CAPITAL 0.132    -0.658    0.555    1 
GDP: GDP growth rate; INF: Inflation rate; FINDEP: ratio of domestic credit provided by banking system to 
GDP; CAPITAL: capitalization of stock market to GDP. 
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APPENDIX F: Description of bank efficiency by ownership on the two sub-periods 
 
Table F1: Description of bank efficiency by ownership (2002-2005) 
 
                  Bank ownership        Mean   Std. Dev.      Min Max     
Fully state-owned bank     0.278    0. 196      0. 121 0. 739 
Private banks without foreign 
shareholders 
  0.638    0. 212     0. 014 0. 886 
Banks with foreign shareholders    0.634    0. 160       0. 306 0. 865 
Overall mean 0.573 0.238 0.014 0.886 
 
Table F2: Description of bank efficiency by ownership (2006-2009) 
 
                  Bank ownership        Mean   Std. Dev.      Min Max     
Fully state-owned bank     0.528    0. 288      0. 099 0. 918 
Private banks without foreign 
shareholders 
  0.720    0. 180     0. 116 0. 941 
Banks with foreign shareholders    0.717    0. 183       0. 202 0. 936 
Overall mean 0.697 0.240 0.099 0.941 
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APPENDIX G: Estimation of profit function (profit before tax) in real values 
 
Model specification 
 
2 2 2 4
0
1 1 1 3
4 4 2 4
2
it 5 6
3 3 1 3
2 4
6 6
1 3
1
ln ln ln ln ln
2
1 1
ln ln ln ln ln ln
2 2
ln ln ln ln
it j jit lk lit kit j jit
j l k j
lk lit kit nm n mit it it
l k n m
j jit it j jit it it it
j j
Y Y Y W
W W Y W z z
Y z W z v u
    
   
 
   
   
 
    
  
   
  
 
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 Variables Parameters Estimates SE 
y1 Total loans  β1 0.212 0.533 
y2 Other earning asset  β2 0.987* 0.548 
w1 Price of labor  β3 3.031
**
 1.219 
w2 Price of fund  β4 -2.482
***
 0.723 
Z Fixed netput  β5 0.283 0.703 
sqy1 ½*total loans* total loans β11 0.019 0.102 
sqy2 ½*other earning asset*other earning asset  β22 0.376
***
 0.065 
y1y2 ½*total loans*other earning asset  β12 -0.538
***
 0.112 
sqw1 ½*price of labor*price of labor  β33 0.391* 0.230 
sqw2 ½*price of fund*price of fund β44 -0.124 0.139 
w1w2 ½*price of labor*price of fund β34 -0.593
**
 0.241 
y1w1 total loans*price of labor β13 -0.430
***
 0.104 
y2w1 other earning asset
 
*price of labor β23 0.218
**
 0.0968 
y1w2 total loans*price of fund  β14 0.080 0.0796 
y2w2 other earning asset
 
*price of fund β24 0.020 0.0648 
Sqz ½*fixed netput*fixed netput β55 0.013 0.109 
y1z total loans*fixed netput  β61 0.045 0.117 
y2z other earning asset
 
*fixed netput β62 -0.016 0.051 
w1z price of labor*fixed netput  β63 0.159 0.096 
w2z price of fund*fixed netput  β64 -0.122 0.082 
Constant Constant β0 1.695 2.511 
itu
    2.862  
itv
    -3.483  
R
2
 
Observations 
  0.863 
221 
 
Number of banks  37  
Dependent variable: pbt (log of Profit-before-tax). 
itu
 ,
itv
 are standardized deviations of random-effect and 
the disturbance. S.E: Standard errors. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively. All variables are expressed in real values. 
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APPENDIX H: Endogeneity test for capitalization in analysis of determinants of bank 
efficiency 
Model specification 
0 1 2it m mit n nt it it iteff X Z foreign private            
Variables (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) 
CAP 0.006
**
 0.005
*
 0.004 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
lgTA 0.068
***
 0.056
***
 0.041 0.018 
 (0.020) (0.018) (0.043) (0.028) 
Loan2deposit 0.076 0.090
**
 0.089
**
 0.083
*
 
 (0.046) (0.044) (0.043) (0.045) 
PRIVATE 0.263
**
 0.231
**
 0.214
**
 0.201
*
 
 (0.105) (0.096) (0.106) (0.107) 
FOREIGN 0.206 0.162 0.147 0.145 
 (0.143) (0.131) (0.146) (0.142) 
GDP 2.179    
 (1.472)    
INF  0.030   
  (0.203)   
FINDEP   0.001  
   (0.001)  
CAPITAL    0.264
**
 
    (0.132) 
Hansen J-stat 0.211 0.082 0.045 0.068 
   Chi2>p-value 0.646 0.775 0.833 0.793 
Endogeneity test 0.000 0.036 0.088 0.312 
p-value 0.998 0.849 0.767 0.576 
R
2
 0.147 0.133 0.134 0.153 
N 219 219 219 219 
lgTA: log of total assets; Loan2deposit: ratio of loans to total customer deposits; PRIVATE: dummy variable 
taking the value of 1 if the bank has at least two partners/shareholders and no foreign member in board of 
managers or directors, 0 otherwise; FOREIGN: dummy variable taking the value of 1 for banks with at least one 
foreign member in board of managers or directors, 0 otherwise; CAP: ratio of equity to total assets; GDP: 
growth rate of Gross Domestic Product; INF: Inflation rate; FINDEP: ratio of domestic credit provided by 
banking system to GDP; CAPITAL: capitalization of stock market to GDP. Hasen J-stat: test for the 
overidentification restriction, H0: the overidentification restrictions are valid. Endogeneity test: the null 
hypothesis is the CAP can be treated as an exogenous. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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APPENDIX I: Determinants of bank efficiency in the sub-period 2006-2009 without the 
two privatized SOCBs 
Model specification: 
0 1 2it m mit n nt it it iteff X Z foreign private            
Variables Coefficient Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
lgTA α1 0.458
***
 0.343
***
 0.451
***
 0.335
***
 
  (0.126) (0.128) (0.131) (0.128) 
Loan2deposit α2 0.089 0.042 0.116 0.055 
  (0.165) (0.165) (0.157) (0.161) 
PRIVATE 1 1.342
***
 1.148
**
 1.359
***
 1.141
**
 
  (0.442) (0.474) (0.454) (0.484) 
FOREIGN 2 1.387
***
 1.131
***
 1.401
***
 1.120
***
 
  (0.422) (0.442) (0.443) (0.453) 
CAP α3 0.054
***
 0.045
***
 0.049
***
 0.042
***
 
  (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) 
GDP α4 18.949
***
    
  (6.504)    
INF α5  -1.145   
   (1.175)   
FINDEP α6   -0.013
**
  
    (0.005)  
CAPITAL α7    -0.092 
     (0.633) 
Constant α0 -7.024
***
 -4.059
**
 -4.325
***
 -4.065
**
 
  (1.877) (1.712) (1.597) (1.709) 
Test: 1 2 0    
       Chi2 
       Prob > chi2 
  
0.05 
0.832 
 
0.01 
0.937 
 
0.04 
0.850 
 
0.01 
0.923 
R
2
  0.253 0.209 0.243 0.203 
Observations  125 125 125 125 
lgTA: log of total assets; Loan2deposit: ratio of loans to total customer deposit; PRIVATE: dummy variable 
taking the value of 1 if the bank has at least two partners/shareholders and no foreign member in board of 
managers or directors, 0 otherwise; FOREIGN: dummy variable taking the value of 1 for banks with at least one 
foreign member in board of managers or directors, 0 otherwise; CAP: ratio of equity to total assets; GDP: 
growth rate of Gross Domestic Products; INF: Inflation rate; FINDEP: ratio of domestic credit provided by 
banking system to GDP; CAPITAL: capitalization of stock market to GDP. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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APPENDIX J: Determinants of bank efficiency using interactive period dummy 
variables 
 
Table J1: Determinants of bank efficiency using interactive period dummy variable 
Model specification 
0 1 2 3 * *
* *
it m mit n nt it it l mit k nt
q it p it it
eff X Z foreign private Break Break X Break Z
Break foreign Break private
       
  
        
 
 
Coefficients  (Model1) (Model2) (Model3) (Model4) 
lgTA α1 0.321 0.335 0.302 0.361 
  (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
Loan2deposit α2 0.411 0.423 0.392 0.446 
  (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.37) 
CAP α3 0.037 0.038 0.036 0.040 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
GDP α4 -1.655    
  (20.99)    
PRIVATE 1 2.302
***
 2.339
***
 2.249
***
 2.409
***
 
  (0.56) (0.56) (0.58) (0.54) 
FOREIGN 2 2.080
***
 2.110
***
 2.036
***
 2.166
***
 
  (0.45) (0.46) (0.46) (0.44) 
Break 3 -1.932 1.054 0.576 1.264 
  (2.71) (2.35) (2.24) (2.36) 
Break*lgTA 4 0.135 0.014 0.157 -0.013 
  (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) 
Break*Loan2deposit 5 -0.306 -0.363 -0.253 -0.370 
  (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) 
Break*CAP 6 0.017 0.007 0.015 0.004 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Break*GDP 7 19.926    
  (21.11)    
Break*PRIVATE 10 -0.974 -1.184 -0.894 -1.252
*
 
  (0.61) (0.63) (0.64) (0.63) 
Break*FOREIGN 11 -0.702 -0.970 -0.629 -1.026 
  (0.54) (0.54) (0.57) (0.55) 
INF α5  -1.264   
   (3.88)   
Break*INF 8  0.356   
   (4.02)   
FINDEP α6   0.002  
    (0.01)  
Break*FINDEP 12   -0.015  
    (0.01)  
CAPITAL α7    -17.746 
     (27.59) 
Break*CAPITAL 9    17.628 
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     (27.58) 
Constant α0 -4.973
*
 -5.187
*
 -4.958
*
 -5.456
**
 
  (2.10) (2.04) (1.95) (2.04) 
1 2 0    
Chi2 
Prob > Chi2 
  
0.670 
0.413 
 
0.490 
0.483 
 
0.590 
0.440 
 
0.540 
0.462 
R
2
  0.373 0.353 0.369 0.352 
N  220 220 220 220 
lgTA: log of total assets; Loan2deposit: ratio of loans to total customer deposit; PRIVATE: dummy variable 
taking the value of 1 if the bank has at least two partners/shareholders and no foreign member in board of 
managers or directors, 0 otherwise; FOREIGN: dummy variable taking the value of 1 for banks with at least one 
foreign member in board of managers or directors, 0 otherwise;  CAP: ratio of equity to total assets; GDP: 
growth rate of Gross Domestic Products; FINDEP: ratio of domestic credit provided by banking system to 
GDP; CAPITAL: capitalization of stock market to GDP. .BREAK: dummy variable that takes the value of 1 over 
the 2006-2009 and 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Table J2: Coefficient tests: 
 
 
Coefficients (Model1) (Model2) (Model3)  (Model4) 
 Chi2 Prob > 
Chi2 
Chi2 Prob > 
Chi2 
Chi2 Prob > 
Chi2 
Chi2 Prob > 
Chi2 
1 4 0    15.640 0.000 9.280 0.002 14.030 0.000 9.120  0.002 
2 5 0    0.390 0.533 0.120 0.725 0.720 0.397 0.210 0.647 
3 6 0    11.590 0.000 7.790 0.005 10.520  0.001 7.860 0.005 
4 7 0    8.230 0.004       
5 8 0      0.670 0.412     
6 12 0        5.770 0.016   
7 9 0          0.040 0.850 
1 10 0    12.270 0.000 8.110 0.004 12.140 0.000 7.830 0.005 
2 11 0    12.630 0.000 8.120 0.004 12.150 0.000 7.810 0.005 
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CHAPTER 2  
 
 
BANK NET INTEREST MARGIN, OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND 
INTEREST RATE REGULATION BY THE CENTRAL BANK
11
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
11 This chapter is jointly written with Isabelle Distinguin and Amine Tarazi. The original article is titled “Bank 
net interest margin, ownership structure and interest rate regulation by the central bank in Vietnam”  
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1. Introduction 
 
The banking sector is a key point to facilitate economic growth in transition 
economies since these economies were reformed from centrally to market oriented 
economies. After decades of reforms, banks have impeded the progress of restructuring 
banking activities. The transformation of the banking system is difficult in countries with lack 
of experience and consultancy, even though most transition economies have received support 
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) to improve banking 
capacities (Fries and Taci, 2002). Many studies on emerging economies have focused on the 
determinants of bank net interest margins (NIM) or interest rate spreads to investigate how 
banks perform their intermediation role. In the case of Vietnam, bank interest margins have 
fluctuated relatively highly during the last decades
12
. Although lower interest margins do not 
necessarily imply that banks are more efficient, they are expected to better contribute to 
economic growth by reducing the cost of financial intermediation in the economy. As such, 
the banking system in Vietnam is closely monitored by the central bank which has firmly 
controlled interest rates to influence bank operations. Another specificity of the Vietnamese 
banking industry is that state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) still play a crucial role even 
if the government has launched a program to privatize them since 2005. Foreign banks have 
been allowed to set up a commercial bank in Vietnam since 2004 but the government has 
protected the domestic commercial banks by imposing limits to foreign shareholding and by 
limiting branches of foreign banks until 2010.  
The aim of this work is to investigate the determinants of bank NIM in Vietnam taking 
into account bank ownership and the effects of the central bank’s interaction with commercial 
banks’ operations. Due to missing data and some limitations regarding disclosure, there is 
only one study on NIM in Vietnam which has analyzed bank interest margins in the 
Philippines over the 2002-2010 period comparing them with 10 other countries in the region 
including Vietnam (Tan, 2012). Thus, our work is the first one to focus on bank NIM in 
Vietnam by considering a sample of 49 banks from 1998 to 2011 and to emphasize that the 
determinants of NIM may differ when bank ownership structure and interest rate policy by the 
central bank are taken into account. This chapter focuses on the method developed by Ho and 
Saunders (1981) which particularly fits the case of Vietnam. On the one hand, banks provide 
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  See the evolution of net interest margins in Vietnam in appendix A 
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savings services and other related services to customers at a certain interest rate and charge 
service fees to their customers (on the supply side). On the other hand, banks lend their 
available sources of funds to borrowers (demand side) and apply fees to monitor and to 
prevent any loss, the spread of “prices” between borrowers and depositors standing for banks’ 
compensation. This framework illustrates that banks’ main business is to collect deposits and 
grant loans and that other non-interest generating bank operations (commission and fee 
activities and trading activities) are much less developed that in other countries.     
The main results show that capitalization that reflects bank risk aversion is a 
significant determinant of bank NIM whatever bank ownership. However, there are 
differences in terms of determinants of NIM across banks. Private and state-owned banks 
probably transfer their inefficiency costs to customers through higher net interest margins. 
When the intervention of the central bank on interest rates is taken into account, we find that 
risk aversion is a significant determinant of foreign and state-owned banks' net interest 
margins only in presence of interest rate regulation. We also find that interest rate control 
leads private banks to accept higher credit risk without being able to raise their margin 
accordingly.  
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some information on the 
Vietnamese banking system during the period under study and a review of relevant literature. 
Section 3 presents the methodology and variables used in the study. Section 4 discusses the 
empirical results and section 5 concludes. 
2. Background and Literature review 
 
2.1 The Vietnamese banking system: a general view after a decade of reforms 
 
Before the reform of 1989, the banking system in Vietnam was a mono-tier banking 
system, in which the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV- the Vietnamese central bank) played two 
roles - the first role was a central bank and the other role was a commercial bank. In the 
context of a centrally oriented economy, SBV was operated in a “top-down” approach- 
meaning that the central bank was an agency of the government and monitored the economy 
and the financial sector according to the government’s view. In line with the economic 
reforms, the banking system has been transformed into a two-tier system in which SBV 
continues to solely play the role of a central bank from 1989; SBV is in charge of monetary 
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policy and other macro-policy. The role of commercial banks has been transferred to two 
subsidies of SBV (Industrial and Commercial bank of Vietnam, and Vietnam bank for 
agriculture) and two specified state-owned banks (Bank for investment and development and 
Bank for foreign trade of Vietnam). These state-owned banks have played a key role in the 
banking system and for the funding of state-owned enterprises and projects defined by the 
annual plans of the government. Their share in the domestic banking market has dropped 
slowly from 75% during the 1990s to approximately 50% in 201013.  
Even if the banking system was reformed in 1989, banking activities remained 
underdeveloped and were deficient and many banks were subject to severe problems such as 
Ponzi-games or high loans to deficient customers (Vuong, 2010). To ensure the stability of 
the banking system, the banking law was enacted in 1997 and the SBV was required to 
monitor interest rates. SBV periodically issued ceilings and floors for lending and deposit 
rates until 2000. Based on the banking law, SBV has generated an instrumental tool to 
manage the interest rate, namely the prime rate from 2000. The prime rate was an indicator 
for banks to set up deposit and credit rates with a small adjustment based on durations of 
deposits or loans (minus or plus a certain proportion according to the duration of contracts). 
For example, if the prime rate was set to 0.5% per month, banks could charge a rate up to 1% 
per month for short-term contracts. In an effort to reduce barriers to banks’ operations, SBV 
cancelled the required adjustment of interest rates from 2002. Banks in Vietnam have been 
able to legally set lending rates as well as deposit rates according to market conditions but the 
prime rate has remained as a reference for banks to set their interest rates. The liberalization 
of lending rates did not lead to a noticeable increase in lending rates. This can partly be 
explained by the fact that 75% of total loans were provided by state-owned banks, which 
provided loans without taking credit risks fully into account (Camen, 2006).  
Until 2004, foreign banks could only establish branches and take a minority share in 
joint venture banks. At the end of 2005, the "Banking Sector Reform Roadmap" was launched 
by the government in order to improve the performance of Vietnamese banks. The entry of 
foreign investors has been facilitated and foreign banks have been allowed to set up a 
commercial bank in Vietnam.  
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 Vietnam banking sector report, September 2011- Vietcombank Securities (VBSC) and the annual report 2011 
of the State-Bank of Vietnam 
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 In the context of the stock market boom and the real estate market bubble in 2006-
2007, the demand for loans boosted followed by a credit crunch since customers had given 
their future properties- shares or real estate- as collaterals for their loans. Banks could not 
solve their problems quickly in the short term and this caused liquidity problems from the end 
of 2007. To solve this problem, the SBV again introduced a ceiling interest policy for bank 
interest rates which could float above or below with a proportion under 150% of the prime 
rates after 2008. Under the context of the new regulation, banks intended to pay more 
attention to risk management and charge higher fees to secure their lending, but the liquidity 
problem remained and banks were on a race to increase their lending capacities via the 
interbank market. Except state-owned banks which were able to collect funds from the 
government or the SBV, most banks participated in the interbank market to fulfill their 
demands for short term resources, especially small and young banks. 
2.2 Literature review 
 
In the literature on bank efficiency, net interest margin is considered as an indicator to 
measure the efficiency of banking activities. Various studies attempt to express the costs of 
financial intermediation through the difference between the lending and the deposit rates and 
assume that higher spreads of bank interest rates imply less efficient institutions. But a high 
margin can also reflect an inadequate regulatory banking environment and a high degree of 
asymmetric information (Claeys and Vander Vennet, 2008). More precisely, banks can use 
their market power by setting higher lending rates (Claeys and Vander Vennet, 2008, Maudos 
and Fernandez de Guevara, 2004, Maudos and Solís, 2009). In that case, the higher interest 
rate spreads do not reflect bank inefficiency. Higher interest margins can also indicate a 
higher risk premium (Thorsten et al., 2003). Besides, Gary and Andrew (1998) argue that, in 
transition economies, there is a necessity for high interest margins that maintain and shield 
bank values to ensure the stability of the financial system as a whole.  
There are two different approaches to analyze the determinants of bank net interest 
margins. Some studies split the determinants of net interest margins into two components that 
differently influence net interest margins: bank-specific components and macro factors. The 
bank specific determinants are explored in a first stage and, in a second stage, the effects of 
macro factors are analyzed. This approach does not take into account the heterogeneity across 
banks (Ho and Saunders, 1981, Saunders and Schumacher, 2000). The alternative approach 
incorporates the bank specific variables and the macro factors in a single-stage analysis taking 
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into account heterogeneity across banks (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga., 1999, Demirguc-
Kunt et al., 2003). These two approaches conclude that the net interest margin is explained by 
both bank performance and macro environment variables. 
According to banking theory, banks operate traditionally as a financial intermediary; 
banks receive money from depositors and provide loans to borrowers. The difference between 
lending rates and deposit rates is the bank's margin. How banks set their interest margins is a 
broad topic in the literature. Ho and Saunders (1981) introduce the term “dealership”, which 
explains the intermediary role of banks. They construct a two-step estimation to analyze the 
determinants of net interest margins. Banks have to decide both optimal deposit and lending 
interest rates, and banks set fees for provisions of their services. The fees are expected to 
cover the costs that banks incur for providing their banking services (Entrop et al., 2012, Kit, 
1997, Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara, 2004). Hence, banks might transfer their costs to 
their customers by charging higher fees or setting higher (lower) lending (deposit) rates. 
Consequently, a bank with a higher operating cost will presumably generate higher interest 
margins to cover this cost. For example, Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara (2004) find that 
the fall of NIM in European banking sectors (Germany, France, Italy, Spain and the United 
Kingdom) is explained by a reduction of operating cost. Entrop et al. (2012) also find that the 
operating cost has a positive effect on German banks' NIM during the 2000-2009 period.  
Beyond operating costs, holding capital is recognized as an opportunity cost for banks. 
Under regulatory restrictions, banks have to maintain a certain ratio of equity to total assets, 
and this ratio can also be viewed as a proxy for the degree of risk aversion (Maudos and 
Fernandez de Guevara, 2004). Thus, banks with a high ratio of equity to total assets, that is 
banks that are more risk averse, require a higher margin in order to cover the higher cost of 
equity financing compared to external financing. By contrast, using a sample of 456 banks in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, Ahokpossi (2013) explains that if a bank has a high ratio of equity to 
total assets (or well-capitalized bank), it has a low cost of borrowing and a low risk of 
bankruptcy. Thus, these banks charge low margins. Using a theoretical model Kit (1997) also 
finds that equity can have a negative effect on the bank interest rate spread. 
In order to reduce risk-taking, the reserve requirement is an instrument to protect 
depositors. This requirement is also recognized as an economic cost of funds or an 
opportunity cost of holding reserves. It causes a fall in bank capacity to supply loans, whereas 
banks continue paying depositors. Consequently, banks have higher input prices resulting 
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from higher reserve requirements (Ho and Saunders, 1981, Maudos and Fernandez de 
Guevara, 2004). Tan (2012) expresses that reserve is a tax on banks and it limits banks’ 
lending capacities and banks intend to pass this cost/tax to customers. However, his finding 
shows that reserves have a negative impact on NIM using data of 11 countries in Asia. A 
reason might be that banks are not able to pass this cost to their customers (Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Huizinga, 1999).  
In the context of bank operations, banks have to pay attention to any kind of risk 
concerning banking activities. Credit risk is an important determinant of net interest margins 
(Beck and Hesse, 2009, Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara, 2004, Tarus et al., 2012). Kit 
(1997) argues that net interest margin is positively related to credit risk in his theoretical 
study. The term credit risk concerns loan services. If the ratio of loans to total assets is high 
the bank is supposedly more exposed to loan default risk and the bank charges higher interest 
margins to cover such risk (Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara, 2004  or Tarus et al., 2012). 
Bank ownership is also considered as a factor affecting the decisions of bank 
executives and impacting banks’ performances. Micco et al. (2007) show that bank ownership 
is an important determinant of bank performance in developing countries whereas its impact 
is weak in developed countries. As state-owned banks serve principally state-owned 
enterprises or government plans, they are less efficient and more costly which might lead to 
higher interest margins. According to Claessens et al. (2001), foreign ownership contributes to 
improve technology and hence efficiency. In the long term, banks are able to reduce their 
operational costs and hence lower net interest margins. Martinez Peria and Mody (2004) show 
that foreign banks have lower interest margins than domestic banks in Latin America. 
However, as foreign investors look for “high risk/high return” activities, the existence of 
foreign investors in a bank can still imply that the bank has a higher net interest margin. Tan 
(2012) obtains results that support this argument. If a bank has foreign investors (foreign 
investors holding more than 50% of bank shares), its net interest margin is higher than in a 
bank without foreign investors. Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) also find that foreign 
banks have higher interest margins than domestic banks in developing countries. Fungacova 
and Poghosyan (2011) find that the determinants of net interest margins of Russian banks 
vary according to bank ownership. 
The determinants of net interest margins are not only bank specific factors, but also 
the macro environment where banks operate i.e. financial structures, monetary policy, real 
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prices and economic growth. These macro factors, to some extent, also drive bank interest 
margins and bank behavior. Ho and Saunders (1981) find that market imperfections and 
several macro variables influence bank net interest margins. The common macro determinants 
found in the literature are monetary policy, financial depth, inflation, banking regulations and 
GDP growth (Aliaga-Dıaz and Olivero, 2005, Claeys and Vennet, 2008, Saunders and 
Schumacher, 2000). Market structure can also influence bank performance. If banks have a 
high market power, they can set higher net interest margins. Market power reflects that banks 
have less incentives to reduce their interest margins and have more power to set higher rates 
when the market is less competitive (Berger, 1995, Claeys and Vander Vennet, 2008 and 
Vander Vennet, 2002).  
As a whole, both macro and bank specific factors are found to explain bank interest 
margins. In this chapter, we investigate the determinants of Vietnamese banks' NIM 
considering these factors and taking into account several dimensions which are specific to this 
country which has recently started its transition towards a market economy. Specifically, we 
suspect that these determinants might differ according to several factors. Given the 
importance of state-owned banks and the recent development of foreign banks in Vietnam, the 
impact of some interest margins determinants should differ across state-owned banks, private 
banks and foreign banks. Besides, we also consider the impact of the central bank's 
intervention on bank interest rates on the determinants of NIM. Indeed, during the 1998-2011 
period, there have been important changes in terms of interest rates regulation. 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Methodology 
 
Our approach is to consider that banks are connecting depositors and borrowers 
following Ho and Saunders (1981). Differently from other methodologies which focus on 
analyzing the actual bank portfolio behavior or explain the bank interest rate spread based on 
the bank specific factors to achieve a maximum profit goal, Ho and Sauders (1981) argue that 
the volatilities of bank spread can be also explained by the macro conditions. Banks have to 
decide their interest rates not only from their operations but also have to adjust their interest 
rate periodically according to the macro conditions. Under this framework, the banks are risk-
averse and charge a spread. Hence, NIM is dominated and affected by bank-specific as well as 
other factors depending on current market conditions. 
Chapter2 
Bank net interest margin, ownership structure and interest rate regulation by the central bank 
50 
 
The empirical specification focuses on the analysis of net interest margins (NIM) 
assumed to be a function of bank specific and macro factors. Besides, because the 
determinants of NIM might be different for state-owned banks, foreign and private banks we 
interact each bank specific variable with dummy ownership variables. . 
NIM =F(Operational efficiency; Reserve; Credit risk; Capital base; Ownership; 
Ownership*(Operational efficiency; Reserve; Credit risk; Capital base); Market competition; 
Inflation: GDP; Money supply) 
In the mathematic form: 
 
0 5 6 5 6* *it it j it it j it it j it it t k itnim X state foreign state X foreign X Z u               
in which: itnim is the net interest margin of bank i at time t. 
itX are bank-specific variables of bank i at time t with coefficients j . 
foreignit and stateit: dummy ownership variables. 
tZ are macro variables that affect bank interest margins at time t with the coefficient k .  
And itu is error term. 
We estimate this model using pooled and static panel regressions with random effects. 
In order to analyze whether the central bank intervention on bank interest rates has an 
impact on the determinants of NIM, we then estimate the model on two sub-samples: in 
absence (2002-2008) and in presence (1998-2001 and 2009-2011) of interest rate regulation 
by the central bank. 
3.2 Data and selected variables 
 
Data are collected from Bankscope – Bureau van Dijk (hereafter, Bankscope) and 
annual reports of banks from 1998 to 2011 for 49 banks14. The sample covers above 86% of 
the aggregate loans granted by the Vietnamese banking industry (VPBank Securities, 2014). 
Due to the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and the banking law enacted the same year 
Vietnamese banks were required to adopt strict reforms from 1998. The banking system had 
more than 10 years to transform and improve its capacities before restrictions on the banking 
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activities were totally released for foreign banks from 2010. The sample period covers all the 
changes in the banking system from 1998 to 2011 to investigate their impact on NIM. The 
macro data (inflation, the growth rate of GDP and money supply- M2) come from World 
Bank indicators.   
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Table 1 Definition of variables 
 
Variable Definition Expected effect  Data source 
  NIM 
 
Bank-specific variables 
  OVERHEAD
1
 
  RESERVE 
  LIQ2DEPO
2
 
  LOAN2ASSET 
  CAP 
  FOREIGN  
 
  STATE  
 
Market concentration    
HHI 
 
 
Macroeconomic environment 
 
  GDPR 
INFLATION 
M2GDP 
Difference between interest income and interest expense to total 
average assets. 
 
Ratio of overhead expenses to total assets 
Non-earning assets to total average assets 
Liquidity assets to Customer deposit and short term funding 
Total loans to total assets 
Ratio of equity to total assets 
Dummy variable that is defined at 1 if the foreign investors hold at 
least 50% of shares, 0 for otherwise 
Dummy variable that is defined at 1 if the state holds at least 50% 
of shares, 0 for otherwise 
 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index calculated from the total assets 
of banks 
 
 
 
The growth rate of the Gross Domestic Product. 
The annual inflation rate. 
Money supply to gross domestic product  
 
 
 
+  
-or + 
- 
+ 
+  
 
+ 
+ 
 
 
+ 
 
 
 
 
+ 
+  
- 
 
 
 
Bankscope 
 
 
Bank annual reports 
Bankscope and bank annual reports 
Bankscope and bank annual reports 
Bankscope 
Bankscope and bank annual reports 
 
 
 
 
Bankscope and bank annual reports 
 
 
 
 
 
General Statistic Office of Vietnam 
General Statistic Office of Vietnam 
International Financial Statistics of 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
1
: Operational efficiency. 
2
: Variable introduced in robustness checks. 
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Table 1 provides the definitions and sources of the variables used in this study. The set 
of independent variables includes bank specific variables as well as macro variables.   
3.2.1 Dependent variable 
The net interest margin (NIM) variable is defined as the difference between interest 
income and interest expense as a percentage of total average assets. 
3.2.2 Independent variables 
Operational efficiency. Operational efficiency (or operational inefficiency) is an indicator to 
measure how banks manage their operational costs. In line with Demirgüc and Huizinga 
(1999), Tan (2012) and Ahokpossi (2013), we use the proportion of overhead expenses to 
total assets as a proxy for operational efficiency (OVERHEAD). If banks are inefficient with 
a high cost ratio, the margin tends to be larger to pass operational inefficient costs to 
customers. Because the banking system in Vietnam is relatively young, overhead expenses 
play an important role to promote banks’ development. A positive sign is expected for this 
variable because investment in human resources leads to high costs and banks might transfer 
this cost to customers.   
Reserve. Reserve requirement is defined as an opportunity cost to bank lending capacities. 
The higher the reserve rate is, the lower bank lending capacity will be. Due to missing data, 
we use the proportion of non-earning assets to total average assets (RESERVE) as a proxy of 
reserve requirement. If RESERVE raises that implies that bank lending sources fall, but if 
banks have market power, they can pass this cost to their customers. Therefore, the effects of 
RESERVE on NIM can be negative if banks are not able to transfer this cost to customers and 
positive if they can. 
Credit risk. If credit risk increases, bank default risk will be higher and NIM is set at a higher 
level to cover this risk. Unfortunately, loan loss provisions are not recorded fully in annual 
reports of banks and in Bankscope. Thus, we use the total loans to total assets ratio 
(LOAN2ASSET) as a proxy for credit risk as proposed by Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara 
(2004). Hanweck and Ryu (2005) also employ the ratio of loans to total earning assets as a 
credit risk variable. The expected effect of LOAN2ASSET on NIM is positive. 
Capital base. Vietnam has not applied the Basel standards yet but regulators introduced some 
regulatory restrictions on bank minimum chartered capitals from 1998 and then other 
requirements were issued in 2006. In the context of an emerging market, capital is not only a 
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critical issue for firms but also for banks. Besides that, the central bank has introduced a 
schedule requiring banks to gradually increase their capital to prevent risk-taking and in 
which statutory capital is a basic requirement
15
. To fulfill the statutory capital requirement, 
Vietnamese banks have not much funding sources and thus raising equity might be a suitable 
choice. To capture the impact of the capital base of Vietnamese banks on NIM, we employ 
the ratio of equity to total assets (CAP) as a proxy of capitalization. In line with Entrop, 
Memmel et al.(2012), Ferguson and Stevenson (2007), and Kasman et al. (2010), the expected 
sign of CAP is positive, the higher the ratio is, the higher charge customers have to pay to 
banks which leads to an increase in net interest margins of banks. 
Ownership. We classify the ownership structure into three categories: state-owned banks, 
private banks and foreign banks. We use two dummy variables to take into account the 
different ownership structures in the banking system, FOREIGN and STATE. These two 
dummy variables indicate the presence of foreign or state shareholders as the priority 
shareholder in bank ownership structures. 
FOREIGN. We create a dummy variable for foreign ownership. If foreign investors hold 
at least 50% of the shares of a bank, the dummy variable- FOREIGN- is 1 and 0 otherwise. 
We assume that due to unstable macro policies, foreign investors invest in high-interest-
margin banks (“high risk/high return” strategy).  
STATE. We generate a dummy variable (namely STATE) to capture ownership by the 
government which is 1 for state-owned banks, that is banks in which the government holds at 
least 50% of the shares of the bank, and 0 otherwise. The government aims to keep state-
owned banks as key players in the banking system; there are 5 state-owned commercial 
banks
16
. Compared to other banks, state-owned banks benefit from the support from the 
government and SBV. Therefore a positive relationship with net interest margin is expected. 
Market concentration. The market structure variable is defined as the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI). If market concentration is high, banks might have greater market power and 
might collude to increase their interest rate spread. Consequently, the net interest margin is 
                                                             
15
 From 2006, banks in Vietnam have to fulfill a certain amount of the statutory capital based on the features of 
banks. 
16
 There are two SOCBs privatized in 2007 and 2008, but the government still holds more than 50% of those 
banks’ shares. To the end of 2011, the central bank held 77.11% of Vietcombank’ shares and 80.30% of 
Viettinbank’s share (Annual reports of banks in 2011). 
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expected to increase. We hence expect a positive effect of market concentration on net interest 
margins.  
Inflation. We employ the annual inflation rate (INFLATION). In line with previous studies, 
inflation can be considered as a type of banks’ cost. If the inflation rate increases, banks will 
have to adjust the deposit rate to keep their depositors and then the loan rate will be adjusted 
to recover the loss caused by inflation. Because bank executives are risk averse, they will 
require higher interest rates to prevent any future loss caused by higher inflation. Our 
hypothesis is that if inflation increases, NIM will also increase and at a higher speed.  
GDP. Economic growth is also recognized as an important determinant of bank net interest 
margins. Banks might benefit from higher aggregate demand and develop their activities 
faster. Hence, the GDP growth rate (GDPR) is expected to have a positive impact on net 
interest margins. 
Money supply. Money supply will affect bank interest rates and possibly interest margins. If 
the central bank increases money supply, the interest rate will fall. Borrowers will not accept a 
loan if banks set a higher lending rate when they can obtain cheaper funds from the interbank 
market or the central bank. Therefore, banks have to reduce their interest margins. The proxy 
to capture money supply is computed as the ratio of money supply to GDP (M2GDP) with the 
hypothesis that an increase in money supply will lead to a lower NIM. 
3.3 Descriptive statistics  
 
Table 2a presents some general descriptive statistics of the sample and Table 2b 
presents these descriptive statistics separately for private, foreign and state-owned banks.  
The mean of NIM is 3.28 and the standard deviation is at 1.79. In the data set, there 
are 8 banks, which have at least 50% of foreign ownership in joint-venture banks or new 
100% foreign banks; the mean of NIM for foreign banks is 3.529 and the mean of NIM for 
state-owned banks is 2.914. State-owned banks have a significantly lower NIM than private 
and foreign banks (see Appendix C). State-owned banks dominate the Vietnamese economy 
and they benefit from government funds and from the central bank through low interest rates 
and a large customer base. However, state-owned banks seem to operate inefficiently. A 
possible explanation is that state-owned banks lend mostly to state-owned enterprises and 
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have more risky loans than other types of banks, especially for a development bank and a 
social bank which have means of NIM under 1%.   
By using key bank specific variables, the data highlight that banks are on average 
focused on loan activities and are highly capitalized. The mean of total loans to total assets 
ratio (LOAN2ASSET) is above 54.5% which illustrates that lending activities are still an 
important component of banks' businesses and the mean of the capitalization ratio (CAP)17 is 
above 14%. However, there is a high heterogeneity across banks according to their ownership 
structure. The average share of loans is over 63% for state-owned banks, over 53% for private 
banks but less than 49% for foreign banks. Regarding the capitalization ratio, the highest 
mean is for foreign banks (26.14%) while the lowest one is for state-owned banks (7.65%).  
In table 2, we can see that NIM is sometimes negative (two banks) and so is the equity 
ratio (one bank). Negative values appear for some banks due to their specific roles. Regarding 
NIM, this is due to increase in bad debts (Vietnam Export and Import Bank
18
) and low-
performance borrowers (inefficient state-enterprises or lending to infrastructure projects of the 
government by the Development Bank). Concerning the equity ratio, like other state-owned 
banks, the Agriculture and rural development bank is a specialized bank which serves the 
rural area and promotes community development programs; this can probably explain the 
poor level of capital in 2001 and in 2002 while this bank remains under the umbrella of the 
government. 
We also compare means of NIM in absence and in presence of interest rate monitoring 
by the central bank (see Appendix C) and find that there is no significant difference. During 
the period without interest rate regulation (2002-2008), the mean of NIM is 3.256 while when 
the central bank intervenes in interest rates, the mean is 3.315.  
  
                                                             
17 Some new banks have a ratio above 85% in the first two years of business and this proportion drops deeply in 
the following years. We checked that dropping these observations does not affect our results (see 4.3.). 
18
 The negative interest margins and the losses of banks are discussed in “Bank prospectus” of Vietnam Export 
and Import bank 2009. 
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Table 2a Descriptive statistics for Vietnamese commercial banks on average  
from 1998 to 2011 
 
Variable Mean S.D Min Max 
NIM 3.284     1.792     - 1.003      21.201 
Growth rates of some banking items (%) 
Total assets 
 
0.675     
 
2.398    
 
-0.800    
 
42.056 
Total customer deposits and short-term funds  
Total loans 
Overhead expenses 
Total earning assets 
Non-earning assets 
Liquidity assets 
Equity 
Derived bank-specific variables (%) 
0.676 
0.559 
0.517 
0.718 
1.629 
0.857 
0.555 
 
1.509 
1.052 
0.629 
3.266 
13.241 
2.731 
1.308 
 
-0.859 
-0.859 
-0.775 
-0.795 
-0.868 
-0.885 
-3.139 
 
    15.409 
    11.326 
      5.113 
    60.184 
  249.758 
    39.479 
16.572 
 
OVERHEAD 1.674     1.601    0.297    23.751 
RESERVE 8.970 7. 094 0.919     55.992 
LOAN2ASSET  54.501     16.975    3.665     91.893 
CAP 14.265     14.067   -0.699           100 
Market concentration 
HHI 
Macro variables 
GDPR 
 
1294.34 
 
6.84    
  
485.49 
 
1.13   
 
726.391 
 
4.80  
 
2013.805 
 
8.48 
INFLATION  7.570     6.567 -1.7        23.1 
M2GDP 77.136  33.586  24.2       125.1 
NIM: Net interest margin; OVERHEAD: ratio of overhead expenses to total assets; RESERVE: ratio of non-
earning asset to total assets; LOAN2ASSET: ratio of loans to total assets; CAP: ratio of equity to total asset. HHI: 
the market concentration; GDPR: The growth rate of the Gross Domestic Product; M2GDP: percentage of the 
ratio of money and quasi money supply to gross domestic product. 
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Table 2b Descriptive statistics by ownership structure for Vietnamese commercial banks on average from 1998 to 2011 
Variable STATE banks PRIVATE banks FOREIGN banks 
 Mean S.D Min Max Mean S.D Min Max Mean S.D Min Max 
NIM 2.914 1.662 -1.003 8.863 3.331 1.904 -0.816 21.201 3.529     1.214     1.076     7.57 
Growth rates of some banking items (%) 
Total assets 
 
0.267 
 
0.262 
 
-0.800 
 
1.614 
 
0.822 
 
2.849 
 
-0.354 
 
42.056 
 
0.463 
 
0.876 
 
-0.373 
 
5.414 
Total customer deposits& short-term funds  
Total loans 
Overhead expenses 
Total earning assets 
Non-earning assets 
Liquidity assets 
Equity 
Derived bank-specific variables (%) 
0.383 
0.276 
0.298 
0.267 
0.622 
0.350 
0.491 
0.948 
0.336 
0.228 
0.278 
1.094 
0.670 
1.826 
-0.859 
-0.859 
-0.652 
-0.795 
-0.866 
-0.730 
-3.139 
7.688 
2.244 
0.918 
1.713 
6.211 
4.396 
13.171 
0.746 
0.651 
0.594 
0.894 
1.099 
0.937 
0.604 
1.618 
1.202 
0.690 
3.912 
3.019 
2.812 
1.242 
-0.451 
-0.317 
-0.775 
-0.345 
-0.750 
-0.885 
-0.106 
15.409 
11.326 
5.113 
60.184 
38.964 
39.479 
16.572 
0.709 
0.471 
0.413 
0.409 
5.805 
1.132 
0.389 
1.522 
0.748 
0.597 
0.587 
35.973 
3.822 
0.619 
-0.417 
-0.271 
-0.165 
-0.379 
-0.868 
-0.506 
-0.293 
6.774 
3.482 
3.737 
2.433 
249.758 
25.135 
2.098 
OVERHEAD 1.521 0.736 0.297 3.185 1.562 1.283 0.348 17.085 2.458 3.082 0.585 23.751 
RESERVE 6.237 4.555 0.919 25.935 10.169 7.075 0.956 55.992 6.346 8.206 0.920 46.900 
LOAN2ASSET 63.298 15.614 20.404 91.531 53.506 16.024 11.383 91.893 48.164 19.296 3.665 82.544 
CAP 7.654 11.811 -0.699 82.690 13.596 11.504 3.226 100 26.144 9.104 9.104 94.285 
NIM: Net interest margin; OVERHEAD: ratio of overhead expenses to total assets; RESERVE: ratio of non-earning asset to total assets; LOAN2ASSET: ratio of loans to total 
assets; CAP: ratio of equity to total assets.  
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4. Results 
 
We analyze the determinants of net interest margins of Vietnamese banks by using 
pooled regressions and static panel regressions with random effects. Moreover, since there exists 
correlations between macro-variables (HHI, inflation and the M2GDP
19
), these variables are not 
introduced together and thus each model is presented under three versions. We first run our 
analysis on the whole period focusing on the impact of ownership structure on the determinants 
of NIM. We then investigate the impact on these determinants of the central bank intervention on 
interest rates. Indeed, even if the mean of NIM is not significantly affected by the intervention of 
the central bank on interest rates, this does not imply that the determinants remain the same. 
4.1 Determinants of net interest margins 
 
Table 3 presents the results of pooled regressions (columns 1-3) and random effects panel 
regressions (columns 4-6). Tests of coefficients at the bottom of the table indicate the 
significance of the explanatory variables for state-owned and foreign banks. 
  
Table 3 Determinants of net interest margins by ownership structure 
Model specification 
0 5 6 5 6* *it it j it it j it it j it it t k itnim X state foreign state X foreign X Z u               
(Xit: bank-specific variables, Zt: market and macro variables) 
 
Variables  Pool OLS GLS random effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
OVERHEAD 1 1.015*** 1.071*** 1.067*** 1.023*** 1.086*** 1.079*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
RESERVE 2 0.017* 0.014 0.015 0.016* 0.012 0.013 
  (0.062) (0.118) (0.101) (0.075) (0.157) (0.117) 
LOAN2ASSET 3 -0.004 -0.002 -0.001 -0.005 -0.001 -0.0001 
  (0.257) (0.615) (0.692) (0.277) (0.862) (0.969) 
CAP 4 0.037*** 0.034*** 0.036*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.028*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) 
STATE 5 -0.026 0.341 0.327 -0.935 -0.163 -0.175 
                                                             
19
 See in the appendix D. 
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  (0.972) (0.641) (0.654) (0.365) (0.873) (0.863) 
FOREIGN 6 0.824 0.862 0.887 0.080 0.392 0.450 
  (0.185) (0.157) (0.145) (0.911) (0.576) (0.522) 
STATE*OVERHEAD 15 0.701*** 0.603*** 0.596*** 0.397 0.096 0.120 
  (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.125) (0.704) (0.636) 
FOREIGN*OVERHEAD 16 -1.060*** -1.136*** -1.133*** -1.028*** -1.100*** -1.093*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
STATE*RESERVE 25 -0.022 -0.033 -0.030 -0.003 -0.017 -0.013 
  (0.492) (0.302) (0.349) (0.908) (0.510) (0.615) 
FOREIGN*RESERVE 26 -0.006 -0.001 -0.001 0.032 0.038* 0.038* 
  (0.741) (0.923) (0.928) (0.122) (0.055) (0.058) 
STATE*LOAN2ASSET 35 -0.016 -0.019** -0.019* -0.004 -0.008 -0.008 
  (0.100) (0.048) (0.051) (0.739) (0.503) (0.492) 
FOREIGN*LOAN2ASSET 36 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.013 0.004 0.004 
  (0.212) (0.243) (0.250) (0.207) (0.659) (0.688) 
STATE*CAP 45 0.018 0.0241* 0.022 0.051*** 0.058*** 0.055*** 
  (0.198) (0.095) (0.116) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
FOREIGN*CAP 46 0.007 0.012 0.010 0.029** 0.032** 0.029** 
  (0.554) (0.320) (0.394) (0.030) (0.014) (0.026) 
GDPR 7 0.147*** 0.137*** 0.120** 0.211*** 0.202*** 0.183*** 
  (0.005) (0.007) (0.017) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
INFLATION 8 0.029***   0.029***   
  (0.002)   (0.000)   
HHI 9  -0.0006***   -0.0007***  
   (0.000)   (0.000)  
M2GDP 10   0.010***   0.011*** 
    (0.000)   (0.000) 
Constant 0 0.056 1.063** -0.583 -0.227 0.721 -1.164** 
  (0.906) (0.022) (0.236) (0.648) (0.127) (0.022) 
15+1=0  1.716*** 
(0.000) 
1.673*** 
(0.000) 
1.663*** 
(0.000) 
1.419*** 
(0.000) 
1.182*** 
(0.000) 
1.199*** 
(0.000) 
16+1=0  -0.045 
(0.382) 
-0.065 
(0.198) 
-0.066 
(0.192) 
-0.005 
(0.913) 
-0.014 
(0.769) 
-0.014 
(0.766) 
25+2=0  -0.004 
(0.880) 
-0.018 
(0.549) 
-0.014 
(0.633) 
0.013 
(0.622) 
-0.005 
(0.840) 
0.0003 
(0.989) 
26+2=0  0.010 
(0.562) 
0.012 
(0.488) 
0.013 
(0.460) 
0.048** 
(0.011) 
0.051*** 
(0.005) 
0.052*** 
(0.004) 
35+3=0  -0.021** 
(0.021) 
-0.022** 
(0.017) 
-0.021** 
(0.021) 
-0.009 
(0.435) 
-0.009 
(0.431) 
-0.008 
(0.451) 
36+3=0  0.006 
(0.412) 
0.008 
(0.294) 
0.008 
(0.278) 
0.007 
(0.389) 
0.003 
(0.681) 
0.003 
(0.662) 
45+4=0  0.056*** 
(0.000) 
0.058*** 
(0.000) 
0.058*** 
(0.000) 
0.077*** 
(0.000) 
0.083*** 
(0.000) 
0.083*** 
(0.000) 
46+4=0  0.045*** 
(0.000) 
0.047*** 
(0.000) 
0.046*** 
(0.000) 
0.055*** 
(0.000) 
0.058*** 
(0.000) 
0.057*** 
(0.000) 
adj. R
2
  0.593 0.611 0.612    
N  412 412 412 412 412 412 
Dependent variable- NIM (net interest margin): difference between interest income and interest expense to total 
average assets. OVERHEAD : ratio of overhead expenses to total assets; RESERVE : ratio of non-earning assets to 
total assets; LOAN2ASSET: ratio of loans to total assets; CAP: ratio of equity to total assets; FOREIGN: dummy 
variable for foreign ownership – the dummy takes the value of one if foreign shareholders hold more than 50% of 
total shares and zero otherwise; STATE: dummy variable for state ownership – the dummy takes the value of one if 
the government holds more than 50% of the bank's equity and zero otherwise; HHI: the market concentration; 
INFLATION: the inflation rate; GDPR: the growth rate of the Gross Domestic Product; M2GDP : percentage of the 
Chapter2 
Bank net interest margin, ownership structure and interest rate regulation by the central bank 
61 
 
ratio of money and quasi money supply to gross domestic product. p-values in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01. 
 
Whereas the ownership dummies (STATE and FOREIGN) are not significant, the impact 
of several explanatory variables differs according to bank ownership. There is only one variable 
that is a significant determinant of NIM for all banks: the ratio of equity to total assets (CAP). It 
has a positive and significant impact on NIM for all private, state-owned and foreign banks. This 
result is consistent with earlier studies (Ferguson and Stevenson, 2007, Entrop et al., 2012, 
Fungacova and Poghosyan, 2011) showing that higher net interest margins are to some extent 
caused by higher capital ratios. This indicates that banks with higher risk aversion set higher 
interest margins. Because equity is more expensive than other sources of funding banks might be 
passing the extra burden to customers.  
In line with Tan (2012), Aokpossi (2013) and Fungacova and Poghosyan (2011), 
OVERHEAD has a positive effect on NIM but only for private and state-owned banks. These 
banks appear to transfer the overhead expenses to their customers. Banks have recently invested 
in new technology and infrastructures, these investments have pushed up bank costs. An increase 
in the overhead ratio is an indicator which probably illustrates that bank operational inefficiency 
is higher. Banks want to reduce this high cost and they pass that cost to customers to cover the 
operational inefficiency.  
State-owned banks differ from the other banks in terms of credit risk. LOAN2ASSET has 
a significant and negative impact on NIM only for state-owned banks. This result is in line with 
Williams (2007) and Fungacova and Poghosyan (2011). This can be explained by the fact that 
depositors ask for a higher interest rate if the bank's exposure to credit risk is higher which 
restrains NIM. This could also reflect the fact that state-owned banks do not price credit risk 
efficiently as they have to participate in social projects and lend to public enterprises. State-
owned banks lend mostly to state-owned enterprises as well as long-term projects (including 
infrastructures of transportation) and some government development programs but they also lend 
at lower interest rates. Furthermore, customers of state-owned banks are considered as inefficient 
customers and thus such banks have more risky loans than other types of banks, 
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Concerning macro variables, HHI has a negative impact on NIM which is surprising. 
However, Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) argue that, in a concentrated market, banks promote 
young firms by taking more risk and setting cheap loan rates to establish a long-term relationship 
with such firms. In less concentrated market (higher competition), such a policy is less pursued 
because firms tend to switch from one bank to the other. Indeed, the private sector had 
difficulties to access loans from banks before 2000s. Most of private enterprises were established 
from the beginning of 2000’s. The large customers were the state-owned organizations. The 
state-owned organizations could borrow easily from state-owned banks with low interest rates, 
while the private banks had a small market share and needed to establish a long-term relationship 
with their customers by credits with low interest rates. As an evidence of the positive effect of 
economic development on NIM, banks have higher net interest margins when the growth rate of 
GDP is higher. This can be explained by the fact that banks have more opportunities to raise their 
loans. Indeed, the Vietnamese economic growth rate was 5-8% per year over the 2000's with the 
creation of many new establishments. Similarly INFLATION has a positive and significant 
influence on NIM. When INFLATION increases, banks also raise their interest rates to recover 
their losses (see more in Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2003 and Tarus et al., 2012). M2GDP has also a 
positive effect on NIM. As banks benefit from cheaper funding sources from the government 
they could be setting a larger spread leading to an increase in NIM. More precisely, the 
government needs to invest into infrastructures and to finance some social programs as well as 
the government expenses. As the agent of the government, the central bank increased the money 
supply to the economy via banks with low interest rates (M2GDP has been increased from 2007 
over 100%
20
 and reached 125% in 2010). Even if banks had cheaper financial resources from the 
government, because of the high demand for credits and banks’ market power, they intend to 
increase the credit interest rates. 
 
Thus, our results suggest that there are differences in terms of the determinants of NIM 
across banks with different ownerships; only capitalization appears as an important determinant 
of banks' NIM for all types of ownership. However, as in Vietnam the central bank (SBV) can 
intervene into banks’ operations through interest rate regulations, the determinants of NIM might 
                                                             
20
 It indicates the proportion of the broad money M2 to the GDP. 
Chapter2 
Bank net interest margin, ownership structure and interest rate regulation by the central bank 
63 
 
also differ depending on the period under study. Indeed, the monitoring role of SBV has been 
tightened during distressed economic conditions such as after the financial crisis in 1997-1998 or 
after the burst of the stock and real estate market in Vietnam in 2005-2007. We thus investigate 
the determinants of NIM separately for the periods with and without interest rate regulation. 
4.2 Impact of the central bank intervention on interest rates on the determinants of net 
interest margins 
 
After the banking law was enacted (1997), the SBV monitored interest rates and it stopped in 
2002 in order to reduce barriers to banks’ operations. However following the stock market boom 
and the real estate market bubble, the SBV again introduced a ceiling interest policy for bank 
interest rates after 2008. We therefore investigate whether the determinants of NIM differ 
depending on the existence of interest rate monitoring by the SBV. Besides, we analyze the 
changes for the different types of banks (state-owned, private and foreign). We thus estimate our 
model in absence (2002-2008) and in presence (1998-2001 and 2009-2011) of regulation by the 
central bank.   
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Table 4a Determinants of net interest margins by ownership structure in absence of 
interest rate regulation 
Model specification 
0 5 6 5 6* *it it j it it j it it j it it t k itnim X state foreign state X foreign X Z u               
(Xit: bank-specific variables, Zt: market and macro variables) 
Variables  Pool OLS GLS random effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
OVERHEAD 1 1.015*** 1.018*** 1.019*** 0.968*** 0.976*** 0.972*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
RESERVE 2 -0.014 -0.015 -0.015 -0.025 -0.026* -0.024 
  (0.334) (0.317) (0.316) (0.107) (0.096) (0.122) 
LOAN2ASSET 3 0.002 0.003 0.003 -0.002 -0.0007 0.0001 
  (0.572) (0.511) (0.462) (0.722) (0.901) (0.982) 
CAP 4 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.043*** 0.042*** 0.043*** 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
STATE 5 -0.084 -0.078 -0.084 -2.157 -2.259 -2.353 
  (0.939) (0.943) (0.939) (0.148) (0.131) (0.117) 
FOREIGN 6 -0.776 -0.712 -0.667 -1.301 -1.175 -1.116 
  (0.466) (0.505) (0.532) (0.210) (0.259) (0.288) 
STATE*OVERHEAD 15 0.899*** 0.889*** 0.876*** 0.579 0.548 0.558 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.116) (0.139) (0.131) 
FOREIGN*OVERHEAD 16 -0.340 -0.364 -0.384 -0.828 -0.899 -0.938 
  (0.591) (0.567) (0.546) (0.185) (0.149) (0.132) 
STATE*RESERVE 25 0.030 0.031 0.032 0.054* 0.055* 0.057* 
  (0.484) (0.476) (0.455) (0.094) (0.085) (0.074) 
FOREIGN*RESERVE 26 0.049** 0.049** 0.048** 0.084*** 0.084*** 0.082*** 
  (0.044) (0.045) (0.050) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
STATE*LOAN2ASSET 35 -0.023 -0.023 -0.023 0.009 0.011 0.013 
  (0.103) (0.102) (0.107) (0.646) (0.584) (0.535) 
FOREIGN*LOAN2ASSET 36 0.022 0.022 0.021 0.035* 0.034* 0.034* 
  (0.128) (0.134) (0.136) (0.088) (0.095) (0.089) 
STATE*CAP 45 -0.031 -0.031 -0.032 0.011 0.010 0.004 
  (0.439) (0.443) (0.428) (0.781) (0.805) (0.913) 
FOREIGN*CAP 46 -0.036 -0.036 -0.036 -0.034 -0.034 -0.036 
  (0.213) (0.207) (0.204) (0.175) (0.179) (0.155) 
GDPR 7 0.315*** 0.188** 0.180** 0.474*** 0.306*** 0.298*** 
  (0.009) (0.035) (0.044) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
INFLATION 8 0.0243   0.032***   
  (0.136)   (0.007)   
HHI 9  -0.0003   -0.0005***  
   (0.126)   (0.004)  
M2GDP 10   0.007*   0.008*** 
    (0.099)   (0.005) 
Constant 0 -1.322 0.356 -0.700 -2.327*** -0.104 -1.536** 
  (0.232) (0.679) (0.410) (0.008) (0.888) (0.035) 
15+1=0  1.913*** 
(0.000) 
1.907*** 
(0.000) 
1.894*** 
(0.000) 
1.547*** 
(0.000) 
1.523*** 
(0.000) 
1.529*** 
(0.000) 
16+1=0  0.674 
(0.284) 
0.654 
(0.298) 
0.634 
(0.313) 
0.140 
(0.822) 
0.077 
(0.901) 
0.033 
(0.957) 
25+2=0  0.015 0.015 0.017 0.028 0.029 0.032 
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(0.706) (0.706) (0.678) (0.329) (0.316) (0.249) 
26+2=0  0.034* 
(0.082) 
0.033* 
(0.093) 
0.032 
(0.102) 
0.058*** 
(0.001) 
0.058*** 
(0.001) 
0.058*** 
(0.001) 
35+3=0  -0.020 
(0.126) 
-0.020 
(0.134) 
-0.019 
(0.150) 
0.007 
(0.708) 
0.010 
(0.595) 
0.013 
(0.517) 
36+3=0  0.025* 
(0.065) 
0.025* 
(0.064) 
0.025* 
(0.061) 
0.032* 
(0.093) 
0.033* 
(0.088) 
0.035* 
(0.075) 
45+4=0  0.002 
(0.956) 
0.002 
(0.956) 
0.001 
(0.968) 
0.054 
(0.164) 
0.052 
(0.179) 
0.048 
(0.217) 
46+4=0  -0.002 
(0.926) 
-0.003 
(0.907) 
-0.002 
(0.912) 
0.008 
(0.707) 
0.008 
(0.717) 
0.007 
(0.735) 
adj. R
2
  0.670 0.670 0.671    
N  218 218 218 218 218 218 
Dependent variable- NIM (net interest margin): difference between interest income and interest expense to total 
average assets. OVERHEAD : ratio of overhead expenses to total assets; RESERVE : ratio of non-earning assets to 
total assets; LOAN2ASSET: ratio of loans to total assets; CAP: ratio of equity to total assets; FOREIGN: dummy 
variable for foreign ownership – the dummy takes the value of one if foreign shareholders hold more than 50% of 
total shares and zero otherwise; STATE: dummy variable for state ownership – the dummy takes the value of one if 
the government holds more than 50% of the bank's equity and zero otherwise; HHI: the market concentration; 
INFLATION: the inflation rate; GDPR: the growth rate of the Gross Domestic Product; M2GDP : percentage of the 
ratio of money and quasi money supply to gross domestic product. p-values in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01. 
 
 
Table 4b Determinants of net interest margins by ownership structure when the central 
bank intervenes on interest rates 
Model specification 
0 5 6 5 6* *it it j it it j it it j it it t k itnim X state foreign state X foreign X Z u               
(Xit: bank-specific variables, Zt: market and macro variables) 
 
Variables  Pool OLS GLS random effects 
  (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
OVERHEAD 1 1.191*** 1.308*** 1.323*** 1.137*** 1.254*** 1.272*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
RESERVE 2 0.032*** 0.036*** 0.037*** 0.018 0.022** 0.023** 
  (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.112) (0.048) (0.040) 
LOAN2ASSET 3 -0.015** -0.014** -0.014** -0.014** -0.014** -0.014** 
  (0.028) (0.027) (0.025) (0.037) (0.037) (0.035) 
CAP 4 0.066*** 0.060*** 0.061*** 0.067*** 0.061*** 0.063*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
STATE 5 0.455 1.121 1.150 -0.079 0.644 0.670 
  (0.639) (0.245) (0.231) (0.941) (0.558) (0.542) 
FOREIGN 6 1.429* 1.615* 1.664** 1.041 1.348 1.410 
  (0.094) (0.053) (0.045) (0.240) (0.127) (0.110) 
STATE*OVERHEAD 15 0.236 0.112 0.092 0.295 0.116 0.093 
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  (0.424) (0.701) (0.750) (0.344) (0.710) (0.765) 
FOREIGN*OVERHEAD 16 -1.279*** -1.404*** -1.418*** -1.227*** -1.346*** -1.362*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
STATE*RESERVE 25 -0.063 -0.102** -0.103** -0.046 -0.0842* -0.084* 
  (0.194) (0.036) (0.034) (0.325) (0.067) (0.064) 
FOREIGN*RESERVE 26 0.112 0.118 0.113 0.145 0.152 0.146 
  (0.323) (0.284) (0.303) (0.172) (0.138) (0.154) 
STATE*LOAN2ASSET 35 -0.001 -0.006 -0.005 0.0005 -0.003 -0.002 
  (0.891) (0.665) (0.688) (0.970) (0.831) (0.862) 
FOREIGN*LOAN2ASSET 36 0.007 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.001 0.002 
  (0.612) (0.726) (0.710) (0.617) (0.904) (0.891) 
STATE*CAP 45 -0.002 0.004 0.002 -0.001 0.006 0.005 
  (0.900) (0.817) (0.886) (0.942) (0.733) (0.801) 
FOREIGN*CAP 46 -0.020 -0.013 -0.014 -0.019 -0.012 -0.013 
  (0.226) (0.441) (0.393) (0.288) (0.512) (0.450) 
GDPR 7 0.240** 0.164 0.103 0.235** 0.156 0.093 
  (0.039) (0.140) (0.357) (0.023) (0.107) (0.337) 
INFLATION 8 0.056***   0.057***   
  (0.000)   (0.000)   
HHI 9  -0.0007***   -0.0007***  
   (0.000)   (0.000)  
M2GDP 10   0.010***   0.011*** 
    (0.000)   (0.000) 
Constant 0 -0.879 0.699 -0.821 -0.600 0.994 -0.591 
  (0.328) (0.406) (0.338) (0.477) (0.207) (0.464) 
15+1=0  1.427*** 
(0.000) 
1.419*** 
(0.000) 
1.415*** 
(0.000) 
1.431*** 
(0.000) 
1.369*** 
(0.000) 
1.364*** 
(0.000) 
16+1=0  -0.87* 
(0.098) 
-0.096* 
(0.064) 
-0.053* 
(0.066) 
-0.090* 
(0.098) 
-0.091* 
(0.094) 
-0.090* 
(0.098) 
25+2=0  -0.031 
(0.516) 
-0.066 
(0.165) 
-0.066 
(0.163) 
-0.027 
(0.551) 
-0.061 
(0.168) 
-0.061 
(0.168) 
26+2=0  0.144 
(0.200) 
0.154 
(0.160) 
0.150 
(0.171) 
0.163 
(0.122) 
0.174* 
(0.087) 
0.168* 
(0.097) 
35+3=0  -0.016 
(0.185) 
-0.020* 
(0.098) 
-0.020 
(0.103) 
-0.014 
(0.302) 
-0.017 
(0.191) 
-0.017 
(0.203) 
36+3=0  -0.007 
(0.541) 
-0.009 
(0.433) 
-0.009 
(0.439) 
-0.007 
(0.591) 
-0.012 
(0.339) 
-0.012 
(0.343) 
45+4=0  0.064*** 
(0.000) 
0.064*** 
(0.000) 
0.064*** 
(0.000) 
0.065 
(0.000) 
0.068*** 
(0.000) 
0.068*** 
(0.000) 
46+4=0  0.045*** 
(0.000) 
0.047*** 
(0.000) 
0.047*** 
(0.000) 
0.047 
(0.000) 
0.049*** 
(0.000) 
0.049*** 
(0.000) 
adj. R
2
  0.573 0.594 0.596    
N  194 194 194 194 194 194 
Dependent variable- NIM (net interest margin): difference between interest income and interest expense to total 
average assets. OVERHEAD : ratio of overhead expenses to total assets; RESERVE : ratio of non-earning assets to 
total assets; LOAN2ASSET: ratio of loans to total assets; CAP: ratio of equity to total assets; FOREIGN: dummy 
variable for foreign ownership – the dummy takes the value of one if foreign shareholders hold more than 50% of 
total shares and zero otherwise; STATE: dummy variable for state ownership – the dummy takes the value of one if 
the government holds more than 50% of the bank's equity and zero otherwise; HHI: the market concentration; 
INFLATION: the inflation rate; GDPR: the growth rate of the Gross Domestic Product; M2GDP : percentage of the 
ratio of money and quasi money supply to gross domestic product. p-values in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01. 
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In absence of interest rate regulation by the central bank (table 4a), we find, as 
previously, a significant and positive influence of OVERHEAD on NIM for both private and 
state-owned banks implying that such banks transfer their operational costs to their clients 
through higher interest margins. We also find that RESERVE is only a significant determinant 
for foreign banks. The ratio of equity to total assets is only significant for private banks meaning. 
An interesting result is also that during this period, credit risk (LOAN2ASSET) has a positive 
and significant impact on NIM for foreign banks. This suggests that foreign banks that take more 
credit risk are able to price it correctly and set higher NIM in absence of interest rate regulation 
by the central bank. 
Table 4b provides the results when the central bank intervenes on interest rates. Like 
previously, OVERHEAD has a significant and positive influence on NIM for both private and 
state-owned banks. However, for foreign banks, this variable becomes significant but only at the 
10% level and with a negative coefficient. Whereas the ratio of equity to total assets (CAP) was 
significant only for private banks in absence of interest rate control, it is highly significant for all 
banks in the presence of controlled interest rates. All banks with higher risk aversion set a higher 
NIM. RESERVE has the expected positive and significant coefficient for private banks. Finally, 
results for credit risk (LOAN2ASSET) are totally different as this variable has a significant and 
negative effect on NIM for private banks- a finding consistent with the results of William (2007) 
and Fungacova and Poghosyan (2011). This can be explained by the fact that, when the central 
bank controls bank interest rates, if banks want to preserve their market share, they have to cope 
with credit risk without being able to raise their margin. Another possibility is that, to increase 
market shares and to attract more customers, private banks might have been willing to accept 
higher credit risk without adjusting their margins. In Table 4a and 4b, the influence of the macro 
variables on NIM remains as expected.  
 
Thus, even if interest rate monitoring by the central bank does not significantly impact 
the mean of NIM of Vietnamese banks, it does affect the determinants of their NIM. Indeed, 
whereas we find that private and state-owned banks transfer their operational costs to their 
clients through higher interest margins in all cases, the impact of other determinants differ 
depending on the presence or absence of central bank intervention on interest rates. More 
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precisely, risk aversion proxied by bank capitalization is an important determinant of NIM of 
foreign and state-owned banks only in the presence of central bank monitoring. Concerning 
credit risk, whereas foreign banks set higher margins when they take higher risk in absence of 
monitoring by the central bank, we find that when the central bank intervenes, private banks' 
NIM are negatively affected by credit risk. This means that interest rate control leads banks to set 
a lower NIM than what would be expected when they take higher credit risk. 
 
4.3 Robustness analysis 
 
In this chapter, to analyze the consistency of our estimations, we conduct several 
robustness checks.  
First, we replace the ratio of loans to total assets (LOAN2ASSET) by the ratio of liquid 
assets to customer deposits and short-term funds (LIQ2DEPO). This is a proxy for liquidity risk 
and allows to measure whether liquidity problems have an impact on NIM. Indeed, banks usually 
use their liquidity as a refinancing source when they have to repeatedly refinance their assets and 
risk is higher if the mismatch between assets’ and liabilities’ average maturities is wider. The 
results are similar to those obtained in the main analysis and the liquidity risk variable 
(LIQ2DEPO) has a negative effect on NIM for state-owned and foreign banks in absence of 
interest rate regulation. Hence, banks with better liquidity conditions (high value of LIQ2DEPO) 
attempt to charge lower rates to their customers. By contrast, banks with poorer liquidity 
conditions charge higher rates to offset higher liquidity risk (see Appendix E).  
Second, to check whether our results are stable, we run our regressions without the macro 
variables but with year dummies (see Appendix F). Results are consistent with those obtained on 
the main regressions. 
Additionally, we also perform other estimations in which we drop negative observations 
of NIM (see Appendix G) or observations of the ratio of equity to total assets above 85% which 
correspond to new banks in their first two years of business (see Appendix H). Our conclusions 
are consistent with those previously obtained.  
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Finally, we run the regressions on the sub-sample of private banks and add individual 
fixed effects. The results are similar to those obtained on the main regressions21 (see Appendix I). 
5. Conclusion 
 
The aim of this study is to investigate the determinants of bank interest margins in 
Vietnam taking into account bank ownership type and the role played by the central bank in 
driving and limiting the extent to which banks can adjust the rates they charge to borrowers and 
the interest they pay to depositors. The results show that banks have pursued different strategies 
in their intermediation role. Private and state-owned banks try to transfer their operational costs 
to customers via fees and higher margins to prevent losses while foreign banks set higher 
margins when their reserve ratio is higher in absence of the interest rate regulation. This partially 
explains the intervention of the central bank, banks having more power than their customers to 
negotiate interest rates. In presence of interest rate regulation by the central bank, bank 
capitalization positively affects the net interest margins of banks whatever their ownership type. 
Presumably, under such conditions financial resources are expensive for all types of banks since 
the central bank intervenes on the interest rates and banks do not have many options to comply 
with capital regulation. We also find that, in order to preserve their market share, private banks 
do not raise their margin to properly offset higher credit risk exposure.  
As a whole, this chapter shows that interest rate control by the central bank differently 
affects bank interest margins depending on bank ownership structure. It also indicates that under 
interest rate control banks tend to pass their costly operations to customers, each type of bank 
pursuing different strategies to transfer their costs to the customers. Because, such a policy is 
likely to be introduced again from time to time in Vietnam, the central bank should account for 
the different impact it might have on the margin setting behavior of banks depending on their 
ownership type. The central bank plays an important role to balance the power of each 
participant in the market and should monitor the interest rates and fees applied to customers 
strictly, the central bank can take a firmly control on banks which attempt to use their market 
power to charge higher fees from customers. According to the finding, bank capital and liquidity 
                                                             
21
 We do not perform the regressions on the sub-samples of state-owned banks or foreign banks due to an 
insufficient number of observations. 
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are important for bank operations and recognized as the shields to maintain bank portfolios- it 
reflects that the central bank should pay more attention to the prudential regulations to ensure 
that banks can protect themselves from any shock of the monetary policy or the economic 
shocks. At the bank level, banks should develop banking services to diversify banks’ revenues 
instead of providing the intermediation role as a predominant activity.  
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A: Net interest margins and interest rate spreads in Vietnam over the period 
1998-2011 
Graph 1: Evolution of net interest margins over the period 1998-2011 
 
Source: Federal Reserve Economic Data – Economic Research Division 
(access link on November 3
rd
 2014 http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/DDEI01VNA156NWDB) 
 
Graph 2: Evolution of the interest rate spreads over the period 1998-2011 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (Version: updated on October 17
th
 2014)  
Interest rate spreads= aggregate lending rates-aggregate deposit rates 
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APPENDIX B: Description of types of banks 
 
Type of bank Number  
of banks 
Remark 
State-owned banks 
   State-owned commercial banks 
 
 Specialized banks 
    
7 
5 
 
2 
 
 
 
Two commercial banks have equitized from 2007 and 2008, but 
the government remains the major shareholder 
Development and social banks 
Private banks 34  
Foreign banks 
   Joint-venture commercial banks 
   100% foreign banks 
 
Total 
8 
3 
5 
 
49 
 
 
One bank transferred from joint-venture to 100% foreign bank 
in 2008 
 
Source: the website of State Bank of Vietnam 
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APPENDIX C: Mean and mean-difference tests of NIM 
 
By ownership structure 
Group vs Group Group means Mean diff FH-test p-value 
STATE vs Private 2.914 3.331 0.417 2.518* 0.075 
STATE vs FOREIGN 2.914 3.529 0.615 2.728* 0.054 
Private vs FOREIGN 3.331 3.529 0.198 1.066 0.451 
Fisher-Hayter pairwise comparisons for ownership studendized range critical value 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 at (2, 
412
22
)=3.660 ; 2.779 and 2.331, respectively. 
 
In the presence and in the absence of the interest rate monitoring 
Group vs Group Group means Mean diff t-statictics Test p-value 
0 vs 1 3.256 3.015 -0.05 -0.331 -0.05<0 0.370 
0 vs 1 3.256 3.015 -0.05 -0.331 -0.05#0 0.740 
0 vs 1 3.256 3.015 -0.05 -0.331 -0.05>0 0.629 
0 : the period absence of the monitoring interest rate, 1 : the period presence of the monitoring interest rate. 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                             
22
 (k, df): k- number of groups and df- degree of freedom. 
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APPENDIX D: Correlations among variables 
 
Bank-specific variables 
 OVERHEAD RESERVE LOAN2ASSET CAP 
OVERHEAD 1    
RESERVE -0.092 1   
LOAN2ASSET 0.007 -0.134 1  
CAP 0.384 -0.119 -0.167 1 
 
Macro-specific variables 
 HHI INFLATION GDPR M2GDP 
HHI 1    
INFLATION -0.647 1   
GDPR 0.078 -0.178 1  
M2GDP -0.975 0.571 -0.018 1 
OVERHEAD: ratio of overhead expenses to total assets; RESERVE: ratio of non-earning assets to total assets; 
LOAN2ASSET: ratio of loans to total assets; CAP: ratio of equity to total assets; HHI: the market concentration; 
INFLATION: the inflation rate; GDPR: the growth rate of Gross Domestic Products; M2GDP: percentage of the 
ratio of money and quasi money supply to gross domestic products.  
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APPENDIX E: Replacing the ratio of loans to total assets (LOAN2ASSET) by the ratio of 
liquid assets to customer deposits and short-term funds (LIQ2DEPO) 
Full sample 
Model specification 
0 5 6 5 6* *it it j it it j it it j it it t k itnim X state foreign state X foreign X Z u               
(Xit: bank-specific variables, Zt: market and macro variables) 
Variables  Pool OLS GLS random effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
OVERHEAD 1 1.008*** 1.077*** 1.074*** 1.016*** 1.089*** 1.084*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
RESERVE 2 0.018* 0.014 0.015* 0.018** 0.012 0.014 
  (0.052) (0.115) (0.098) (0.037) (0.135) (0.103) 
LIQ2DEPO 3 0.050 -0.029 -0.044 0.099 -0.010 -0.035 
  (0.860) (0.918) (0.875) (0.737) (0.970) (0.902) 
CAP 4 0.037*** 0.034*** 0.036*** 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.028*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.005) (0.002) 
STATE 5 0.148 0.369 0.317 -0.806 -0.412 -0.495 
  (0.796) (0.510) (0.570) (0.272) (0.567) (0.491) 
FOREIGN 6 1.424*** 1.372*** 1.389*** 0.740 0.614 0.644 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.162) (0.242) (0.220) 
STATE*OVERHEAD 15 0.162 0.035 0.052 0.279 0.002 0.039 
  (0.490) (0.877) (0.819) (0.315) (0.992) (0.884) 
FOREIGN*OVERHEAD 16 -1.058*** -1.150*** -1.147*** -1.025*** -1.112*** -1.106*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
STATE*RESERVE 25 -0.016 -0.026 -0.023 -0.006 -0.017 -0.012 
  (0.596) (0.391) (0.457) (0.804) (0.504) (0.636) 
FOREIGN*RESERVE 26 -0.009 -0.003 -0.003 0.028 0.038* 0.037* 
  (0.636) (0.853) (0.861) (0.166) (0.054) (0.056) 
STATE*LIQ2DEPO 35 -1.495*** -1.457*** -1.376** -0.649 -0.380 -0.285 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.308) (0.534) (0.641) 
FOREIGN*LIQ2DEPO 36 -0.096 -0.030 -0.014 -0.171 -0.070 -0.044 
  (0.739) (0.914) (0.959) (0.568) (0.805) (0.876) 
STATE*CAP 45 0.031** 0.037** 0.034** 0.054*** 0.059*** 0.056*** 
  (0.032) (0.011) (0.017) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
FOREIGN*CAP 46 0.010 0.016 0.013 0.035** 0.038*** 0.034** 
  (0.449) (0.230) (0.300) (0.013) (0.005) (0.012) 
GDPR 7 0.150*** 0.143*** 0.125** 0.213*** 0.206*** 0.186*** 
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
INFLATION 8 0.033***   0.031***   
  (0.000)   (0.000)   
HHI 9  -0.0006***   -0.0007***  
   (0.000)   (0.000)  
M2GDP 10   0.010***   0.011*** 
    (0.000)   (0.000) 
Constant 0 -0.265 0.964** -0.753* -0.564 0.668* -1.216*** 
  (0.530) (0.023) (0.077) (0.162) (0.093) (0.003) 
15+1=0  1.170*** 
(0.000) 
1.113*** 
(0.000) 
1.127*** 
(0.000) 
1.294*** 
(0.000) 
1.091*** 
(0.000) 
1.123*** 
(0.000) 
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16+1=0  -0.049 
(0.337) 
-0.072 
(0.154) 
-0.072 
(0.152) 
-0.008 
(0.858) 
-0.022 
(0.639) 
-0.022 
(0.645) 
25+2=0  0.001 
(0.954) 
-0.011 
(0.691) 
-0.007 
(0.799) 
0.011 
(0.658) 
-0.004 
(0.849) 
0.001 
(0.955) 
26+2=0  0.008 
(0.642) 
0.010 
(0.546) 
0.011 
(0.513) 
0.047** 
(0.013) 
0.051*** 
(0.005) 
0.051*** 
(0.004) 
35+3=0  -1.444*** 
(0.003) 
-1.486*** 
(0.002) 
-1.420*** 
(0.002) 
-0.548 
(0.331) 
-0.390 
(0.472) 
-0.320 
(0.556) 
36+3=0  -0.045 
(0.104) 
-0.059** 
(0.030) 
-0.058** 
(0.033) 
-0.070*** 
(0.006) 
-0.081*** 
(0.001) 
-0.079*** 
(0.001) 
45+4=0  0.069*** 
(0.000) 
0.071*** 
(0.000) 
0.071*** 
(0.000) 
0.079*** 
(0.000) 
0.085*** 
(0.000) 
0.084*** 
(0.000) 
46+4=0  0.047*** 
(0.000) 
0.050*** 
(0.000) 
0.050*** 
(0.000) 
0.060*** 
(0.000) 
0.064*** 
(0.000) 
0.063*** 
(0.000) 
adj. R
2
  0.596 0.615 0.616    
R
2
 within     0.647 0.680 0.678 
R
2
 between     0.376 0.366 0.378 
R
2
 overall     0.594 0.608 0.610 
N  413 413 413 413 413 413 
Dependent variable- NIM (net interest margin): difference between interest income and interest expense to total 
average assets. OVERHEAD : ratio of overhead expenses to total assets; RESERVE : ratio of non-earning assets to 
total assets; LOAN2ASSET: ratio of loans to total assets; CAP: ratio of equity to total assets; FOREIGN: dummy 
variable for foreign ownership – the dummy takes the value of one if foreign shareholders hold more than 50% of 
total shares and zero otherwise; STATE: dummy variable for state ownership – the dummy takes the value of one if 
the government holds more than 50% of the bank's equity and zero otherwise; HHI: the market concentration; 
INFLATION: the inflation rate; GDPR: the growth rate of the Gross Domestic Product; M2GDP : percentage of the 
ratio of money and quasi money supply to gross domestic product. p-values in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01 
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In absence of interest rate regulation 
Model specification 
0 5 6 5 6* *it it j it it j it it j it it t k itnim X state foreign state X foreign X Z u               
(Xit: bank-specific variables, Zt: market and macro variables) 
Variables  Pool OLS GLS random effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
OVERHEAD 1 1.027*** 1.037*** 1.034*** 0.920*** 0.937*** 0.932*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
RESERVE 2 -0.016 -0.017 -0.016 -0.024 -0.026* -0.023 
  (0.281) (0.262) (0.281) (0.103) (0.090) (0.119) 
LIQ2DEPO 3 0.00001 -0.040 -0.051 0.290 0.218 0.204 
  (1.000) (0.908) (0.884) (0.425) (0.548) (0.576) 
CAP 4 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.042*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
STATE 5 0.533 0.516 0.455 -0.354 -0.389 -0.523 
  (0.536) (0.549) (0.596) (0.728) (0.702) (0.607) 
FOREIGN 6 1.184 1.227 1.255 1.251 1.304 1.368 
  (0.360) (0.344) (0.333) (0.372) (0.352) (0.330) 
STATE*OVERHEAD 15 -0.035 -0.041 -0.017 0.261 0.248 0.316 
  (0.923) (0.909) (0.961) (0.552) (0.572) (0.468) 
FOREIGN*OVERHEAD 16 -0.283 -0.312 -0.318 -0.568 -0.633 -0.642 
  (0.640) (0.607) (0.601) (0.308) (0.256) (0.250) 
STATE*RESERVE 25 0.026 0.027 0.029 0.041 0.042 0.044 
  (0.519) (0.505) (0.466) (0.181) (0.168) (0.147) 
FOREIGN*RESERVE 26 0.048** 0.048** 0.047** 0.082*** 0.083*** 0.081*** 
  (0.044) (0.045) (0.049) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
STATE*LIQ2DEPO 35 -1.855*** -1.799*** -1.723*** -1.454* -1.356* -1.219 
  (0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.072) (0.094) (0.134) 
FOREIGN*LIQ2DEPO 36 -1.922* -1.893* -1.897* -2.460* -2.406* -2.441* 
  (0.083) (0.088) (0.088) (0.066) (0.072) (0.068) 
STATE*CAP 45 -0.019 -0.019 -0.022 0.018 0.019 0.014 
  (0.630) (0.624) (0.581) (0.612) (0.604) (0.687) 
FOREIGN*CAP 46 -0.019 -0.020 -0.020 -0.013 -0.013 -0.014 
  (0.512) (0.494) (0.476) (0.559) (0.557) (0.514) 
GDPR 7 0.349*** 0.191** 0.183** 0.464*** 0.292*** 0.285*** 
  (0.004) (0.033) (0.042) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
INFLATION 8 0.030*   0.034***   
  (0.056)   (0.004)   
HHI 9  -0.0004*   -0.0005***  
   (0.057)   (0.004)  
M2GDP 10   0.007*   0.008*** 
    (0.064)   (0.007) 
Constant 0 -1.458 0.673 -0.536 -2.407*** -0.059 -1.411** 
  (0.158) (0.408) (0.486) (0.002) (0.928) (0.021) 
15+1=0  0.992*** 
(0.005) 
0.995*** 
(0.005) 
1.016*** 
(0.004) 
1.181*** 
(0.006) 
1.184*** 
(0.005) 
1.247*** 
(0.003) 
16+1=0  0.744 
(0.214) 
0.724 
(0.227) 
0.715 
(0.234) 
0.351 
(0.523) 
0.303 
(0.582) 
0.289 
(0.599) 
25+2=0  0.009 
(0.801) 
0.009 
(0.800) 
0.012 
(0.736) 
0.016 
(0.561) 
0.016 
(0.559) 
0.020 
(0.453) 
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26+2=0  0.032* 
(0.099) 
0.031 
(0.109) 
0.031 
(0.112) 
0.057*** 
(0.001) 
0.057*** 
(0.001) 
0.057*** 
(0.001) 
35+3=0  -1.854*** 
(0.001) 
-1.839*** 
(0.001) 
-1.774*** 
(0.002) 
-1.164 
(0.110) 
-1.137 
(0.119) 
-1.014 
(0.165) 
36+3=0  -1.922* 
(0.068) 
-1.932* 
(0.067) 
-1.948* 
(0.065) 
-2.170* 
(0.090) 
-2.187* 
(0.087) 
-2.237* 
(0.080) 
45+4=0  0.012 
(0.752) 
0.011 
(0.757) 
0.010 
(0.786) 
0.060* 
(0.087) 
0.060* 
(0.085) 
0.057* 
(0.099) 
46+4=0  0.012 
(0.654) 
0.011 
(0.674) 
0.011 
(0.670) 
0.027 
(0.170) 
0.027 
(0.170) 
0.027 
(0.168) 
adj. R
2
  0.683 0.683 0.682    
R
2
 within     0.803 0.804 0.802 
R
2
 between     0.553 0.549 0.551 
R
2
 overall     0.689 0.689 0.688 
N  218 218 218 218 218 218 
Dependent variable- NIM (net interest margin): difference between interest income and interest expense to total 
average assets. OVERHEAD : ratio of overhead expenses to total assets; RESERVE : ratio of non-earning assets to 
total assets; LOAN2ASSET: ratio of loans to total assets; CAP: ratio of equity to total assets; FOREIGN: dummy 
variable for foreign ownership – the dummy takes the value of one if foreign shareholders hold more than 50% of 
total shares and zero otherwise; STATE: dummy variable for state ownership – the dummy takes the value of one if 
the government holds more than 50% of the bank's equity and zero otherwise; HHI: the market concentration; 
INFLATION: the inflation rate; GDPR: the growth rate of the Gross Domestic Product; M2GDP : percentage of the 
ratio of money and quasi money supply to gross domestic product. p-values in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01 
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When the central bank intervenes on interest rates 
Model specification 
0 5 6 5 6* *it it j it it j it it j it it t k itnim X state foreign state X foreign X Z u               
(Xit: bank-specific variables, Zt: market and macro variables) 
Variables  Pool OLS GLS random effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
OVERHEAD 1 1.146*** 1.282*** 1.298*** 1.101*** 1.235*** 1.254*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
RESERVE 2 0.034*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.019* 0.024** 0.025** 
  (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.095) (0.031) (0.024) 
LIQ2DEPO 3 0.479 0.695 0.711 0.506 0.703 0.725 
  (0.411) (0.223) (0.212) (0.416) (0.251) (0.236) 
CAP 4 0.060*** 0.052*** 0.054*** 0.059*** 0.052*** 0.054*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
STATE 5 0.341 0.798 0.898 0.079 0.555 0.679 
  (0.695) (0.351) (0.295) (0.933) (0.560) (0.477) 
FOREIGN 6 1.928*** 2.104*** 2.179*** 1.514** 1.689** 1.779** 
  (0.008) (0.003) (0.002) (0.039) (0.021) (0.015) 
STATE*OVERHEAD 15 0.130 -0.019 -0.044 0.204 0.009 -0.022 
  (0.673) (0.950) (0.883) (0.536) (0.977) (0.946) 
FOREIGN*OVERHEAD 16 -1.248*** -1.396*** -1.411*** -1.211*** -1.353*** -1.371*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
STATE*RESERVE 25 -0.052 -0.092* -0.093* -0.044 -0.085* -0.086* 
  (0.284) (0.056) (0.052) (0.342) (0.066) (0.061) 
FOREIGN*RESERVE 26 0.077 0.075 0.070 0.114 0.099 0.092 
  (0.464) (0.464) (0.493) (0.251) (0.299) (0.333) 
STATE*LIQ2DEPO 35 -0.358 -0.342 -0.426 -0.793 -0.676 -0.798 
  (0.777) (0.781) (0.728) (0.551) (0.602) (0.537) 
FOREIGN*LIQ2DEPO 36 -0.531 -0.764 -0.781 -0.566 -0.783 -0.805 
  (0.363) (0.181) (0.171) (0.363) (0.202) (0.189) 
STATE*CAP 45 0.007 0.015 0.014 0.008 0.017 0.016 
  (0.705) (0.408) (0.456) (0.667) (0.388) (0.434) 
FOREIGN*CAP 46 -0.007 0.004 0.003 -0.001 0.011 0.009 
  (0.686) (0.787) (0.854) (0.944) (0.534) (0.605) 
GDPR 7 0.274** 0.185* 0.114 0.256** 0.165* 0.094 
  (0.019) (0.099) (0.310) (0.011) (0.084) (0.323) 
INFLATION 8 0.066***   0.064***   
  (0.000)   (0.000)   
HHI 9  -0.0008***   -0.0008***  
   (0.000)   (0.000)  
M2GDP 10   0.012***   0.012*** 
    (0.000)   (0.000) 
Constant 0 -1.983** -0.198 -1.946** -1.566** 0.174 -1.600** 
  (0.018) (0.805) (0.016) (0.040) (0.810) (0.028) 
15+1=0  1.276*** 
(0.000) 
1.262*** 
(0.000) 
1.253*** 
(0.000) 
1.304*** 
(0.000) 
1.244*** 
(0.000) 
1.231*** 
(0.000) 
16+1=0  -0.101* 
(0.060) 
-0.114** 
(0.030) 
-0.112** 
(0.032) 
-0.109** 
(0.050) 
-0.118** 
(0.036) 
-0.116** 
(0.039) 
25+2=0  -0.017 
(0.710) 
-0.052 
(0.259) 
-0.053 
(0.252) 
-0.025 
(0.585) 
-0.061 
(0.177) 
-0.061 
(0.173) 
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26+2=0  0.111 
(0.288) 
0.114 
(0.265) 
0.110 
(0.281) 
0.133 
(0.176) 
0.123 
(0.195) 
0.117 
(0.216) 
35+3=0  0.120 
(0.914) 
0.353 
(0.746) 
0.285 
(0.793) 
-0.287 
(0.806) 
0.027 
(0.981) 
-0.072 
(0.949) 
36+3=0  -0.052* 
(0.074) 
-0.069** 
(0.016) 
-0.069** 
(0.016) 
-0.060** 
(0.026) 
-0.080*** 
(0.002) 
-0.079*** 
(0.002) 
45+4=0  0.067*** 
(0.000) 
0.068*** 
(0.000) 
0.068*** 
(0.000) 
0.067*** 
(0.000) 
0.069*** 
(0.000) 
0.070*** 
(0.000) 
46+4=0  0.053*** 
(0.000) 
0.057*** 
(0.000) 
0.057*** 
(0.000) 
0.057*** 
(0.000) 
0.064*** 
(0.000) 
0.063*** 
(0.000) 
adj. R
2
  0.561 0.584 0.585    
R
2
 within     0.588 0.619 0.621 
R
2
 between     0.710 0.671 0.672 
R
2
 overall     0.591 .0611 0.613 
N  195 195 195 195 195 195 
Dependent variable- NIM (net interest margin): difference between interest income and interest expense to total 
average assets. OVERHEAD : ratio of overhead expenses to total assets; RESERVE : ratio of non-earning assets to 
total assets; LOAN2ASSET: ratio of loans to total assets; CAP: ratio of equity to total assets; FOREIGN: dummy 
variable for foreign ownership – the dummy takes the value of one if foreign shareholders hold more than 50% of 
total shares and zero otherwise; STATE: dummy variable for state ownership – the dummy takes the value of one if 
the government holds more than 50% of the bank's equity and zero otherwise; HHI: the market concentration; 
INFLATION: the inflation rate; GDPR: the growth rate of the Gross Domestic Product; M2GDP : percentage of the 
ratio of money and quasi money supply to gross domestic product. p-values in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01 
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APPENDIX F: Replacing macro variables by year dummies 
 
Model specification 
0 5 6 5 5* *it it j it it j it it j it it t itnim X state foreign state X foreign X year u              
(Xit: bank-specific variables) 
Variables  Pool OLS GLS random effects 
  Full FIXED=0 FIXED=1 Full FIXED=0 FIXED=1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
OVERHEAD 1 1.053*** 1.029*** 1.298*** 1.063*** 0.990*** 1.236*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
RESERVE 2 0.014 -0.016 0.037*** 0.011 -0.029* 0.022* 
  (0.137) (0.290) (0.002) (0.197) (0.070) (0.053) 
LOAN2ASSET 3 -0.001 0.003 -0.013** -0.001 -0.001 -0.013* 
  (0.700) (0.533) (0.040) (0.726) (0.784) (0.057) 
CAP 4 0.039*** 0.032*** 0.064*** 0.032*** 0.040*** 0.066*** 
  (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
FOREIGN 5 0.751 -0.849 1.767** 0.338 -1.376 1.497* 
  (0.221) (0.436) (0.035) (0.614) (0.190) (0.092) 
STATE 6 0.269 -0.096 1.115 -0.132 -2.273 0.606 
  (0.713) (0.931) (0.247) (0.892) (0.129) (0.581) 
STATE*OVERHEAD 15 0.601*** 0.869*** 0.109 0.179 0.526 0.097 
  (0.003) (0.002) (0.707) (0.473) (0.155) (0.754) 
FOREIGN*OVERHEAD 16 -1.115*** -0.338 -1.384*** -1.081*** -0.795 -1.319*** 
  (0.000) (0.599) (0.000) (0.000) (0.210) (0.000) 
STATE*RESERVE 25 -0.023 0.030 -0.098** -0.011 0.054* -0.077* 
  (0.474) (0.488) (0.045) (0.678) (0.097) (0.091) 
FOREIGN*RESERVE 26 0.004 0.050** 0.084 0.038* 0.088*** 0.112 
  (0.816) (0.042) (0.447) (0.060) (0.000) (0.277) 
STATE*LOAN2ASSET 35 -0.018* -0.022 -0.005 -0.009 0.011 -0.002 
  (0.062) (0.113) (0.692) (0.453) (0.577) (0.879) 
FOREIGN*LOAN2ASSET 36 0.011 0.022 0.005 0.007 0.032 0.002 
  (0.193) (0.134) (0.699) (0.474) (0.117) (0.876) 
STATE*CAP 45 0.018 -0.029 -0.0002 0.048*** 0.015 0.002 
  (0.197) (0.476) (0.991) (0.001) (0.704) (0.908) 
FOREIGN*CAP 46 0.007 -0.031 -0.017 0.023* -0.026 -0.017 
  (0.539) (0.280) (0.297) (0.071) (0.308) (0.355) 
Constant 0 1.834*** 1.195*** 1.360*** 1.860*** 1.407*** 1.625*** 
  (0.000) (0.004) (0.002) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) 
YEAR  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
15+1=0  1.654*** 
(0.000) 
1.898*** 
(0.000) 
1.406*** 
(0.000) 
1.242*** 
(0.000) 
1.515*** 
(0.000) 
1.322*** 
(0.000) 
16+1=0  -0.062 
(0.222) 
0.691 
(0.277) 
-0.086* 
(0.095) 
-0.017 
(0.715) 
0.194 
(0.758) 
-0.083 
(0.129) 
25+2=0  -0.009 
(0.767) 
0.013 
(0.740) 
-0.061 
(0.200) 
0.0001 
(0.996) 
0.024 
(0.398) 
-0.055 
(0.216) 
26+2=0  0.019 
(0.311) 
0.034* 
(0.092) 
0.121 
(0.272) 
0.050*** 
(0.006) 
0.059*** 
(0.001) 
0.134 
(0.190) 
35+3=0  -0.020** 
(0.027) 
-0.019 
(0.149) 
-0.019 
(0.126) 
-0.011 
(0.346) 
0.009 
(0.622) 
-0.015 
(0.252) 
36+3=0  0.010 0.025* -0.008 0.005 0.030 -0.010 
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(0.209) (0.065) (0.508) (0.530) (0.122) (0.412) 
45+4=0  0.058*** 
(0.000) 
0.003 
(0.933) 
0.064*** 
(0.000) 
0.080*** 
(0.000) 
0.056 
(0.155) 
0.068*** 
(0.000) 
46+4=0  0.047*** 
(0.000) 
0.0007 
(0.979) 
0.046*** 
(0.000) 
0.056*** 
(0.000) 
0.014 
(0.549) 
0.048*** 
(0.000) 
adj. R
2
  0.611 0.667 0.597    
R
2
 within     0.690 0.810 0.629 
R
2
 between     0.423 0.528 0.728 
R
2
 overall     0.621 0.672 0.633 
N  412 218 194 412 218 194 
Dependent variable- NIM (net interest margin): difference between interest income and interest expense to total 
average assets. OVERHEAD : ratio of overhead expenses to total assets; RESERVE : ratio of non-earning assets to 
total assets; LOAN2ASSET: ratio of loans to total assets; CAP: ratio of equity to total assets; FOREIGN: dummy 
variable for foreign ownership – the dummy takes the value of one if foreign shareholders hold more than 50% of 
total shares and zero otherwise; STATE: dummy variable for state ownership – the dummy takes the value of one if 
the government holds more than 50% of the bank's equity and zero otherwise; p-values in parentheses, * p < 0.10, 
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  
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APPENDIX G: Dropping negative values of nim 
 
Full sample 
Model specification 
0 5 6 5 6* *it it j it it j it it j it it t k itnim X state foreign state X foreign X Z u               
(Xit: bank-specific variables, Zt: market and macro variables) 
Variables  Pool PLS GLS random effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
OVERHEAD 1 1.007*** 1.063*** 1.058*** 1.025*** 1.085*** 1.078*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
RESERVE 2 0.018** 0.015* 0.015* 0.015* 0.011 0.013 
  (0.047) (0.097) (0.081) (0.083) (0.172) (0.129) 
LOAN2ASSET 3 -0.003 -0.0008 -0.0005 -0.003 0.0001 0.0006 
  (0.397) (0.821) (0.886) (0.409) (0.977) (0.889) 
CAP 4 0.037*** 0.034*** 0.035*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.026*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) 
STATE 5 -0.529 -0.245 -0.256 -0.960 -0.226 -0.249 
  (0.471) (0.733) (0.722) (0.342) (0.819) (0.802) 
FOREIGN 6 0.839 0.875 0.897 0.093 0.391 0.440 
  (0.162) (0.135) (0.126) (0.894) (0.567) (0.522) 
STATE*OVERHEAD 15 0.342 0.192 0.198 0.315 0.016 0.046 
  (0.136) (0.397) (0.380) (0.227) (0.948) (0.856) 
FOREIGN*OVERHEAD 16 -1.053*** -1.128*** -1.124*** -1.030*** -1.098*** -1.092*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
STATE*RESERVE 25 -0.015 -0.024 -0.021 0.001 -0.012 -0.008 
  (0.640) (0.436) (0.502) (0.970) (0.639) (0.760) 
FOREIGN*RESERVE 26 -0.006 -0.001 -0.001 0.034* 0.039** 0.039** 
  (0.748) (0.920) (0.926) (0.090) (0.043) (0.045) 
STATE*LOAN2ASSET 35 -0.0006 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004 -0.004 
  (0.955) (0.922) (0.918) (0.929) (0.745) (0.727) 
FOREIGN*LOAN2ASSET 36 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.012 0.004 0.003 
  (0.247) (0.279) (0.284) (0.231) (0.682) (0.701) 
STATE*CAP 45 0.024* 0.030** 0.029** 0.053*** 0.059*** 0.057*** 
  (0.084) (0.028) (0.037) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
FOREIGN*CAP 46 0.007 0.0128 0.011 0.030** 0.033** 0.030** 
  (0.518) (0.284) (0.358) (0.022) (0.010) (0.019) 
GDPR 7 0.123** 0.116** 0.099** 0.192*** 0.187*** 0.168*** 
  (0.015) (0.017) (0.041) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
INFLATION 8 0.026***   0.026***   
  (0.003)   (0.001)   
HHI 9  -0.0006***   -0.0007***  
   (0.000)   (0.000)  
M2GDP 10   0.009***   0.010*** 
    (0.000)   (0.000) 
Constant 0 0.221 1.162*** -0.412 -0.089 0.768* -0.987** 
  (0.637) (0.010) (0.390) (0.854) (0.097) (0.049) 
15+1=0  1.348*** 
(0.000) 
1.254*** 
(0.000) 
1.256*** 
(0.000) 
1.339*** 
(0.000) 
1.101*** 
(0.000) 
1.124*** 
(0.000) 
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16+1=0  -0.045 
(0.360) 
-0.065 
(0.181) 
-0.065 
(0.178) 
-0.005 
(0.918) 
-0.013 
(0.772) 
-0.013 
(0.773) 
25+2=0  0.003 
(0.912) 
-0.009 
(0.757) 
-0.005 
(0.863) 
0.016 
(0.527) 
-0.0005 
(0.982) 
0.005 
(0.841) 
26+2=0  0.011 
(0.513) 
0.013 
(0.460) 
0.013 
(0.430) 
0.050*** 
(0.007) 
0.051*** 
(0.004) 
0.052*** 
(0.003) 
35+3=0  -0.004 
(0.702) 
-0.001 
(0.849) 
-0.001 
(0.869) 
-0.005 
(0.684) 
-0.004 
(0.737) 
-0.003 
(0.749) 
36+3=0  0.006 
(0.387) 
0.008 
(0.272) 
0.008 
(0.260) 
0.008 
(0.355) 
0.004 
(0.631) 
0.004 
(0.610) 
45+4=0  0.061*** 
(0.000) 
0.064*** 
(0.000) 
0.064*** 
(0.000) 
0.077*** 
(0.000) 
0.084*** 
(0.000) 
0.084*** 
(0.000) 
46+4=0  0.045*** 
(0.000) 
0.046*** 
(0.000) 
0.046*** 
(0.000) 
0.055*** 
(0.000) 
0.057*** 
(0.000) 
0.056*** 
(0.000) 
adj. R
2
  0.593 0.611 0.611    
R
2
 within     0.657 0.686 0.684 
R
2
 between     0.384 0.381 0.393 
R
2
 overall     0.595 0.612 0.612 
N  405 405 405 405 405 405 
Dependent variable- NIM (net interest margin): difference between interest income and interest expense to total 
average assets. OVERHEAD : ratio of overhead expenses to total assets; RESERVE : ratio of non-earning assets to 
total assets; LOAN2ASSET: ratio of loans to total assets; CAP: ratio of equity to total assets; FOREIGN: dummy 
variable for FOREIGN ownership – the dummy takes the value of one if FOREIGN shareholders hold more than 
50% of total shares and zero otherwise; STATE: dummy variable for STATE ownership – the dummy takes the 
value of one if the government holds more than 50% of the bank's equity and zero otherwise; HHI: the market 
concentration; INFLATION: the inflation rate; GDP: the growth rate of the Gross Domestic Product; M2GDP : 
percentage of the ratio of money and quasi money supply to gross domestic product. p-values in parentheses, * p < 
0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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In absence of interest rate regulation 
Model specification 
0 5 6 5 6* *it it j it it j it it j it it t k itnim X state foreign state X foreign X Z u               
(Xit: bank-specific variables, Zt: market and macro variables) 
Variables  Pool OLS GLS random effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
OVERHEAD 1 1.025*** 1.030*** 1.028*** 0.974*** 0.981*** 0.977*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
RESERVE 2 -0.015 -0.016 -0.016 -0.026* -0.026* -0.024 
  (0.295) (0.277) (0.286) (0.098) (0.088) (0.116) 
LOAN2ASSET 3 0.003 0.003 0.004 -0.001 -0.0004 0.0004 
  (0.543) (0.469) (0.422) (0.753) (0.944) (0.933) 
CAP 4 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.033*** 0.043*** 0.042*** 0.043*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
STATE 5 -1.011 -1.006 -1.003 -2.483 -2.587* -2.667* 
  (0.378) (0.380) (0.381) (0.100) (0.088) (0.080) 
FOREIGN 6 -0.781 -0.702 -0.658 -1.309 -1.178 -1.119 
  (0.458) (0.506) (0.533) (0.206) (0.258) (0.286) 
STATE*OVERHEAD 15 0.257 0.244 0.242 0.307 0.280 0.306 
  (0.483) (0.506) (0.508) (0.430) (0.471) (0.430) 
FOREIGN*OVERHEAD 16 -0.351 -0.379 -0.397 -0.831 -0.905 -0.946 
  (0.576) (0.546) (0.528) (0.179) (0.142) (0.125) 
STATE*RESERVE 25 0.041 0.042 0.044 0.060* 0.062* 0.063** 
  (0.334) (0.324) (0.302) (0.057) (0.051) (0.044) 
FOREIGN*RESERVE 26 0.049** 0.049** 0.048** 0.085*** 0.085*** 0.083*** 
  (0.041) (0.043) (0.047) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
STATE*LOAN2ASSET 35 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.022 0.024 0.025 
  (0.752) (0.751) (0.753) (0.312) (0.276) (0.259) 
FOREIGN*LOAN2ASSET 36 0.022 0.021 0.021 0.034* 0.033 0.034* 
  (0.127) (0.135) (0.136) (0.093) (0.101) (0.095) 
STATE*CAP 45 -0.021 -0.021 -0.023 0.011 0.009 0.003 
  (0.592) (0.596) (0.566) (0.784) (0.811) (0.924) 
FOREIGN*CAP 46 -0.034 -0.034 -0.035 -0.032 -0.032 -0.034 
  (0.236) (0.228) (0.219) (0.196) (0.201) (0.174) 
GDPR 7 0.368*** 0.210** 0.200** 0.504*** 0.327*** 0.319*** 
  (0.002) (0.018) (0.024) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
INFLATION 8 0.030*   0.034***   
  (0.063)   (0.004)   
HHI 9  -0.0004*   -0.0005***  
   (0.058)   (0.003)  
M2GDP 10   0.008*   0.009*** 
    (0.050)   (0.003) 
CONSTANT 0 -1.791 0.298 -0.977 -2.575*** -0.245 -1.733** 
  (0.106) (0.726) (0.249) (0.003) (0.737) (0.017) 
15+1=0  1.281*** 
(0.000) 
1.273*** 
(0.000) 
1.269*** 
(0.000) 
1.280*** 
(0.001) 
1.261*** 
(0.001) 
1.282*** 
(0.001) 
16+1=0  0.674 
(0.278) 
0.650 
(0.296) 
0.630 
(0.311) 
0.142 
(0.817) 
0.076 
(0.901) 
0.030 
(0.960) 
25+2=0  0.025 
(0.529) 
0.026 
(0.527) 
0.028 
(0.489) 
0.034 
(0.228) 
0.035 
(0.216) 
0.039 
(0.163) 
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26+2=0  0.033* 
(0.087) 
0.032* 
(0.099) 
0.031 
(0.108) 
0.059*** 
(0.001) 
0.059*** 
(0.001) 
0.059*** 
(0.001) 
35+3=0  0.008 
(0.611) 
0.009 
(0.585) 
0.009 
(0.570) 
0.020 
(0.337) 
0.023 
(0.270) 
0.025 
(0.236) 
36+3=0  0.025* 
(0.063) 
0.025* 
(0.061) 
0.025* 
(0.057) 
0.032* 
(0.096) 
0.033* 
(0.091) 
0.034* 
(0.076) 
45+4=0  0.011 
(0.776) 
0.010 
(0.777) 
0.009 
(0.797) 
0.054 
(0.168) 
0.051 
(0.185) 
0.047 
(0.226) 
46+4=0  -0.001 
(0.960) 
-0.002 
(0.935) 
-0.002 
(0.938) 
0.010 
(0.657) 
0.009 
(0.668) 
0.009 
(0.688) 
adj. R
2
  0.659 0.659 0.660    
R
2
 within     0.809 0.811 0.809 
R
2
 between     0.517 0.509 0.510 
R
2
 overall     0.669 0.669 0.670 
N  215 215 215 215 215 215 
Dependent variable- NIM (net interest margin): difference between interest income and interest expense to total 
average assets. OVERHEAD : ratio of overhead expenses to total assets; RESERVE : ratio of non-earning assets to 
total assets; LOAN2ASSET: ratio of loans to total assets; CAP: ratio of equity to total assets; FOREIGN: dummy 
variable for FOREIGN ownership – the dummy takes the value of one if FOREIGN shareholders hold more than 
50% of total shares and zero otherwise; STATE: dummy variable for STATE ownership – the dummy takes the 
value of one if the government holds more than 50% of the bank's equity and zero otherwise; HHI: the market 
concentration; INFLATION: the inflation rate; GDP: the growth rate of the Gross Domestic Product; M2GDP : 
percentage of the ratio of money and quasi money supply to gross domestic product. p-values in parentheses, * p < 
0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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When the central bank intervenes on interest rates 
Model specification 
0 5 6 5 6* *it it j it it j it it j it it t k itnim X state foreign state X foreign X Z u               
(Xit: bank-specific variables, Zt: market and macro variables) 
Variables  Pool OLS GLS random effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
OVERHEAD 1 1.150*** 1.263*** 1.277*** 1.115*** 1.233*** 1.250*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
RESERVE 2 0.032*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.018* 0.022** 0.023** 
  (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.098) (0.037) (0.030) 
LOAN2ASSET 3 -0.011* -0.011* -0.011* -0.011 -0.011* -0.011* 
  (0.087) (0.071) (0.065) (0.101) (0.084) (0.078) 
CAP 4 0.061*** 0.056*** 0.057*** 0.061*** 0.056*** 0.058*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
STATE 5 0.147 0.685 0.705 -0.309 0.359 0.378 
  (0.873) (0.455) (0.441) (0.765) (0.733) (0.719) 
FOREIGN 6 1.460* 1.625** 1.668** 1.074 1.367 1.423* 
  (0.067) (0.038) (0.033) (0.203) (0.105) (0.091) 
STATE*OVERHEAD 15 0.098 -0.051 -0.069 0.139 -0.058 -0.079 
  (0.736) (0.860) (0.811) (0.655) (0.852) (0.800) 
FOREIGN*OVERHEAD 16 -1.237*** -1.357*** -1.370*** -1.205*** -1.324*** -1.340*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
STATE*RESERVE 25 -0.052 -0.085* -0.085* -0.040 -0.075* -0.076* 
  (0.261) (0.066) (0.063) (0.366) (0.083) (0.082) 
FOREIGN*RESERVE 26 0.111 0.117 0.113 0.143 0.150 0.144 
  (0.297) (0.259) (0.277) (0.152) (0.123) (0.139) 
STATE*LOAN2ASSET 35 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.005 0.006 
  (0.805) (0.883) (0.851) (0.641) (0.709) (0.675) 
FOREIGN*LOAN2ASSET 36 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.003 -0.0008 -0.0004 
  (0.821) (0.915) (0.894) (0.783) (0.952) (0.973) 
STATE*CAP 45 0.005 0.011 0.009 0.005 0.013 0.011 
  (0.776) (0.518) (0.577) (0.767) (0.495) (0.556) 
FOREIGN*CAP 46 -0.016 -0.009 -0.010 -0.013 -0.007 -0.009 
  (0.315) (0.550) (0.495) (0.435) (0.675) (0.600) 
GDPR 7 0.209* 0.140 0.083 0.204** 0.133 0.074 
  (0.058) (0.187) (0.434) (0.038) (0.156) (0.431) 
INFLATION 8 0.052***   0.054***   
  (0.000)   (0.000)   
HHI 9  -0.0006***   -0.0006***  
   (0.000)   (0.000)  
M2GDP 10   0.009***   0.010*** 
    (0.000)   (0.000) 
Constant 0 -0.678 0.784 -0.602 -0.416 1.066 -0.411 
  (0.423) (0.327) (0.460) (0.604) (0.158) (0.596) 
15+1=0  1.248*** 
(0.000) 
1.211*** 
(0.000) 
1.207*** 
(0.000) 
1.254*** 
(0.000) 
1.175*** 
(0.000) 
1.170*** 
(0.000) 
16+1=0  -0.086* 
(0.081) 
-0.094* 
(0.054) 
-0.093* 
(0.056) 
-0.089* 
(0.085) 
-0.090* 
(0.082) 
-0.089* 
(0.086) 
25+2=0  -0.019 
(0.665) 
-0.040 
(0.276) 
-0.048 
(0.276) 
-0.021 
(0.619) 
-0.053 
(0.213) 
-0.052 
(0.216) 
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26+2=0  0.143 
(0.177) 
0.153 
(0.139) 
0.149 
(0.149) 
0.162 
(0.105) 
0.172* 
(0.075) 
0.167* 
(0.084) 
35+3=0  -0.007 
(0.564) 
-0.009 
(0.468) 
-0.008 
(0.485) 
-0.003 
(0.781) 
-0.005 
(0.675) 
-0.005 
(0.700) 
36+3=0  -0.007 
(0.504) 
-0.009 
(0.397) 
-0.009 
(0.403) 
-0.007 
(0.573) 
-0.012 
(0.327) 
-0.012 
(0.332) 
45+4=0  0.066*** 
(0.000) 
0.067*** 
(0.000) 
0.067*** 
(0.000) 
0.006*** 
(0.000) 
0.069*** 
(0.000) 
0.069*** 
(0.000) 
46+4=0  0.045*** 
(0.000) 
0.047*** 
(0.000) 
0.046*** 
(0.000) 
0.047*** 
(0.000) 
0.049*** 
(0.000) 
0.049*** 
(0.000) 
adj. R
2
  0.585 0.601 0.602    
R
2
 within     0.599 0.620 0.620 
R
2
 between     0.721 0.716 0.719 
R
2
 overall     0.616 0.631 0.632 
N  190 190 190 190 190 190 
Dependent variable- NIM (net interest margin): difference between interest income and interest expense to total 
average assets. OVERHEAD : ratio of overhead expenses to total assets; RESERVE : ratio of non-earning assets to 
total assets; LOAN2ASSET: ratio of loans to total assets; CAP: ratio of equity to total assets; FOREIGN: dummy 
variable for FOREIGN ownership – the dummy takes the value of one if FOREIGN shareholders hold more than 
50% of total shares and zero otherwise; STATE: dummy variable for STATE ownership – the dummy takes the 
value of one if the government holds more than 50% of the bank's equity and zero otherwise; HHI: the market 
concentration; INFLATION: the inflation rate; GDP: the growth rate of the Gross Domestic Product; M2GDP : 
percentage of the ratio of money and quasi money supply to gross domestic product. p-values in parentheses, * p < 
0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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APPENDIX H: Dropping values of the ratio equity to total assets higher than 85% 
 
Full sample 
Model specification 
0 5 6 5 6* *it it j it it j it it j it it t k itnim X state foreign state X foreign X Z u               
(Xit: bank-specific variables, Zt: market and macro variables) 
Variables  Pool OLS GLS random effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
OVERHEAD 1 1.015*** 1.072*** 1.068*** 1.023*** 1.088*** 1.081*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
RESERVE 2 0.017* 0.014 0.015 0.016* 0.012 0.013 
  (0.063) (0.120) (0.102) (0.072) (0.156) (0.115) 
LOAN2ASSET 3 -0.004 -0.002 -0.00159 -0.005 -0.0006 -0.00002 
  (0.258) (0.625) (0.702) (0.277) (0.886) (0.996) 
CAP 4 0.037*** 0.034*** 0.036*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.028*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) 
STATE 5 -0.025 0.349 0.334 -0.934 -0.139 -0.152 
  (0.972) (0.634) (0.647) (0.365) (0.891) (0.881) 
FOREIGN 6 0.823 0.860 0.886 0.135 0.477 0.535 
  (0.186) (0.158) (0.145) (0.850) (0.495) (0.446) 
STATE*OVERHEAD 15 0.701*** 0.601*** 0.594*** 0.398 0.088 0.112 
  (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.123) (0.728) (0.657) 
FOREIGN*OVERHEAD 16 -1.064*** -1.145*** -1.142*** -1.040*** -1.117*** -1.110*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
STATE*RESERVE 25 -0.022 -0.033 -0.030 -0.003 -0.018 -0.013 
  (0.492) (0.298) (0.345) (0.908) (0.495) (0.603) 
FOREIGN*RESERVE 26 -0.006 -0.001 -0.001 0.032 0.039* 0.038* 
  (0.742) (0.925) (0.930) (0.118) (0.051) (0.054) 
STATE*LOAN2ASSET 35 -0.016 -0.020** -0.019* -0.004 -0.008 -0.008 
  (0.101) (0.047) (0.051) (0.735) (0.492) (0.481) 
FOREIGN*LOAN2ASSET 36 0.010 0.008 0.008 0.010 0.001 0.0008 
  (0.251) (0.326) (0.334) (0.305) (0.909) (0.937) 
STATE*CAP 45 0.019 0.024* 0.022 0.051*** 0.058*** 0.055*** 
  (0.198) (0.093) (0.114) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
FOREIGN*CAP 46 0.009 0.017 0.015 0.036** 0.040*** 0.037*** 
  (0.485) (0.214) (0.265) (0.012) (0.003) (0.006) 
GDPR 7 0.148*** 0.139*** 0.121** 0.215*** 0.208*** 0.188*** 
  (0.005) (0.006) (0.015) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
INFLATION 8 0.029***   0.029***   
  (0.002)   (0.000)   
HHI 9  -
0.0006*** 
  -0.0007***  
   (0.000)   (0.000)  
M2GDP 10   0.010***   0.011*** 
    (0.000)   (0.000) 
Constant 0 0.049 1.059** -0.610 -0.259 0.689 -1.236** 
  (0.918) (0.023) (0.217) (0.602) (0.143) (0.015) 
15+1=0  1.716*** 
(0.000) 
1.672*** 
(0.000) 
1.662*** 
(0.000) 
1.421*** 
(0.000) 
1.176*** 
(0.000) 
1.193*** 
(0.000) 
16+1=0  -0.048 
(0.354) 
-0.073 
(0.158) 
-0.073 
(0.152) 
-0.016 
(0.746) 
-0.028 
(0.556) 
-0.028 
(0.557) 
25+2=0  -0.004 
(0.880) 
-0.019 
(0.542) 
-0.015 
(0.626) 
0.013 
(0.617) 
-0.005 
(0.823) 
-0.00002 
(0.999) 
26+2=0  0.010 
(0.562) 
0.012 
(0.489) 
0.013 
(0.460) 
0.049*** 
(0.010) 
0.051*** 
(0.005) 
0.052*** 
(0.004) 
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35+3=0  -0.021** 
(0.022) 
-0.022** 
(0.017) 
-0.021** 
(0.021) 
-0.009 
(0.432) 
-0.009 
(0.427) 
-0.008 
(0.447) 
36+3=0  0.005 
(0.474) 
0.006 
(0.395) 
0.007 
(0.376) 
0.005 
(0.548) 
0.0005 
(0.995) 
0.0007 
(0.931) 
45+4=0  0.056*** 
(0.000) 
0.058*** 
(0.000) 
0.058*** 
(0.000) 
0.077*** 
(0.000) 
0.084*** 
(0.000) 
0.083*** 
(0.000) 
46+4=0  0.047*** 
(0.000) 
0.051*** 
(0.000) 
0.051*** 
(0.000) 
0.061*** 
(0.000) 
0.066*** 
(0.000) 
0.065*** 
(0.000) 
adj. R
2
  0.591 0.609 0.610    
R
2
 within     0.646 0.680 0.678 
R
2
 between     0.436 0.424 0.435 
R
2
 overall     0.590 0.603 0.605 
N  411 411 411 411 411 411 
Dependent variable- NIM (net interest margin): difference between interest income and interest expense to total 
average assets. OVERHEAD : ratio of overhead expenses to total assets; RESERVE : ratio of non-earning assets 
to total assets; LOAN2ASSET: ratio of loans to total assets; CAP: ratio of equity to total assets; FOREIGN: 
dummy variable for FOREIGN ownership – the dummy takes the value of one if FOREIGN shareholders hold 
more than 50% of total shares and zero otherwise; STATE: dummy variable for STATE ownership – the dummy 
takes the value of one if the government holds more than 50% of the bank's equity and zero otherwise; HHI: the 
market concentration; INFLATION: the inflation rate; GDP: the growth rate of the Gross Domestic Product; 
M2GDP : percentage of the ratio of money and quasi money supply to gross domestic product. p-values in 
parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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In absence of interest rate regulation 
 
Model specification 
0 5 6 5 6* *it it j it it j it it j it it t k itnim X state foreign state X foreign X Z u               
(Xit: bank-specific variables, Zt: market and macro variables) 
Variable  Pool OLS GLS random effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
OVERHEAD 1 1.015*** 1.018*** 1.019*** 0.968*** 0.976*** 0.972*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
RESERVE 2 -0.014 -0.015 -0.015 -0.025 -0.026* -0.024 
  (0.334) (0.317) (0.316) (0.107) (0.096) (0.122) 
LOAN2ASSET 3 0.002 0.003 0.003 -0.002 -0.0007 0.0001 
  (0.572) (0.511) (0.462) (0.722) (0.901) (0.982) 
CAP 4 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.043*** 0.042*** 0.043*** 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
STATE 5 -0.084 -0.078 -0.084 -2.157 -2.259 -2.353 
  (0.939) (0.943) (0.939) (0.148) (0.131) (0.117) 
FOREIGN 6 -0.776 -0.712 -0.667 -1.301 -1.175 -1.116 
  (0.466) (0.505) (0.532) (0.210) (0.259) (0.288) 
STATE*OVERHEAD 15 0.899*** 0.889*** 0.876*** 0.579 0.548 0.558 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.116) (0.139) (0.131) 
FOREIGN*OVERHEAD 16 -0.340 -0.364 -0.384 -0.828 -0.899 -0.938 
  (0.591) (0.567) (0.546) (0.185) (0.149) (0.132) 
STATE*RESERVE 25 0.030 0.031 0.032 0.054* 0.055* 0.057* 
  (0.484) (0.476) (0.455) (0.094) (0.085) (0.074) 
FOREIGN*RESERVE 26 0.049** 0.049** 0.048** 0.084*** 0.084*** 0.082*** 
  (0.044) (0.045) (0.050) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
STATE*LOAN2ASSET 35 -0.023 -0.023 -0.023 0.009 0.011 0.013 
  (0.103) (0.102) (0.107) (0.646) (0.584) (0.535) 
FOREIGN*LOAN2ASSET 36 0.022 0.022 0.021 0.035* 0.034* 0.034* 
  (0.128) (0.134) (0.136) (0.088) (0.095) (0.089) 
STATE*CAP 45 -0.031 -0.031 -0.032 0.011 0.010 0.004 
  (0.439) (0.443) (0.428) (0.781) (0.805) (0.913) 
FOREIGN*CAP 46 -0.036 -0.036 -0.036 -0.034 -0.034 -0.036 
  (0.213) (0.207) (0.204) (0.175) (0.179) (0.155) 
GDPR 7 0.315*** 0.188** 0.180** 0.474*** 0.306*** 0.298*** 
  (0.009) (0.035) (0.044) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
INFLATION 8 0.024   0.032***   
  (0.136)   (0.007)   
HHI 9  -0.0003   -0.0005***  
   (0.126)   (0.004)  
M2GDP 10   0.007*   0.008*** 
    (0.099)   (0.005) 
Constant 0 -1.322 0.356 -0.700 -2.327*** -0.104 -1.536** 
  (0.232) (0.679) (0.410) (0.008) (0.888) (0.035) 
15+1=0  1.913*** 
(0.000) 
1.907*** 
(0.000) 
1.894*** 
(0.000) 
1.547*** 
(0.000) 
1.523*** 
(0.000) 
1.529*** 
(0.000) 
16+1=0  0.674 
(0.284) 
0.654 
(0.298) 
0.634 
(0.313) 
0.140 
(0.822) 
0.077 
(0.901) 
0.033 
(0.957) 
25+2=0  0.015 
(0.706) 
0.015 
(0.706) 
0.017 
(0.678) 
0.028 
(0.329) 
0.029 
(0.316) 
0.032 
(0.249) 
26+2=0  0.034* 
(0.082) 
0.033* 
(0.093) 
0.032 
(0.102) 
0.058*** 
(0.001) 
0.058*** 
(0.001) 
0.058*** 
(0.001) 
35+3=0  -0.030 
(0.126) 
-0.020 
(0.134) 
-0.019 
(0.150) 
0.007 
(0.708) 
0.010 
(0.595) 
0.013 
(0.517) 
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36+3=0  0.025* 
(0.065) 
0.025* 
(0.064) 
0.025* 
(0.061) 
0.032* 
(0.093) 
0.033* 
(0.088) 
0.035* 
(0.075) 
45+4=0  0.002 
(0.956) 
0.002 
(0.956) 
0.001 
(0.968) 
0.054 
(0.164) 
0.052 
(0.179) 
0.048 
(0.217) 
46+4=0  -0.002 
(0.926) 
-0.003 
(0.907) 
-0.002 
(0.912) 
0.008 
(0.707) 
0.008 
(0.717) 
0.007 
(0.735) 
adj. R
2
  0.670 0.670 0.671    
R
2
 within     0.803 0.805 0.804 
R
2
 between     0.534 0.526 0.527 
R
2
 overall     0.671 0.670 0.671 
N  218 218 218 218 218 218 
Dependent variable- NIM (net interest margin): difference between interest income and interest expense to total 
average assets. OVERHEAD : ratio of overhead expenses to total assets; RESERVE : ratio of non-earning assets 
to total assets; LOAN2ASSET: ratio of loans to total assets; CAP: ratio of equity to total assets; FOREIGN: 
dummy variable for FOREIGN ownership – the dummy takes the value of one if FOREIGN shareholders hold 
more than 50% of total shares and zero otherwise; STATE: dummy variable for STATE ownership – the dummy 
takes the value of one if the government holds more than 50% of the bank's equity and zero otherwise; HHI: the 
market concentration; INFLATION: the inflation rate; GDP: the growth rate of the Gross Domestic Product; 
M2GDP : percentage of the ratio of money and quasi money supply to gross domestic product. p-values in 
parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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When the central bank intervenes on interest rates 
Model specification 
0 5 6 5 6* *it it j it it j it it j it it t k itnim X state foreign state X foreign X Z u               
(Xit: bank-specific variables, Zt: market and macro variables) 
Variable  Pool OLS GLS random effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
OVERHEAD 1 1.191*** 1.312*** 1.327*** 1.137*** 1.258*** 1.276*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
RESERVE 2 0.032*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.018 0.021* 0.022** 
  (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.111) (0.050) (0.041) 
LOAN2ASSET 3 -0.014** -0.014** -0.014** -0.014** -0.014** -0.014** 
  (0.028) (0.030) (0.027) (0.037) (0.040) (0.037) 
CAP 4 0.066*** 0.060*** 0.061*** 0.067*** 0.061*** 0.063*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
STATE 5 0.455 1.159 1.185 -0.079 0.686 0.709 
  (0.638) (0.226) (0.215) (0.941) (0.530) (0.516) 
FOREIGN 6 1.462* 1.670** 1.719** 1.080 1.410 1.473* 
  (0.086) (0.044) (0.038) (0.222) (0.109) (0.093) 
STATE*OVERHEAD 15 0.235 0.102 0.083 0.294 0.095 0.073 
  (0.425) (0.723) (0.773) (0.343) (0.756) (0.811) 
FOREIGN*OVERHEAD 16 -1.291*** -1.425*** -1.439*** -1.243*** -1.374*** -1.390*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
STATE*RESERVE 25 -0.063 -0.103** -0.104** -0.045 -0.085* -0.085* 
  (0.196) (0.033) (0.032) (0.328) (0.061) (0.059) 
FOREIGN*RESERVE 26 0.125 0.136 0.130 0.146 0.149 0.143 
  (0.271) (0.218) (0.236) (0.168) (0.139) (0.157) 
STATE*LOAN2ASSET 35 -0.001 -0.006 -0.005 0.0005 -0.003 -0.002 
  (0.890) (0.648) (0.673) (0.973) (0.819) (0.853) 
FOREIGN*LOAN2ASSET 36 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
  (0.898) (0.856) (0.879) (0.826) (0.793) (0.811) 
STATE*CAP 45 -0.002 0.004 0.002 -0.001 0.007 0.005 
  (0.898) (0.805) (0.878) (0.941) (0.710) (0.783) 
FOREIGN*CAP 46 -0.012 -0.001 -0.002 -0.010 0.001 -0.0005 
  (0.492) (0.948) (0.875) (0.595) (0.935) (0.979) 
GDPR 7 0.247** 0.174 0.110 0.241** 0.165* 0.099 
  (0.033) (0.117) (0.322) (0.019) (0.085) (0.303) 
INFLATION 8 0.056***   0.057***   
  (0.000)   (0.000)   
HHI 9  -0.0007***   -0.0007***  
   (0.000)   (0.000)  
M2GDP 10   0.011***   0.011*** 
    (0.000)   (0.000) 
Constant 0 -0.930 0.656 -0.919 -0.648 0.967 -0.687 
  (0.300) (0.432) (0.281) (0.441) (0.214) (0.389) 
15+1=0  1.426*** 
(0.000) 
1.413*** 
(0.000) 
1.410*** 
(0.000) 
1.430*** 
(0.000) 
1.353*** 
(0.000) 
1.349*** 
(0.000) 
16+1=0  -0.099* 
(0.064) 
-0.113** 
(0.031) 
-0.112** 
(0.033) 
-0.106* 
(0.055) 
-0.115** 
(0.037) 
-0.114** 
(0.039) 
25+2=0  -0.030 
(0.521) 
-0.067 
(0.155) 
-0.067 
(0.154) 
-0.026 
(0.557) 
-0.063 
(0.154) 
-0.062 
(0.155) 
26+2=0  0.157 
(0.164) 
-.171 
(0.118) 
0.167 
(0.127) 
0.164 
(0.118) 
0.171* 
(0.089) 
0.165* 
(0.099) 
35+3=0  -0.016 
(0.186) 
-0.020* 
(0.096) 
-0.020 
(0.101) 
-0.014 
(0.301) 
-0.017 
(0.190) 
-0.017 
(0.202) 
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36+3=0  -0.013 
(0.329) 
-0.016 
(0.191) 
-0.016 
(0.198) 
-0.011 
(0.405) 
-0.018 
(0.175) 
-0.017 
(0.179) 
45+4=0  0.064*** 
(0.000) 
0.064*** 
(0.000) 
0.064*** 
(0.000) 
0.065*** 
(0.000) 
0.068 
(0.000) 
0.068*** 
(0.000) 
46+4=0  0.053*** 
(0.000) 
0.059*** 
(0.000) 
0.058*** 
(0.000) 
0.056*** 
(0.000) 
0.062*** 
(0.000) 
0.062*** 
(0.000) 
adj. R
2
  0.571 0.596 0.598    
R
2
 within     0.589 0.625 0.626 
R
2
 between     0.756 0.735 0.735 
R
2
 overall     0.603 0.625 0.626 
N  193 193 193 193 193 193 
Dependent variable- NIM (net interest margin): difference between interest income and interest expense to total 
average assets. OVERHEAD : ratio of overhead expenses to total assets; RESERVE : ratio of non-earning assets 
to total assets; LOAN2ASSET: ratio of loans to total assets; CAP: ratio of equity to total assets; FOREIGN: 
dummy variable for FOREIGN ownership – the dummy takes the value of one if FOREIGN shareholders hold 
more than 50% of total shares and zero otherwise; STATE: dummy variable for STATE ownership – the dummy 
takes the value of one if the government holds more than 50% of the bank's equity and zero otherwise; HHI: the 
market concentration; INFLATION: the inflation rate; GDP: the growth rate of the Gross Domestic Product; 
M2GDP : percentage of the ratio of money and quasi money supply to gross domestic product. p-values in 
parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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APPENDIX I: Determinants of the net interest margins of private banks 
Model specification 
0it it j t k itnim X Z u       (Xit: bank-specific variables, Zt: market and macro variables) 
Variables  Pool OLS GLS fixed effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
OVERHEAD 1 1.013*** 1.085*** 1.079*** 1.055*** 1.124*** 1.115*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
RESERVE 2 0.018* 0.013 0.014 0.016 0.010 0.012 
  (0.074) (0.181) (0.150) (0.109) (0.272) (0.206) 
LOAN2ASSET 3 -0.004 -0.001 -0.0009 -0.003 0.001 0.002 
  (0.273) (0.759) (0.828) (0.531) (0.726) (0.647) 
CAP 4 0.038*** 0.033*** 0.035*** 0.015 0.017* 0.020** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.147) (0.080) (0.042) 
GDPR 7 0.150** 0.152** 0.132** 0.228*** 0.232*** 0.210*** 
  (0.025) (0.018) (0.038) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
INFLATION 8 0.025**   0.023**   
  (0.032)   (0.017)   
HHI 9  -0.0007***   -0.0008***  
   (0.000)   (0.000)  
M2GDP 10   0.011***   0.012*** 
    (0.000)   (0.000) 
Constant 0 0.072 1.076* -0.843 -0.280 0.616 -1.490** 
  (0.901) (0.054) (0.163) (0.637) (0.261) (0.015) 
adj. R
2
  0.572 0.599 0.598 0.568 0.615 0.611 
N  285 285 285 285 285 285 
Dependent variable- NIM (net interest margin): difference between interest income and interest expense to total 
average assets. OVERHEAD: ratio of overhead expenses to total assets; RESERVE : ratio of non-earning assets to 
total assets; LOAN2ASSET: ratio of loans to total assets; CAP: ratio of equity to total assets; HHI: the market 
concentration; INFLATION: the inflation rate; GDPR: the growth rate of the Gross Domestic Product; M2GDP : 
percentage of the ratio of money and quasi money supply to gross domestic product. p-values in parentheses, * p 
< 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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In absence of interest rate regulation 
Model specification 
0it it j t k itnim X Z u       (Xit: bank-specific variables, Zt: market and macro variables) 
Variables  Pool OLS GLS fixed effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
OVERHEAD 1 1.027*** 1.032*** 1.030*** 1.016*** 1.025*** 1.019*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
RESERVE 2 -0.016 -0.017 -0.016 -0.026 -0.026 -0.023 
  (0.335) (0.313) (0.319) (0.136) (0.127) (0.171) 
LOAN2ASSET 3 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.004 
  (0.576) (0.500) (0.452) (0.735) (0.570) (0.490) 
CAP 4 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.033*** 
  (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.006) 
GDPR 7 0.365** 0.200* 0.189* 0.594*** 0.424*** 0.414*** 
  (0.021) (0.074) (0.091) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
INFLATION 8 0.031   0.033**   
  (0.130)   (0.019)   
HHI 9  -0.0004   -0.0005**  
   (0.115)   (0.012)  
M2GDP 10   0.009*   0.008** 
    (0.099)   (0.017) 
Constant 0 -1.781 0.415 -0.950 -3.376*** -1.136 -2.590*** 
  (0.212) (0.689) (0.373) (0.001) (0.173) (0.003) 
adj. R
2
  0.670 0.670 0.671 0.766 0.768 0.767 
N  155 155 155 155 155 155 
Dependent variable- NIM (net interest margin): difference between interest income and interest expense to total 
average assets. OVERHEAD: ratio of overhead expenses to total assets; RESERVE : ratio of non-earning assets to 
total assets; LOAN2ASSET: ratio of loans to total assets; CAP: ratio of equity to total assets; HHI: the market 
concentration; INFLATION: the inflation rate; GDPR: the growth rate of the Gross Domestic Product; M2GDP : 
percentage of the ratio of money and quasi money supply to gross domestic product. p-values in parentheses, * p 
< 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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When the central bank intervenes on interest rates 
Model specification 
0it it j t k itnim X Z u       (Xit: bank-specific variables, Zt: market and macro variables) 
Variables  Pool OLS GLS fixed effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
OVERHEAD 1 1.192*** 1.333*** 1.349*** 1.109*** 1.249*** 1.266*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
RESERVE 2 0.032** 0.034*** 0.035*** 0.009 0.014 0.015 
  (0.017) (0.007) (0.005) (0.502) (0.282) (0.250) 
LOAN2ASSET 3 -0.015** -0.013* -0.013* -0.018* -0.015* -0.016* 
  (0.043) (0.064) (0.058) (0.078) (0.094) (0.082) 
CAP 4 0.065*** 0.058*** 0.059*** 0.031 0.038 0.044 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.282) (0.162) (0.111) 
GDPR 7 0.161 0.119 0.046 0.100 0.070 -0.002 
  (0.297) (0.407) (0.748) (0.468) (0.575) (0.983) 
INFLATION 8 0.054***   0.055***   
  (0.006)   (0.003)   
HHI 9  -0.0008***   -0.0009***  
   (0.000)   (0.000)  
M2GDP 10   0.013***   0.014*** 
    (0.000)   (0.000) 
Constant 0 -0.346 1.114 -0.737 0.944 2.223** 0.184 
  (0.766) (0.285) (0.496) (0.420) (0.034) (0.868) 
adj. R
2
  0.481 0.534 0.534 0.321 0.419 0.411 
N  130 130 130 130 130 130 
Dependent variable- NIM (net interest margin): difference between interest income and interest expense to total 
average assets. OVERHEAD: ratio of overhead expenses to total assets; RESERVE : ratio of non-earning assets to 
total assets; LOAN2ASSET: ratio of loans to total assets; CAP: ratio of equity to total assets; HHI: the market 
concentration; INFLATION: the inflation rate; GDPR: the growth rate of the Gross Domestic Product; M2GDP : 
percentage of the ratio of money and quasi money supply to gross domestic product. p-values in parentheses, * p 
< 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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 This chapter is from an article titled: “Bank capital and bank lending channel: an empirical study of 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the money transmission mechanism, equity capital is generally not considered as a 
major component of the bank lending channel. Early studies analyze how monetary policy 
affects the role of reserves and their impact on the supply of loans, which can also be 
considered by determining the volume of demand deposits (Van-den-Heuvel, 2006). There are 
few studies that discuss the role of bank capital in the money transmission mechanism. For 
example, Ehmann et al (2001) assume that bank capital is linked to the level of loans; or 
Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004) analyze the influence of bank capital on the response of 
lending to a change in monetary policy. In the presence of perfect capital markets, banks 
could raise funds continuously to adjust to the demand for loans and to comply with 
prudential regulation. But because of financial constraints on imperfect capital markets, banks 
face difficulties in increasing their funds (debt or equity). Consequently, bank lending 
capacities are reduced. Moreover, bank prudential regulations require banks to fund a certain 
proportion of their loans with equity capital. Hence, bank equity is expected to play an 
important role in the bank lending channel.  
The aim of this chapter is to analyze the response of bank lending to monetary policy 
and also economic conditions changes and specifically the influence played by bank equity in 
such responses in the context of the Vietnamese banking system. Although Vietnamese 
regulators have not implemented the Basel accords strictly speaking, the central bank imposes 
minimum capital rules requiring banks to raise their equity level and capital ratios to prevent 
excessive risk-taking and to stabilize the banking system. Similarly to other transition 
economies, Vietnam has not developed its capital market and banks therefore face severe 
difficulties to raise funds (foreign debt and equity) to fulfill the capital requirements. 
Consequently the banking system can encounter severe problems if banks cannot increase 
their capital and reduce their loans to maintain a satisfactory prudential capital ratio. Besides, 
the bank lending channel plays an important role for economic development in Vietnam. The 
private sector has significantly evolved from the beginning of 2000s; new firms were family 
businesses and were of small size.  
Our contributions in this chapter are the following. First, this is the first study on the 
role played by bank equity in the bank lending channel in Vietnam, a transition economy 
where the banking system has been affected by the centrally oriented regime for a long time. 
Second, it provides a deep analysis of the monetary transmission mechanism by using 
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individual bank data in Vietnam with more insightful implications than the aggregate data 
used in earlier studies. 
The results indicate that bank lending negatively responds to a monetary policy change 
and interacts positively with GDP shocks. Specifically, bank equity -a proxy for bank 
capitalization- has a negative influence on loan growth suggesting that bank regulation might 
be a heavy burden for banks. By contrast, liquidity appears as a valuable internal financial 
source allowing banks to maintain, to some extent, their lending activities when they face a 
tighter monetary policy.  
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides information on monetary 
policy and regulatory capital requirements in Vietnam. Section 3 discusses related literature 
and presents the methodology applied in this work. Section 4 describes the data and the 
variables used in the empirical investigation. Section 5 discusses the main results and reports 
robustness analysis. The last section concludes the chapter. 
2. Monetary policy and capital requirements in Vietnam 
 
Under the reforms of the financial system, Vietnam enacted the law of the central bank 
and another law for financial institutions in 1997, in which the central bank (the State Bank of 
Vietnam- SBV) announces a monthly prime rate (or the base interest rate as defined by the 
SBV). By law, the prime rate is defined as a monetary policy instrument to ease or to tighten 
monetary conditions. Additionally, the prime rate also plays another role as a base rate for 
financial institutions and banks to set their interest rates. The prime rate was officially 
implemented for the first time in 2000, and the last announcement of the SBV regarding the 
prime rate was in November 201024. This rate has served until February 2011 and banks have 
since then set their interest rates by complying with other rules and namely ceiling rules 
regarding deposit rates25. 
Beside the prime rate, the SBV employs other monetary policy instruments to control 
the financial market: discount policy, open market operations and reserve requirements. The 
discount policy includes discount rates and refinance rates. These rates allow banks to access 
funds by quotas. The open market operations, which started in 2000, are recognized as the 
                                                             
24
 Circulation number 2868/QD-NHNN dated 29 November 2010. 
25
 Circulation number 02/2011/TT-NHNN dated 03 March 2011 on the ceiling deposit rate for Vietnamese 
currency. 
Chapter 3 
Bank capital and bank lending channel 
101 
 
critical monetary instrument to control liquidity. The last instrument- reserve requirements- 
was considered as an important instrument for the demand for deposits. 
Regarding capital regulation, the Vietnamese banking system had not applied the 
international standards until 2005. Indeed, the SBV issued the first bank prudential rules in 
August 1999 and then amended them in April 200526. These capital regulations were not 
strictly applied until 2010 when the SBV required banks to record their capital ratios more 
frequently and to comply with minimum capital ratio rules27. Beyond capital ratio rules, the 
government also regulates the level of bank statutory capital according to bank ownership 
structures and specialized banking services. The first regulation was enacted in 1998 to 
prevent a chaos of the banking system after the financial crisis in Thailand in 1997. Most 
banks had increasing bad debts and were weakly capitalized (Pham and Vuong, 2009). The 
other statutory regulation was issued in 2006 to restructure the banking system and increase 
bank capacity and liability. Due to a cool down of the stock market from 2005 and the 
limitation on external funds, banks had not much choices to increase their capital other than to 
increase their equity. The favorite method of Vietnamese banks is to retain profits that are 
transferred to new shares for current shareholders and strategic investors (except for the 100% 
foreign banks which have to satisfy the statutory capital rule when established). Credit growth 
is therefore an important indicator to banks and the central bank.  For this purpose the SBV 
plans annual targets for banks' credit growth.   
3. Related literature and methodology 
 
3.1 Related literature  
 
Several studies focus on the impact of a tightening of monetary policy on bank lending 
(Bernanke and Gertler (1995); Guiso, Kashyap et al. (1999); Kashyap and Stein (2000); 
Ehrmann, Gambacorta et al. (2001)). Bernanke and Gertler (1995) argue that a monetary 
policy tightening typically influences interest rates which lead to a drop in real GDP and in 
the price level. They state that monetary policy hardly influences short-term interest rates. 
Angeloni, Mojon et al. (2002) study the monetary transmission mechanism in European 
countries from 1970 to 2000 with aggregated data and bank level data to see whether 
                                                             
26
 Circulation number 457/2005/QD-NHNN dated 19 April 2005 on the capital adequacy ratios of financial 
institutions. 
27
 Circulation number 13/2010/TT-NHNN dated 20 May 2010 on prudential regulations for financial institutions. 
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monetary policy induced a change in the GDP as well as in bank loan supply. The results 
indicate that monetary policy negatively influences real price (CPI) and the GDP, and the 
responses of loan volumes are different among countries; Ireland has a positive response of 
loan volume to monetary policy, while other countries have negative effects. Cottarellí, Ferrí 
et al. (1995) employ the inflation and the prime rates to analyze the influence of monetary 
policy on the bank lending rate in Italy by using aggregated data. They find that the inflation 
and prime rates have positive effects on bank lending rates in Italy. Using data on Europe, 
Altunbas, Fazylov et al. (2002) also show that monetary shocks significantly impact on loan 
supply and real output.  
In a theoretical study, Thakor (1996) investigates the relationship between loans, 
capital requirements and monetary policy by analyzing banks’ behavior. Banks decide their 
loans based on the risks they might endure and the regulations that they have to comply with. 
Gale (2010) explains that the minimum capital requirement is an important rule to prevent 
excessive risk-taking of banks’ executives and this type of regulation is also recognized as a 
stabilizing factor for the financial sector. Indeed, he argues that the charter values (equity) 
reflect the amount of loans banks can supply. He indicates that raising the deposit rate or 
lowering the loan rate has the effect of lowering bank charter values. In other words, this can 
explain the presence of bank capital in the monetary transmission mechanism, in which the 
tightening of monetary policy causes a fall in bank profits. Under the context of bank capital 
regulations, banks might raise their capital to meet the capital requirements. In presence of an 
imperfect market of bank equity, banks choose to reduce their loan portfolio when issuing 
new shares is costly (Thakor, 1996; Bolton and Freixas, 2000 and Gale and Ozgur, 2005). 
Banks attempt to shift their risks to firms when their charter value declines and this forces the 
government to impose a minimum capital requirement to prevent excessive risk-taking. More 
precisely, Peydró (2010), in a discussion of Bernanke and Gertler (1995)’s article, definitely 
points out that bank capital can affect bank lending and correlates with the business cycle. 
Recent studies on the monetary transmission mechanism have focused on the bank 
lending (or credit) channel by taking into consideration the role of bank capital. Such studies 
analyze the response of bank lending to monetary policy - as well as to changes in economic 
conditions - for banks with different levels of capital (Bolton and Freixas, 2000; Ruby and 
Opiela, 2000; Emann et al., 2001; Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004; Van-den-Heuvel, 2006). 
Ruby and Opiela (2000) employ a sample of 13,042 banks in the US from 1980 to 1995. They 
focus on the equity to total assets ratio and form different groups of banks based on their 
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capital ratio - undercapitalized (ratio<8%), adequately capitalized (8% ≤ ratio <10%) and 
well-capitalized (ratio≥ 10%). The results show that the better banks are capitalized, the lower 
is the reaction of bank lending to monetary policy. Van-den-Heuvel (2006) also uses the same 
classification of banks to analyze the bank capital channel. By emphasizing capital market 
imperfections, he shows that monetary policy can effectively change the supply of bank loans 
through its impact on bank equity. For low-capitalized banks, the impact of monetary policy 
is delayed but the impact of monetary policy shocks on lending is larger than for well-
capitalized banks. In a theorical study of the monerary transmission mechanism Bolton and 
Freixas (2006) also argue that banks issue new equity only if the loan rate exceeds the cost of 
increasing equity. Ehrmann et al. (2001) analyze the bank lending channel in Europe (France, 
Germany, Italy and Spain) and do not find a significant influence of bank capital (the ratio of 
equity to total assets) on the response of bank lending to monetary policy, GDP and real 
prices. The results indicate that capitalisation does not play an important role in distinguishing 
banks' reactions. Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004), using a sample of Italian banks, analyze 
the effects of capital on banks’ response to various economic shocks. Their results indicate 
that bank capital influences the way banks react to GDP shocks. Bank capital matters in the 
propagation of different types of shocks to lending because of the presence of regulatory 
capital constraints and imperfections in the equity market.  
The monetary transmission mechanism in Vietnam is rarely studied. Le and Pfau 
(2009) and Nguyen (2012) analyze monetary transmission to the economy by using aggregate 
data. Another study, by Pham (2014), investigates the determinants of bank lending behavior 
in Vietnam by considering individual bank data. More specifically, Pham (2014) looks into 
both lending growth and deposit growth of 39 commercial banks in Vietnam during the 2008-
2012 period. His conclusion is that loan growth is determined by economic growth and the 
government bond rate. Moreover, equity growth has a critical effect on state-owned banks and 
the liquidity constraint is significant to explain loan supply in private banks in Vietnam. 
However, the role played by bank equity in the bank lending channel in Vietnam is not 
analyzed in his study.   
3.2 Methodology 
 
In line with Stephen and Glenn (1995), Kashyap and Stein (1994), Gambacorta and 
Mistrulli (2004); Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez (2011), Bolton and Freixas (2000), we 
design a framework to test whether banks with different capitalization react differently to 
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monetary policy and to GDP shocks. Whereas Stephen and Glenn (1995) consider that the 
monetary transmission mechanism is affected by bank debt and the monetary policy 
conducted in the previous period, other studies consider more macro environment variables 
and bank specific variables to examine the effect of monetary policy on the bank lending 
channel and the responses of bank lending to shocks on other factors. Moreover, as 
Berrospide and Edge (2010) and Peydró (2010), we incorporate the interaction of the capital 
ratio with the real price (inflation) and the business cycle. As in Ehrmann et al., (2001) and 
Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004), we consider the lagged value of the bank specific-variables 
to avoid an endogeneity bias. 
The empirical model is defined as followed: 
1 2 3 4 5 1
6 1 1 7 1 8 1 1 1* * *
it i it-1 t t t t
t t t t-1 t t j jit it
lgloan lgloan MP inflation gdp cap
cap MP cap inflation cap gdp X
     
    

     
        
     
 (Model A) 
with i=1,…,N (N=number of banks) and t=1,…,T (T= number of years) 
Δlgloanit= change in the natural logarithm of loans of bank i in year t 
MPt=monetary policy indicator. Previous studies use rates that are set by an authorized 
department (central banks). We employ the monthly base rate (or the prime rate) which is set 
by the Vietnamese State Bank. It is expected to have a negative effect on loan growth 
(Ehrmann et al., 2001, Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004). 
 gdpt= growth rate of the Gross Domestic Product.   
inflationt= inflation rate 
Inflation and the growth rate of GDP are used to control for loan demand effects. A rise in 
inflation can cause a higher bank lending rate, under the risk-averse hypothesis; banks will 
narrow down their loan growth to prevent losses. The loan growth should be negatively linked 
with the inflation rate and positively with the growth rate of GDP. 
capit= measure of capital of bank i at year t.  
Because of missing data, instead of using the capital adequacy ratios we consider the equity to 
total assets ratio. The Vietnamese central bank imposes equity to remain at a certain level if 
banks want to expand their credit services. Thus, the expected relationship with loan growth is 
positive. The capital indicator is normalized with respect to the average across all banks in the 
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sample in order to obtain a variable that sums to zero over all observations (Ehrmann et al., 
2001; Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004):  
1 1it it
it i
tit t it
equity equity
cap
Totalassets T N Totalassets
  
     
  
     (1) 
This leads to the averages of the interaction terms
1 1*t tcap MP  , 1 1*inflationt tcap    and 
1 1*t tcap gdp   to be equal to zero. The coefficients 2 , 3  and 4  will be interpretable as the 
average effects of monetary policy, inflation and GDP, respectively. We assume that the 
coefficients of the interaction terms are positive because banks with a larger capital ratio 
should react less strongly to a monetary policy change and inflation and more strongly to 
GDP shocks. 
Xjit= control variables of bank i at year t. The set of control variables includes a size indicator 
given by the log of total assets and a liquidity indicator defined as the ratio of liquid assets to 
total assets. Banks can use their liquidity as an internal temporary source to maintain their 
loans (Ruby and Opiela, 2000). Hence, the expected influence of bank liquidity on the bank 
lending channel is positive. For the same reason as for the capital indicator, the liquidity 
indicator is normalized with respect to its average across all banks in the sample. Size is 
normalized with respect to the mean of each single period to remove trends (if present) due to 
the fact that size is measured in nominal values.  
1
log logit it i it
t
size Totalassets Totalassets
N
       (2) 
1 1it it
it i
tit t it
liquidity liquidity
liq
TA T N TA
  
     
  
    (3) 
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Table 1 gives the description of the variables and the expected effects. 
Table 1: Variables and expected effects 
 
Variables Description Expected 
effects 
lgloan Log of loans  
cap Normalized ratio of equity to total assets + 
liq Normalized ratio of liquid assets to total assets + 
size Normalized log of total assets + 
Gdp Growth rate of Gross Domestic Product + 
inflation The inflation rate +or- 
MP The monetary policy rate- annual mean of the monthly prime 
rate 
- 
cap*MP Interaction term among cap variable and monetary policy + 
cap*gdp Interaction term among cap variable and gdp + 
cap*inflation Interaction term among cap variable and inflation + 
liq*MP Interaction term among liquidity and monetary policy + 
size*MP Interaction term among size and monetary policy + 
 
In addition, we add other specifications as introduced in Ehrmann et al. (2001). Bank 
size and bank liquidity are interacted with the monetary policy variable in order to allow for 
asymmetric responses of bank lending to monetary policy depending on these characteristics.  
With these interaction terms, we can test whether bank size and bank liquidity magnify the 
influence of monetary policy on bank lending.  
 
Model A can be re-written as follows (namely Model (B)): 
1 2 3 4 5 1
6 1 1 7 1 8 1 1 1 1 1* * * *
it i it-1 t t t t
t t t t-1 t t j jit j jit t it
lgloan lgloan MP inflation gdp cap
cap MP cap inflation cap gdp X X MP
     
     

       
        
       
 
where 
j  are the coefficients of the interaction terms of size and liquidity with the monetary 
policy variable. The interaction terms of the two bank specific variables (size and liquidity) 
are introduced separately in order to measure the effects of each variable on bank lending
28
. 
Following the literature, we assume that small or less liquid banks react more strongly to the 
monetary policy change than a bank with a high value of the respective bank characteristic. 
We thus expect positive coefficients on the interaction terms. 
  
                                                             
28
 See details in Ehrmann et al. (2001) and Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004).  
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The models are estimated using the GMM estimator by Arellano and Bover (1995) 
and Blundell and Bond (1998). The estimation procedure is the two-step system GMM with 
the Windmeijer (2005) correction for the standard errors. 
4. Data  
 
Our sample consists of 43 banks from 2000 to 2011. It accounts for 90% of the total 
assets of the Vietnamese banking industry. Individual bank data are collected from the bank 
annual reports and BankScope. The macro variables are from the World Bank Indicator 
database, the prime rate is the annual mean of monthly prime rates available on SBV’s 
website.    
Table 2a: Descriptive statistics 
 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
lgloan 8.712 1.706 4.843 12.949 
liquid2ta (%) 32.140 15.434 2.651 85.188 
equity2ta (%) 12.733 9.753 -0.699 67.803 
lgTA  9.372 1.698 1.658 13.19 
Gdp (%) 7.055 1.009 5.32 8.48 
Inflation (%) 8.665 6.731 -1.7 23.1 
Baserate (%) 8.326 1.266 7.091 11.682 
lgloan: log of loans, liquid2ta: ratio of liquid assets to total assets, equity2ta: ratio of equity to total assets, lgTA: 
log of total assets, gdp: the growth rate of Gross Domestic Product, inflation: inflation rate (or real price), 
baserate: the prime rate/monetary policy rate. 
 
Table 2b: Descriptive statistics of bank-specific variables over year 
 
Year Banks Statistics lgloan liquid2ta equity2ta lgTA 
2000 21 Mean 
Std. Dev. 
7.231 
1.663 
33.324 
21.985 
15.635 
15.625 
7.918 
1.606 
2001 22 Mean 
Std. Dev. 
7.437 
1.629 
34.879 
20.306 
13.035 
13.139 
8.091 
1.572 
2002 25 Mean 
Std. Dev. 
7.592 
1.585 
29.993 
17.017 
11.775 
9.931 
8.134 
1.557 
2003 25 Mean 
Std. Dev. 
7.930 
1.527 
30.603 
15.400 
9.548 
4.845 
8.455 
1.488 
2004 27 Mean 
Std. Dev. 
8.179 
1.460 
34.274 
16.667 
9.241 
4.738 
8.713 
1.405 
2005 29 Mean 
Std. Dev. 
8.325 
1.530 
34.258 
16.183 
10.625 
7.833 
8.876 
1.516 
2006 34 Mean 8.403 40.018 14.552 9.084 
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Std. Dev. 1.573 16.017 10.423 1.472 
2007 35 Mean 
Std. Dev. 
9.147 
1.323 
37.828 
16.403 
10.962 
4.101 
9.879 
1.194 
2008 38 Mean 
Std. Dev. 
9.125 
1.437 
29.960 
13.387 
16.096 
10.949 
9.825 
1.332 
2009 41 Mean 
Std. Dev. 
9.505 
1.306 
27.118 
11.189 
14.325 
11.111 
10.156 
1.282 
2010 38 Mean 
Std. Dev. 
9.817 
1.475 
27.253 
8.663 
13.233 
10.029 
10.567 
1.453 
2011 28 Mean 
Std. Dev. 
10.049 
1.493 
28.407 
9.234 
12.006 
8.039 
10.871 
1.525 
lgloan: log of loans, liquid2ta: ratio of liquid assets to total assets, equity2ta: ratio of equity to total assets, lgTA: 
log of total assets, gdp: the growth rate of Gross Domestic Product, inflation: inflation rate (or real price), 
baserate: the prime rate. 
 
Table 2a gives the descriptive statistics of the main bank specific variables. The mean 
value of the equity to total assets ratio is above 12% and the liquid assets ratio around 30%. 
There is one bank that presents a negative ratio of the ratio of equity to total assets. This 
bank's annual report indicates that it is a specialized state-owned bank serving the 
government’s poverty program mainly in the agricultural sector and rural areas. This bank 
endured severe losses in 2001 and 2002 and was bailed out by the government. 
 
The descriptive statistics of bank specific variables are also given by year in Table 2b. 
Because size exhibits a trend, the variable introduced in the regressions is normalized based 
on the formula introduced in the previous section (equation 2)). 
 
Table 3: Correlation matrix between bank specific variables and macroeconomic 
variables 
 
 lgloan  liq size cap MP  gdp inflation 
lgloan  1       
liq 0.114 1      
size -0.119 -0.131 1     
cap -0.028 0.099 -0.616 1    
MP  -0.208 0.035 0.018 -0.039 1   
gdp 0.223 0.235 -0.001 -0.135 0. 264 1  
inflation -0.214 -0.076 0.029 0.043 0.618 -0. 338 1 
lgloan : The loan growth, liq: ratio of liquid assets to total assets (normalized), size: log of total assets 
(normalized), cap: ratio of equity to total assets (normalized), MP : change of monetary policy/prime rate, 
gdp: growth rate of Gross Domestic Products, inflation: inflation rate/real price. 
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As mentioned above, to avoid endogeneity problems, we employ the lag of bank 
specific variables. Tables 3 present the correlation matrices of the variables introduced in the 
regressions29.  
5. Results 
 
5.1 Empirical results 
 
The baseline estimation is defined as in model A in the previous section and we also 
conduct additional estimations (namely Liquidity, Size, and Liquidity and Size  based on the 
model B) by adding interaction terms between monetary policy and liquidity or between 
monetary policy and size or between monetary policy and size and liquidity, respectively. The 
results are shown in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Responses of bank lending channel 
Model specification:  
Model A:
1 1 2 3 4 5 1 6 1 1
7 1 1 8 1 1 9 1 10 1
lgloan lgloan inflation *
*inflation *
it i it t t t t t t
t t t t it it it
MP gdp cap cap MP
cap cap gdp liq size
      
    
   
     
          
    
 
Model B  
1 2 3 4 5 1
6 1 1 7 1 8 1 1 1 1 1* * * *
it i it-1 t t t t
t t t t-1 t t j jit j jit t it
lgloan lgloan MP inflation gdp cap
cap MP cap inflation cap gdp X X MP
     
     

       
        
       
 
Variables Model A Model B  
  Liquidity Size Liquidity 
and Size 
L. lgloan   0.039 0.058 0.058 0.044 
 (0.034) (0.045) (0.050) (0.079) 
L.liq 0.011
***
 0.011
***
 0.010
***
 0.012
***
 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
L.size -0.138
***
 -0.129
***
 -0.153
***
 -0.120
*
 
 (0.039) (0.041) (0.022) (0.070) 
MP  -0.042
***
 -0.046
***
 -0.039
***
 -0.044
***
 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) 
gdp 0.083
***
 0.082
***
 0.079
***
 0.079
***
 
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) 
                                                             
29
 As shown in Table 3, some correlations between variables are above 50%- size with capitalization, and 
monetary policy with inflation. We drop size or inflation in the estimations as a robustness test to ensure that 
these correlations do not influence the main results (see section 5.2.). 
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inflation -0.004 -0.003 -0.006
*
 -0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
L.cap -0.066
***
 -0.062
***
 -0.068
***
 -0.062
***
 
 (0.019) (0.021) (0.024) (0.023) 
L.cap* MP  -0.144 -0.232
*
 -0.162 -0.261
*
 
 (0.112) (0.122) (0.112) (0.135) 
L.cap*gdp 101.840
***
 93.122
***
 106.258
***
 94.587
***
 
 (26.90) (29.57) (32.92) (34.34) 
L.cap*inflation 0.059 0.077 0.040 0.077
*
 
 (0.042) (0.049) (0.039) (0.046) 
L.liq* MP   0.084
***
  0.084
***
 
  (0.023)  (0.019) 
L.size* MP    -0.002 -0.002 
   (0.002) (0.003) 
Constant -0.110 -0.126 -0.065 -0.096 
 (0.118) (0.139) (0.129) (0.154) 
Sargan (2) 
p-value 
27.654 
0.995 
28.410 
0.994 
29.928 
0.989 
27.743 
0.995 
AR(1) (z-score) 
p-value 
-3.245 
0.001 
-2.714 
0.007 
-3.397 
0.001 
-2.460 
0.013 
AR(2) (z-score) 
p-value 
-1.083 
0.278 
-1.066 
0.286 
-0.965 
0.334 
-1.047 
0.295 
N 271 271 271 271 
1jitX  : represents liquidity or size or both liquidity and size, lgloan : the loan growth, liq: ratio of liquid 
assets to total assets (normalized), size: log of total assets (normalized), cap: ratio of equity to total assets 
(normalized), MP : change of monetary policy/prime rate, gdp: growth rate of Gross Domestic Product, 
inflation: inflation rate/real price. Sargan: the test of overidentifying restrictions, AR(#): autocorrelation tests in 
1 and 2 order, p-value in italics. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.1, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01. 
 
Consistent with earlier studies (Farinha and Robalo Marques, 2001, Gambacorta and 
Mistrulli, 2004, Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez, 2011, Ehrmann et al., 2001, Chatelain, 
Ehrmann et al., 2001), the results reflect a monetary policy tightening negatively impacts loan 
supply. A tighter monetary policy reduces banks’ financial sources for lending grants and 
banks need to narrow down their loan growth rate due to an increase in funding cost. With a 
limitation of funding sources, Vietnamese banks mostly depend on the interbank market and 
the primary market for their funding. If the monetary policy changes, banks ought to use their 
internal financial sources- liquidity or bank capitalization (equity) to maintain their 
operations. At the macro level, it also reflects that the central bank can use the interest rate 
instrument to drive the economy periodically via the lending channel. For example, if the 
credit expansion is too high due to the low interest rate or due to the high consumption, a 
tightening policy can be implemented to cool down the economy and reduce the risk-taking of 
banks. Although there are some insignificant estimated coefficients of the interaction between 
capitalization and monetary policy ( *cap MP ), when it is significant the signs are negative- 
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contrary to the expected sign. It suggests that lending might react more importantly to 
monetary changes for banks with a higher level of capitalization.   
In the additional estimations, the interaction term between monetary policy and size is 
not significant, as in Ehrmann et al (2001) size is not a useful indicator for the bank lending 
channel. For the interaction term between monetary policy and liquidity ( liq* MP ), the 
results indicate that banks with higher level of liquidity can shield their loan portfolio better 
than banks with a lower level of liquidity. It can be stated that lending activities of banks with 
higher liquidity ratios are less affected by a tighter monetary policy; this is consistent with 
standard results in the monetary transmission channel literature.   
The positive coefficient of gdp shows that an increase in GDP leads banks to extend 
their loans as it produces a loan demand shift. Vietnam has reformed and boosted its economy 
from 2000 with GDP growth of around 6-7% per year; and as mentioned in the first section of 
this chapter, private enterprises have low capitalization and mostly need more financial 
sources to expand their business. Consequently, banks have benefited from such trends. 
Another macro variable, inflation, shows an insignificant coefficient. The results show a high 
and stable positive coefficient of the interaction term cap* gdp . This reflects that the credit 
supply of banks with lower capitalization is less influenced by the economic shock, while the 
interaction term between capitalization and the real price ( *inflationcap ) is not significant in 
all estimations. 
In terms of bank specific variables, the results obtained for the size and capitalization (
cap ) variables are not the expected ones as the coefficients are negative. These unexpected 
results are not due to correlation issues. Indeed, if we drop the size (capitalization) variable, 
capitalization (size) is still negatively and significantly related to loan growth (section 5.2.). 
There is one reason which can explain the negative impact of size on lending growth in 
Vietnam:  the loan supply is the most important part of the activity of small banks whereas 
bigger banks can diversify their operations and bank services.  It probably explains the 
negative effect of size on bank lending. For capitalization, as mentioned above, banks with a 
higher capital ratio are more influenced by monetary policy in Vietnam, but the loan growth 
seems to be higher for banks with a lower capital ratio. As mentioned in the preceding 
section, capitalization (cap ) reflects the intensity of prudential regulation and reduces risk-
taking incentives of banks’ executives. In Vietnam, banks have to firmly fulfill their statutory 
capital as scheduled by the government and they do not have much external funding sources. 
Banks increase their capital via retained profits and via new issuance of shares. But in the 
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meantime, under the context of risk-aversion, they need to shield their capital by preventing 
riskier loans. Banks increase their capitalization but loan growth is reduced; there is a 
negative effect of cap  on bank lending. Besides, in Vietnam, the stock market is young and 
unstable and has fluctuated dramatically over the 2005-2008 period. Banks have difficulties to 
access foreign credit that is restricted under bank regulations. In this context, banks’ 
shareholders are careful to protect themselves with low risk loan portfolio.  
Concerning liquidity (liq), its effect is as expected and it implies that banks can use 
liquidity to maintain their loan portfolio. Banks use liquidity as an internal source after a 
monetary policy tightening.  
 
  In conclusion, bank lending negatively responds to a monetary change and banks 
with higher capital ratios might be more influenced by monetary changes than banks with 
lower capital ratios. Also, economic shocks are identified as important determinants of bank 
loan responses but banks with lower capitalization are less influenced by the business cycle. 
As bank specific variables, liquidity plays an important role as an internal funding tool to 
maintain bank lending when there is a monetary policy tightening. Capital regulation is 
necessary to avoid excessive risk-taking but higher capitalization has a negative influence on 
bank loan growth.  
5.2 Further issues and robustness analysis 
 
In this section, we perform several robustness tests to check the stability of our results 
and investigate further issues. 
In the first robustness analysis, due to the presence of correlations among cap and size 
and among MP  and inflation, we run different regressions in which we exclude size or 
inflation or both size and inflation to see whether these correlations can generate unstable 
results for the response of bank lending channel to monetary policy and bank capitalization. 
Results are presented in table 5 in which column (1) and (4) exclude size and inflation, 
column (2) and (5) drop size and column (3) and (6) exclude inflation. We obtain similar 
results. Monetary policy tightening leads to a reduction in loan growth, the interaction term 
between capitalization and monetary policy is negative and significant from column (3) to (6), 
and the interaction between liquidity and monetary policy still shows a positive effect.  There 
is a change for the inflation variable which becomes significant at the highest critical value 
(1%) in columns (2) and (5) while it is not significant or only at 10% in our main analysis. 
The lagged dependent variable becomes also significant in four columns. 
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Table 5: Response of banking lending channel after dropping size or inflation or both 
variables 
Model specification:  
Model A:  
1 1 2 3 4 5 1 6 1 1
7 1 1 8 1 1 9 1 10 1
lgloan lgloan inflation *
*inflation *
it i it t t t t t t
t t t t it it it
MP gdp cap cap MP
cap cap gdp liq size
      
    
   
     
          
    
 
Model B     
 
1 2 3 4 5 1 6 1 1
7 1 8 1 1 1 1 1
*
* * *
it i it-1 t t t t t t
t t-1 t t j jit j jit t it
lgloan lgloan MP inflation gdp cap cap MP
cap inflation cap gdp X X MP
      
    
  
     
          
     
 
Variables Model A Model B 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
L. lgloan   0.135
***
 0.111
***
 0.080
***
 0.159
***
 0.029 0.079 
 (0.033) (0.038) (0.018) (0.041) (0.060) (0.048) 
L.liq 0.006
***
 0.008
***
 0.009
***
 0.007
***
 0.014
***
 0.009
***
 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
L.size   -0.155
***
   -0.153
***
 
   (0.032)   (0.024) 
MP  -0.058
***
 -0.042
***
 -0.052
***
 -0.062
***
 -0.035
***
 -0.053
***
 
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004) (0.007) (0.003) 
gdp 0.117
***
 0.087
***
 0.096
***
 0.113
***
 0.070
***
 0.098
***
 
 (0.005) (0.014) (0.006) (0.008) (0.015) (0.006) 
inflation  -0.007
***
   -0.009
***
  
  (0.002)   (0.002)  
L.cap -0.060
***
 -0.036
**
 -0.067
***
 -0.055
***
 -0.050
**
 -0.055
***
 
 (0.013) (0.016) (0.014) (0.016) (0.021) (0.016) 
L.cap* MP  -0.054 -0.046 -0.037
*
 -0.088
*
 -0.200
*
 -0.071
***
 
 (0.045) (0.089) (0.019) (0.047) (0.119) (0.025) 
L.cap*gdp 105.836
***
 70.859
***
 106.091
***
 98.669
***
 89.224
***
 92.575
***
 
 (19.74) (21.38) (18.70) (24.14) (26.27) (21.13) 
L.cap*inflation  -0.005   0.043  
  (0.039)   (0.041)  
L.liq* MP     0.088
***
 0.077
***
 0.077
***
 
    (0.015) (0.016) (0.020) 
Constant -0.440
***
 -0.173 -0.245
***
 -0.422
***
 0.012 -0.285
***
 
 (0.038) (0.114) (0.048) (0.053) (0.142) (0.046) 
Sargan (2) 32.565 30.062 31.075 31.712 25.092 31.130 
 0.979 0.991 0.983 0.984 0.999 0.983 
AR(1) (z-score) -3.555 -3.514 -3.273 -3.455 -3.185 -3.206 
 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 
AR(2) (z-score) -0.599 -0.631 -1.142 -0.661 -0.751 -1.148 
 0.549 0.528 0.253 0.509 0.452 0.251 
N 271 271 271 271 271 271 
In the first column of each model (column (1) and (4)), we drop both size and inflation variables. (2) and (5) are 
estimated without the size variable. The inflation variable is not included in (3) and (6).
1jitX  : represents 
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liquidity or size or both liquidity and size, lgloan : the loan growth, liq: ratio of liquid assets to total assets 
(normalized), size: log of total assets (normalized), cap: ratio of equity to total assets (normalized),, MP : 
change of monetary policy/prime rate, gdp: growth rate of Gross Domestic Products, inflation: inflation rate/real 
price. Sargan: the test of overidentifying restrictions, AR(#): autocorrelation tests in 1 and 2 order, p-value in 
italics. Standard errors in parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.1, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01. 
 
Second, as the lagged dependent variable is not significant in the main analysis, we 
drop this variable from the model in the table 6. Results are consistent with those previously 
obtained in the main analysis.   
 
Table 6: Response of the bank lending channel without the presence of the previous 
growth rate of loans as independent variable 
Model specification:  
Model A: 
1 2 3 4 1 5 1 1
6 1 1 7 1 1 8 1 9 1
lgloan inflation *
*inflation *
it i t t t t t t
t t t t it it it
MP gdp cap cap MP
cap cap gdp liq size
     
    
  
     
        
    
 
 
Model B: 
1 2 3 4 1
5 1 1 6 1 7 1 1 1 1 1* * * *
it i t t t t
t t t t-1 t t j jit j jit t it
lgloan MP inflation gdp cap
cap MP cap inflation cap gdp X X MP
    
     

       
      
       
 
 
Variables Model A Model B  
  Liquidity Size Liquidity 
and size 
L.liq 0.012
***
 0.011
***
 0.010
***
 0.011
***
 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
L.size -0.130
***
 -0.133
***
 -0.160
***
 -0.160
***
 
 (0.033) (0.044) (0.050) (0.031) 
MP  -0.035
***
 -0.043
***
 -0.041
***
 -0.039
***
 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) 
gdp 0.072
***
 0.085
***
 0.087
***
 0.072
***
 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.017) 
inflation -0.006
*
 -0.003 -0.004 -0.005
*
 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
L.cap -0.051
***
 -0.066
***
 -0.052
***
 -0.052
***
 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.014) 
L.cap* MP  -0.109 -0.185 -0.065 -0.170 
 (0.115) (0.125) (0.099) (0.108) 
L.cap*gdp 78.707
***
 104.557
***
 84.869
***
 83.536
***
 
 (18.12) (18.71) (27.30) (18.97) 
L.cap*inflation 0.046 0.051 0.017 0.033 
 (0.049) (0.052) (0.035) (0.039) 
L.liq* MP   0.078
***
  0.064
***
 
  (0.019)  (0.017) 
L.size* MP    -0.001 -0.003 
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   (0.002) (0.002) 
Constant -0.000 -0.128 -0.125 -0.049 
 (0.128) (0.121) (0.109) (0.143) 
Sargan (2) 28.624 30.190 31.037 29.359 
p-value 0.995 0.991 0.987 0.993 
AR(1) (z-score) -2.999 -2.943 -2.940 -2.945 
p-value 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
AR(2) (z-score) -1.221 -1.216 -1.334 -1.206 
p-value 0.222 0.223 0.182 0.227 
N 271 271 271 271 
1jitX  : represents liquidity or size or both liquidity and size, lgloan : the loan growth, liq: ratio of liquid 
assets to total assets (normalized), size: log of total assets (normalized), cap: ratio of equity to total assets 
(normalized),  MP : change of monetary policy/prime rate, gdp: growth rate of Gross Domestic Product, 
inflation: inflation rate/real price. Sargan: the test of overidentifying restrictions, AR(#): autocorrelation tests in 
1 and 2 order, p-value in italics. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.1, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01.  
Next, following Ehrmann et al. (2001), we add a new interaction term of monetary 
policy, liquidity and size (liq*size*MP). This extended estimation is run to analyze whether 
the effect of liquidity depends on bank size (and vice-versa) when monetary policy changes. 
The table 8 presents results of these extended estimations. The lagged dependent variable has 
a positive effect on bank lending and the added term liq*size*MP is not significant for all 
the estimations but when it is significant, the coefficient is negative which is consistent with 
Ehrmann et al. (2001)’s results for Germany. The result indicates that the effect of liquidity 
depends on bank size; it is stronger for smaller banks. 
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Table 7: Robustness analysis of the response of the bank lending channel with the 
interaction term of the monetary policy, liquidity and size. 
Model specification:  
Model A: 
1 2 3 4 1 5 1 1
6 1 1 7 1 1 8 1 9 1 1 1 1
lgloan inflation *
*inflation * *size *
it i t t t t t t
t t t t it it it t t it
MP gdp cap cap MP
cap cap gdp liq size liq MP
     
     
  
        
        
      
 
Model B: 
1 2 3 4 1 5 1 1
6 1 7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
*
* * *size * *
it i t t t t t t
t t-1 t t it t t j jit j jit t it
lgloan MP inflation gdp cap cap MP
cap inflation cap gdp liq MP X X MP
     
     
  
        
        
       
 
Variables Model A Model B  
  Liquidity Size Liquidity 
and size 
L. lgloan   0.085
***
 0.110
***
 0.119
***
 0.132
***
 
 (0.021) (0.033) (0.023) (0.028) 
L.liq 0.011
***
 0.009
***
 0.008
***
 0.008
***
 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
L.size -0.092
**
 -0.094
*
 -0.119
***
 -0.107
**
 
 (0.043) (0.049) (0.029) (0.042) 
MP  -0.042
***
 -0.057
***
 -0.053
***
 -0.055
***
 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) 
gdp 0.078
***
 0.100
***
 0.100
***
 0.093
***
 
 (0.015) (0.0146) (0.019) (0.014) 
inflation -0.004 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
L.cap -0.053
***
 -0.038
**
 -0.034
*
 -0.028 
 (0.019) (0.018) (0.020) (0.029) 
L.cap* MP  -0.018 -0.014 -0.015 0.029 
 (0.111) (0.116) (0.109) (0.178) 
L.cap*gdp 89.776
***
 71.860
***
 65.048
**
 64.659
*
 
 (28.30) (25.25) (31.47) (37.81) 
L.cap*inflation 0.010 0.003 -0.009 -0.054 
 (0.0414) (0.045) (0.030) (0.073) 
L.liq* MP   0.093
***
  0.084
***
 
  (0.026)  (0.019) 
L.size* MP    -0.006 -0.005
*
 
   (0.004) (0.002) 
L.liq*size* MP  -4*10
-4
 -2*10
-4**
 -4*10
-4**
 -6*10
-4*
 
 (2*10
-4
) (1*10
-4
) (2*10
-4
) (2*10
-4
) 
Constant -0.111 -0.323
***
 -0.319
**
 -0.282
***
 
 (0.127) (0.112) (0.162) (0.105) 
Sargan (2) 28.563 30.131 29.335 28.899 
p-value 0.995 0.991 0.993 0.994 
AR(1) (z-score) -3.368 -3.245 -3.442 -3.311 
p-value 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 
AR(2) (z-score) -1.040 -1.083 -1.009 -1.043 
p-value 0.298 0.278 0.312 0.297 
N 271 271 271 271 
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1jitX  : represents liquidity or size or both liquidity and size, lgloan : the loan growth, liq: ratio of liquid 
assets to total assets (normalized), size: log of total assets (normalized), cap: ratio of equity to total assets 
(normalized), MP : change of monetary policy/prime rate, gdp: growth rate of Gross Domestic Product, 
inflation: inflation rate/real price. 
1itZ  : denotes the interaction term of liquidity and size. Sargan: the test of 
overidentifying restrictions, AR(#): autocorrelation tests in 1 and 2 order, p-value in italics. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.1, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01. 
 
We also follow Ehrmann et al. (2001) and add the interaction terms between liquidity 
or between size and gdp or inflation. Table 8 illustrates these further estimations. 
 
Table 8: Response of the bank lending channel with the liquidity and size variables 
interacted with the GDP and inflation 
 
 
Model specification:  
1 1 2 3 4 5 1 6 1 1
7 1 1 8 1 1 9 1 10 1 14 1 1 15 1 1
16 1
lgloan lgloan inflation *
*inflation * * *inflation
*
it i it t t t t t t
t t t t it it it t it t
it t
MP gdp cap cap MP
cap cap gdp liq size size MP size
size gdp
      
     

   
         
 
          
      
 1 it
1 1 2 3 4 5 1 6 1 1
7 1 1 8 1 1 9 1 10 1 11 1 1 12 1 1
13 1 1
lgloan lgloan inflation *
*inflation * * *inflation
*
it i it t t t t t t
t t t t it it it t it t
it t
MP gdp cap cap MP
cap cap gdp liq size liq MP liq
liq gdp
      
     
 
   
         
 
          
      
  it
 
Variables Size Liquidity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
L. lgloan   0.004 0.094
*
 0.111
***
 0.144
***
 
 (0.064) (0.050) (0.032) (0.035) 
L.liq 0.011
***
 0.011
***
 0.073
**
 0.073
***
 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.023) (0.023) 
L.size -0.080 -0.189 -0.095
*
 -0.143
***
 
 (0.239) (0.208) (0.050) (0.055) 
MP  -0.039
***
 -0.045
***
 -0.051
***
 -0.046
***
 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
gdp 0.083
***
 0.100
***
 0.089
***
 0.085
***
 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.019) (0.017) 
inflation -0.004 -0.006
*
 -0.001 -0.006
*
 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
L.cap -0.069
***
 -0.060
**
 -0.054 -0.043 
 (0.026) (0.025) (0.034) (0.027) 
L.cap* MP  -0.104 -0.016 -0.203 -0.121 
 (0.141) (0.130) (0.179) (0.127) 
L.cap*gdp 109.567
***
 98.915
***
 87.416
**
 78.654
**
 
 (36.65) (36.78) (41.75) (39.05) 
L.cap*inflation 0.027 -0.011 0.050 0.017 
 (0.048) (0.056) (0.076) (0.054) 
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L.liq* MP    0.338
**
 0.280
*
 
   (0.133) (0.143) 
L.liq*gdp   -0.008
***
 -0.008
***
 
   (0.002) (0.002) 
L.liq*inflation   -0.090
*
 -0.072 
   (0.047) (0.052) 
L.size* MP  0.012 0.012
*
   
 (0.009) (0.006)   
L.size*gdp -0.006 0.000   
 (0.028) (0.026)   
L.size*inflation -0.007 -0.006
*
   
 (0.004) (0.003)   
Constant -0.070 -47.360
***
 -0.202 -37.721
***
 
 (0.137) (15.30) (0.161) (11.01) 
Sargan (2) 29.308 29.746 29.638 26.425 
p-value 0.991 0.989 0.990 0.997 
AR(1) (z-score) -2.641 -3.009 -3.501 -3.502 
p-value 0.008 0.002 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) (z-score) -1.159 -0.896 -0.951 -0.702 
p-value 0.246 0.370 0.342 0.483 
YEAR DUMMY NO YES NO YES 
N 271 271 271 271 
The model is estimated based on the model B. In the columns (2) and (4) the year dummies are added.
1jitX  : represents liquidity or size or both liquidity and size, lgloan : the loan growth, liq: ratio of liquid 
assets to total assets (normalized), size: log of total assets (normalized), cap: ratio of equity to total assets 
(normalized), MP : change of monetary policy/prime rate, gdp: growth rate of Gross Domestic Product, 
inflation: inflation rate/real price. Sargan: the test of overidentifying restrictions, AR(#): autocorrelation tests in 
1 and 2 order, p-value in italics. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.1, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01. 
 
The results for the main variables do not change, although the estimated coefficients 
of size and capitalization are not significant in two estimations, but their signs remain as 
previously. The new terms are not significant in all estimations- except liq*gdp which has a 
negative and highly significant effect on bank lending. The significant coefficient of liq*gdp 
indicates that banks with higher ratios are less influenced by the business cycle. 
 
Then, under the context of the government’s umbrella for state-owned banks, we 
generate a dummy variable (state) that takes into account the government’s shares in 
Vietnamese banks. It captures whether banks with state ownership are better off in terms of 
loan supply. The dummy state gets 1 if the government holds more than 50% of bank shares 
and zero otherwise. The results are shown in table 9. 
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Table 9: Response of the bank lending channel taking into account the presence of state 
ownership 
Model specification:  
Model A: 
1 1 2 3 4 5 1 6 1 1
7 1 1 8 1 1 9 1 10 1
lgloan lgloan inflation *
*inflation *
it i it t t t t t t
t t t t it it i it
MP gdp cap cap MP
cap cap gdp liq size state
      
     
   
     
          
     
 
Model B: 
1 2 3 4 5 1
6 1 1 7 1 8 1 1 1 1 1* * * *
it i it-1 t t t t
t t t t-1 t t j jit j jit t i it
lgloan lgloan MP inflation gdp cap
cap MP cap inflation cap gdp X X MP state
     
      

       
        
        
 
Variables Model A Model B 
  Size Liquidity Size and 
Liquidity 
L. lgloan   0.005 0.023 -0.028 0.012 
 (0.061) (0.041) (0.058) (0.048) 
L.liq 0.011
***
 0.012
***
 0.013
***
 0.013
***
 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) 
L.size -0.148
***
 -0.069 -0.140
**
 -0.074 
 (0.044) (0.056) (0.054) (0.050) 
State -0.388
*
 -0.548
*
 -0.344 -0.712
***
 
 (0.202) (0.299) (0.257) (0.237) 
MP  -0.040
***
 -0.039
***
 -0.031
***
 -0.036
***
 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.010) (0.006) 
gdp 0.092
***
 0.085
***
 0.078
***
 0.073
***
 
 (0.019) (0.014) (0.022) (0.015) 
inflation -0.005 -0.005 -0.008
**
 -0.008
**
 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
L.cap -0.054
**
 -0.047
**
 -0.051
**
 -0.045
**
 
 (0.017) (0.021) (0.025) (0.021) 
L.cap* MP  -0.110 -0.161 -0.150 -0.225 
 (0.115) (0.120) (0.141) (0.146) 
L.cap*gdp 84.944
***
 80.066
***
 80.262
**
 73.425
**
 
 (23.89) (27.44) (32.52) (28.54) 
L.cap*inflation 0.040 0.039 0.057 0.055 
 (0.046) (0.052) (0.063) (0.058) 
L.liq* MP   0.072
***
  0.062
***
 
  (0.026)  (0.022) 
L.size* MP    -0.001 -0.002 
   (0.002) (0.002) 
Constant -0.105 -0.055 0.055 0.053 
 (0.182) (0.127) (0.199) (0.133) 
Sargan (2) 27.470 28.625 28.459 26.710 
p-value 0.994 0.991 0.992 0.996 
AR(1) (z-score) -2.478 -2.847 -2.612 -2.852 
p-value 0.013 0.004 0.009 0.004 
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AR(2) (z-score) -1.216 -1.061 -1.255 -0.975 
p-value 0.224 0.288 0.209 0.329 
N 271 271 271 271 
1jitX  : represents liquidity or size or both liquidity and size, lgloan : the loan growth, liq: ratio of liquid 
assets to total assets (normalized), size: log of total assets (normalized), cap: ratio of equity to total assets 
(normalized), MP : change of monetary policy/prime rate, gdp: growth rate of Gross Domestic Product, 
inflation: inflation rate/real price. State: dummy variable that takes the value of one for banks in which the state 
holds at least 50% of shares. Sargan: the test of overidentifying restrictions, AR(#): autocorrelation tests in 1 and 
2 order, p-value in italics. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.1, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01. 
 
The results show for the main variables do not change and state is significant in three 
out of four estimations and the sign of its coefficient is negative. This can reflect the fact that 
the state-owned banks have lower loan growth due to a high competition with other types of 
banks.  
6. Conclusion 
 
This study focuses on the bank lending channel in Vietnam and the response of banks 
to capitalization/equity shocks under imperfect markets of debts and bank equity. There is a 
link between bank lending channel to the development of the private sector and the 
Vietnamese economy. Indeed, the development of the private sector contribute a certain 
development to Vietnam, the private firms/entrerprises are small and medium sizes, their 
demand for capital are large, but the markets of debts and equity are imperfect and those 
firms/enterprises cannot develop and the economy can be hearted thus banks are risky when 
they cannot fulfill their capital requirement for the loan growth and cannot prevent in an 
uncertain condition of the capital market. The results show that monetary policy is effective in 
influencing bank lending.  Monetary policy is taken into account through the prime rate and 
negatively affects loan growth when there is any tightening policy. Besides, the bank lending 
channel is influenced not only by monetary policy but also by economic shocks. 
Under the context of young markets, the Vietnamese banking market remains less 
developed while the reforms in 2000’s firmly require banks to improve their capacities as well 
as their risk management. These reforms have given more challenges for banks since they 
have little experience and financial sources are limited. Capitalization is a necessary indicator 
to measure banks’ health and to reduce bank executives’ risk-taking incentives. Indeed, highly 
capitalized banks attempt to prevent riskier loans and reduce their loan growth. In line with 
earlier studies, liquidity appears as an important internal financial source to maintain bank 
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lending and it seems to be an important factor to maintain banks’ credit supply when there is a 
monetary policy tightening. 
The state-owned banks received supports from the government and have been defined 
as key-players in the Vietnamese banking market, but they lost their monopoly power due to a 
highly competitive market with new established banks and the entrance of foreign banks after 
the government lifted barriers to foreign banks and their branches from 2006. Consequently, 
state-owned banks have lower loan growth. 
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In the context of the economic development and the opening to foreign investors of 
specific sectors which were been protected by the government, the analysis of the banking 
industry in Vietnam is of particular interest. The banking system has some weaknesses and 
needs to be improved with time; there is a need to focus on bank efficiency and on 
implementing more reforms and restructuring programs to strengthen bank capacities. These 
are the main motivations of this dissertation. In this chapter, we provide the overall 
conclusions, implications of each finding, remarks and limitations of the dissertation.  
At first, by studying the efficiency of domestic commercial banks in Vietnam, we 
show that ownership has a significant effect on bank efficiency, the presence of foreign 
investors or shareholders can be an opportunity for banks to gain experience from those 
investors or shareholders to improve their efficiency. Besides, foreign investors can also 
contribute to improving bank capital standards. The results indicate that state-owned banks 
are the less efficient banks, although their efficiency has improved over time to close the gap 
with private banks and banks with foreign shareholders. It implies that the privatization 
process is probably a motivation for state-owned banks to improve efficiency. Turning to the 
effects of the economic reforms on bank efficiency, banks did not benefit from the high 
economic growth rate over 2002-2005 due to their inefficient customers- small and medium 
enterprises and state-owned enterprises; or because they provided credits to some State 
programs. But over the period 2006-2009- the period of reforms, banks paid more attention to 
develop their infrastructures or new technology to improve their banking products and to 
compete with other banks. Consequently, banks benefited more from economic development. 
To have more incentives to improve bank efficiency and to make a transparent banking 
market in Vietnam, the support of the government should be reduced as well as their shares in 
the private banks and it might be argued that state-owned banks should be fully privatized. 
Turning to the bank regulations, banks can have more freedom to access foreign capital 
sources for their development and the regulations should be more focused on the enhancement 
of bank transparency and performance. The positive relationship found between bank capital 
and efficiency suggests that bank regulation should meet international capital standards to 
strengthen bank efficiency. 
In the second chapter, we discuss the determinants of bank interest margins taking into 
account bank ownership type and the role played by the central bank in monitoring bank 
interest rates. In this chapter, we find that banks follow different strategies in their 
intermediation role. Private and state-owned banks attempt to transfer their operational costs 
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and extend their gap of interest rates to prevent losses while foreign banks have larger gaps if 
the reserve ratio is higher in absence of the interest rate regulation. It implies that banks have 
more power than their customers to negotiate interest rates. To balance the relationship 
between banks and customers, the central bank plays an important role and it should monitor 
the interest rates and fees applied to customers strictly. Besides, prudential regulation needs to 
focus on each tier of capital, liquidity and non-performing loans to reduce excessive risk-
taking of bank executives in absence of the central bank’s intervention on the interest rates. 
In the last chapter, we analyze the bank lending channel and the response of banks to 
capitalization/equity shocks under imperfect market of debts and bank equity. More precisely, 
the bank lending channel is affected negatively by a tighter monetary policy and it also 
indicates that bank capital is a necessary factor to prevent excessive risk taking of banks’ 
executives; banks with higher capital ratios attempt to reduce the riskier loans. Besides, 
liquidity is an internal financial source for banks if the central bank has a tighter monetary 
policy, it can be viewed as a shield for banks to maintain their loan portfolio in presence of a 
tighter policy. Interestingly, state-owned banks receive more support from the government 
and are key-players in the banking market, but their loan growth is reduced after the new 
banks have established and the entrance of foreign bank has been more easier from 2006. A 
possible explanation is that such banks progressively lose their monopoly power due to an 
increasingly competitive market with new established banks and the entrance of foreign 
banks. Since bank loans are important for the economy and the private sector, the central bank 
needs to closely observe banks’ loan growth. Besides, capital regulation could be adapted to 
comply with international standards. This should not only prevent excessive risk-taking of 
banks, but it could also be a necessary condition to enable Vietnamese banks to access foreign 
capital markets in case of insufficient capital sources on the domestic market. Moreover, the 
bank liquidity ratio should be strictly regulated to avoid liquidity problems that could 
destabilize the banking system. 
To sum up, ownership structure, bank capital and bank regulation are recognized as 
the key components to explain bank performance in Vietnam. To improve banks’ capacities 
and performances as well as to maintain the stability of the banking system, the government 
and the central bank should reduce their shares in state-owned banks as well as in private 
banks. It is not only to make banks more independent but also to have a transparent market. 
Concerning bank capital, the central bank should allow banks to access foreign capital for 
their development and hence promote foreign shareholdings. In terms of regulations, 
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regulators can refer to international standards for the domestic banking system i.e. the Basel 
Accords. That will allow the market to be more stable with more stable and efficient banks if 
they can fulfill those requirements. 
This dissertation cannot cover all aspects of the banking system in Vietnam due to 
missing data, therefore it could contain some limitations. For example, in the first chapter, we 
cannot collect the number of employees of each bank which can be a bias for state-owned 
banks which have low wages and a very large number of employees due to a complex 
organization structure and such banks are  very large compared to their competitors.  
Obviously, the price of labor cannot capture correctly the overhead expenses of each bank. In 
the second chapter, banks have not recorded their non-performing loans fully In the third 
chapter, the prime rate has been abandoned since 2011 and the central bank employs open 
market operations (OMO) to partially replace the prime rate. Future studies could usefully 
compare how these two monetary policy instruments operate in the money transmission 
mechanism. 
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Abstract 
This dissertation is composed of three chapters. The first chapter analyzes the impact of 
ownership structure and the reforms implemented in the mid 2000's on the efficiency of 
commercial banks in Vietnam. The results show that the efficiency differs depending on 
ownership type; state-owned banks have the lowest efficiency levels in comparison with 
private banks and banks with foreign shareholders. Since the implementation of more 
stringent minimum capital rules, bank capitalization has also been an important driver of bank 
efficiency. The second chapter discusses how banks in Vietnam set their interest margins with 
a particular focus on bank ownership and interest rate regulation by the central bank. The 
results show that only private and state-owned banks transfer their operational costs to their 
clients. Bank capitalization which reflects bank risk aversion is a significant determinant for 
foreign and state owned banks only in presence of interest rate regulation; these banks tend to 
pass the high capital cost to customers. We also show that, in absence of interest rate control, 
foreign banks set higher margins when they take higher credit risk while in presence of 
interest rate regulation private banks cope with higher credit risk without being able to raise 
their margin accordingly. The last chapter investigates the impact of monetary policy and 
economic conditions on bank lending for different levels of bank capitalization. The results 
indicate that all types of monetary policy shocks have a negative effect on lending but that an 
increase in bank liquidity leads to a lower reduction in loan growth. Finally, banks with lower 
capitalization are less influenced by the business cycle.  
Keywords: Efficiency, ownership structure, interest rate regulation, transition economies, 
bank lending, bank capital, monetary transmission 
 
Résumé 
Cette thèse se compose de trois chapitres. Le premier chapitre analyse l'impact de la structure 
actionnariale et des réformes mises en œuvre dans les années 2000 sur l'efficacité des banques 
commerciales au Vietnam. Les résultats montrent que l'efficacité diffère selon le type de 
structure actionnariale ; les banques d'État ont des niveaux d'efficacité plus bas en 
comparaison avec les banques privées et les banques avec des actionnaires étrangers. Depuis 
la mise en œuvre de règles minimales de fonds propres plus strictes, la capitalisation des 
banques a également été un moteur important de l'efficacité de la banque. Le deuxième 
chapitre traite de la façon dont les banques au Vietnam fixent leurs marges d'intérêt avec un 
accent particulier sur la structure actionnariale des banques et la réglementation des taux 
d'intérêt par la banque centrale. Les résultats montrent que seules les banques privées et 
publiques transfèrent leurs coûts opérationnels à leurs clients. La capitalisation bancaire qui 
reflète l'aversion au risque des banques est un déterminant significatif pour les banques 
étrangères et d'Etat uniquement en cas de réglementation des taux d'intérêt; ces banques ont 
tendance à répercuter le coût élevé du capital sur les clients. Nous montrons aussi que, en 
l'absence de contrôle des taux d'intérêt, les banques étrangères fixent des marges plus élevées 
quand elles prennent un risque de crédit plus élevé alors qu'en présence de la réglementation 
des taux d'intérêt les banques privées font face à un risque de crédit plus élevé sans pouvoir 
augmenter leur marge en conséquence. Le dernier chapitre étudie l'impact de la politique 
monétaire et des conditions économiques sur les prêts bancaires pour les différents niveaux de 
capitalisation des banques. Les résultats indiquent que tous les types de chocs de politique 
monétaire ont un effet négatif sur les prêts, mais que l'augmentation de la liquidité bancaire 
conduit à une réduction plus faible de la croissance des prêts. Enfin, les banques dont la 
capitalisation est plus faible sont moins influencées par le cycle économique. 
Mots clés : efficience, structure actionnariale, réglementation des taux d'intérêt, économies 
en transition, prêts bancaires, capital, transmission de la politique monétaire. 
